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My thesis attempts to provide a new account of the opening transitions of Hegel's 
Phenomenology' of  Spirit (i.e. the transitions of sections A.-C.(AA.)) as the basis for a 
critical assessment of that work.
My account is motivated by two interpretative difficulties that often prove divisive for 
commentators. First, the difficulty of how we are to understand the transition from 
section 'A. Consciousness' to section 'B. Self-Consciousness'; and second, the 
difficulty of precisely what Hegel means by identifying Kantian Idealism as the "same 
kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as Scepticism" (PS 238. p. 144). albeit a positive 
rather than a negative expression of this ambiguity, in section C.(AA.). I argue that 
these two difficulties are related, insofar as Hegel's reaction to Scepticism informs his 
critique of Kant, w hich in turn affects the conception that Hegel has of his own 
project in the Phenomenology and of the manner in w hich it is to be structured.
I contend that, for Hegel, a key problem to be addressed is the failure of previous 
philosophical positions to investigate the general form of judgement (the 
subject/predicate relation) in a sufficiently critical manner. This failure, for Hegel, 
leads to a distorted view, to the effect that thought and being are irreparably separated, 
which he takes to be at the heart of Kantian theoretical philosophy, and which 
precludes the possibility o f giving true philosophical proofs. 1  argue that the 
correction of such a distorted view is a main aim of the Phenomenology>  and that, in 
the transitions from A. to C.(AA.). Hegel provides an in principle proof of the unity of 
thought and being.
2Per Clara -
“La dubbia dimane non t ’impaura.
Leggiadra ti distendi 
sullo scoglio lucente di sale 
e al sole bruci le membra ...
L ’acqua e la forza che ti tempra,
nell ’acqua ti ritrovi e ti rinnovi:
noi ti pensiamo come un ’alga, un ciottolo,
come un ’equorea creatura che la salsedine non intacca
ma torna al lito piii pur  a ...
Ti guardiamo noi, della razza 
di chi rimane a terra. ”
(E. Montale)
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4Preface
As the title suggests, the primary aim of this dissertation is to present an interpretation 
of the relation of thought and being in the opening transitions (those from A. 
Consciousness to C.(AA) Reason) of Hegel's Phenomenology of  Spirit. According to 
this interpretation, the opening transitions demonstrate to the reader the unity or 
identity of thought and being, that is. the transitions demonstrate that “ what is 
thought. is. and that what is. only is in so far as it is thought” (PM §465. p.224). In 
other words. Hegel there shows that thought is capable of comprehending the 
fundamental ontological structure of being as being is itself intrinsically rational or 
conceptual in nature.
This interpretation is arrived at by considering the similarities between two 
ways for unifying thought and being suggested by Hegel in his Encyclopcedia Logic 
discussion of Kant's objections to the proofs of God's existence, and the passage from 
A. Consciousness to C.(AA.) Reason in the Phenomenology. Broadly. 1  argue that the 
passage from section A. to section B. in the Phenomenology exemplifies one way. and 
the passage from section B. to section C.(AA.) the other. We find that in both the 
Encyclopcedia Logic and the Phenomenology the view that thought and being are 
dichotomous rests on a number of unwarranted assumptions which must be 
relinquished if a philosophically defensible picture of thought and being is to emerge.
Specifically, what is objected to the unity of thought and being is that the 
immediately given empirical determinations which being is ordinarily taken to to 
consist in seem, on their own account, essentially diverse from the universals we 
employ in thinking or making judgements about them. Such a diversity seems to 
preclude deriving the universal determinations from the immediate ones as well as the 
converse: deriving the immediate determinations from the universals. i.e. it seems to 
preclude both directions in which one might attempt to show the unity of thought and 
being. Hegel argues that this kind of objection rests on a number of unwarranted 
assumptions, the primary being that the general form of  judgement, in which some 
determination (as predicate) is compared to some fixed, already isolated 
determination (as subject), is the form of truth. Alternatively put, the assumption is 
that truth, as a determinate content, is fixed and capable of being isolated such that it 
can act as a standard against which to compare other determinations. A clear and
5philosophically defensible picture of thought and being, which for Hegel involves 
their unity, can only be given via a recognition and suspension of such assumptions.
My claim is that the opening sections of the Phenomenology show this to the 
reader, that is. they show that the result of the suspension of all such assumptions is 
that thought and being constitute a unity. The course through the opening sections of 
the Phenomenology does not alone establish this  unity as it does not treat all the 
relevant assumptions, but it does allow the reader to discern that the eventual result is 
such a unity. In this sense the demonstration or the proof or unity is here only in 
principle.
The implication for a reading of Hegel's philosophy is that this philosophy 
results from the suspension of what Hegel sees to be unwarranted assumptions 
concerning the relation of thought to being that underlie other philosophical positions. 
If all such assumptions are suspended, then we are. for Hegel, lead to the realization 
that thought and being constitute a unity, that being is intrinsically conceptual in its 
structure. Such a reading is then 'metaphysical', while it views Hegel's metaphysics to 
be grounded in an imperative to demonstrate all unwarranted principles and 
fundamental assumptions, an imperative which is. to a lesser degree, present in the 
Critical philosophy of Hegel's immediate predecessors: Kant and Fichte.
In order to highlight the role of this imperative in Hegel's thought. I have 
provided a broadly historical account of Hegel's analysis of scepticism and its relation 
to Critical philosophy as he sees it. While Critical philosophy adopts elements of 
scepticism into its methodology, for Hegel, it ultimately fails to discern the potency of 
'true' or 'authentic' scepticism and, as a result, proves dogmatic in some of its 
procedures. Hegel accordingly identifies Critical philosophy as both a positive 
expression and an imperfect form of scepticism, and understanding the details of what 
is meant by characterizing Critical philosophy in this way allows one to grasp the 
force of the imperative and its role in Hegel's methodology.
Throughout the dissertation I have attempted to emphasize the importance of 
the notion that thought and being form a unity in Hegel's philosophy, and the role this 
notion plays in the early sections of the Phenomenology as well as in Hegel's critique 
o f pre-Critical metaphysics, empiricism and Critical philosophy. As a consequence, I 
have focused heavily on Hegel's texts and do not make much of moments where 
Hegel's argument may appear overly ambitious or implausible. Thus, I do not attempt 
to make of Hegel something more palatable to contemporary sensibilities, to save
6what is deemed worthwhile from an otherwise fundamentally defunct project. Indeed, 
given Hegel's imperative to demonstrate all assumptions and unwarranted principles, 
to do so prior to understanding the nature of this imperative would be a failure to take 
Hegel's thought seriously. What follows is, therefore, primarily an attempt to 
understand Hegel rather to improve upon or reject him.
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9Introduction
There is nothing contentious about the claim that much of Hegel's philosophy is 
strongly informed by his reaction to the works of his philosophical contemporaries 
and immediate predecessors such as Schelling. Fichte. Reinhold. Schulze and perhaps 
most significantly Kant. Indeed, it is possible to give a general account of a broad but 
standard framework of some of the developments in the philosophical thought of the 
period that lead up to Hegel's own philosophy1 . However, contention does arise 
between commentators on the period when it comes to addressing questions of the 
following kind: 'precisely which details are most important to the formulation of 
Hegel's thought?', 'just what is the nature and degree of influence that they can be 
said to have exerted on that process of formulation?', and such questions will seldom 
receive the same answer from different commentators. Many of the recent trends in 
the interpretation of Hegel's works can be delineated by the standpoints they adopt 
regarding matters of Hegel's relation to figures such as Kant et al\ and more 
generally debate continues surrounding the relation of these figures to each other and 
the impact this has on the philosophical orientation of German Idealism as a whole '.
The focus of my interest in this dissertation is not with the wider issue of the 
general orientation of German Idealism, though some of what I say may well impact 
on this wider issue, but instead with the issue of Hegel's reaction to Kant's theoretical 
philosophy and the impact it has on the structure of his philosophical project as 
presented in the Phenomenology of  Spirit. This interest grows out of a couple of 
interpretive difficulties encountered in the opening sections of the Phenomenology. 
difficulties that often prove divisive for commentators.
The first difficulty is that of the transition from section ‘A. Consciousness' to 
section ‘B. Self-Consciousness'. Perhaps the most straighforward reading of this
1   For example, see  F.  Beiser (ed.)  1993. pp. 1-20.  Basically put.  such an account typically  traces the 
development of attempts to respond to dualisms  found  in  Kant's work by early critics such as  Mainion. 
outlining  Fichte's attempt to solve the dualisms through a principle of subject-object  identity and the 
subsequent  reactions of Schelling and  Hegel to  Fichte’s system.
:  l or a useful  summary of recent trends see  K.  Ameriks  1992.  Also see  M. N.  Forster  1989 &   1998.  R.
B.  Pippin  1989,  K.  Westphal  1989 &   2003,  R.  Stem  1990 &  2002. J.  Stewart 2000.  Even  interpreters 
whose focus  is more specifically oriented toward the impact o f the problems of Ancient Scepticism  on 
Hegel's work, such as Forster and  Westphal above, can be grouped under this rubric. Certainly  Hegel’s 
desire to meet such problems stems in a  large degree from  his reading of influential sceptical  woks of 
the period  like G.  E. Schulze’s AenesiJemus, along with his perception that such works failed to 
encapsulate the genuine sceptical threat.
’  For instance see S. Gardner &   P.  Franks 2002.
10transition is to see it as a movement from the theoretical to the practical. Section A. 
appears to involve a movement through increasingly complex theoretical 
understandings of objects in which a wedge is driven between the subject, on the one 
hand, and its object on the other, until the object as the subject experiences it is 
usurped by a theoretical or scientific approximation of it. The wedge driven between 
subject and object here comes to be viewed by the subject as permanent and fixed, 
and in light of this situation the subject reacts by leaving the theoretical stance behind 
and moving over to a more direct mode o f engagement with its object. Section B. is 
then seen as involving a movement through a certain conception of practical ideas 
expressed in terms of stages of incomplete recognition. This seems to fit the text well 
enough, but work has to be done to show how the transition from the final stage of A. 
to the first of B. is a necessary one. as well as how both sections are to cohere in their 
results.
Charles Taylor suggests that a certain structural sense is to be made of the 
transition if we accept it as involving two diverse kinds of dialectic4. The first, which 
we witness in A., he calls ‘ontological* or ‘strict* dialectics “whose starting point is or 
can reasonably claim to be undeniable"5. So in the Phenomenology'
“(W )e start  from  the basis that there  is knowledge, and that  knowledge  is an 
achievement.  What  we do not  know,  if we can  put  it this way.  is  what  is  involved 
in  meeting the standard. O r rather, all  we know about this  is certain  very  sketchy 
critical  properties.  Thus we start with  the simple  but  intuitively  persuasive idea 
that knowledge  is  receiving data, and that the standard to be met  is that o f 
maximum  openness and  receptivity.  This  is the  idea behind sensible certainty.
When this  involves us  in contradiction,  we alter our conception o f what 
knowledge  is.  This starts a second  phase o f the dialectic: and so on. The key to 
dialectic  movement here is that since  we know that the standard  is met.  we can 
conclude that any  conception o f it  which  shows  itself unrealisable must  be 
wrong.w’
This strict dialectic, given the starting point, convinces by argument and stands in 
distinction to the second type: ‘historical* or ‘interpretive* dialectic, which
4  C. Taylor  1975. Ch.  V III. pp. 214-21  &   Ch  IV . p p l30-5.
'  Ibid. p.218.
6  Ibid. p.216.
11“starts from the thesis that a certain purpose is sought after, even though  it  is not 
yet realized.  Here the clash  between  purpose and effective reality  leads not to our 
redefining the purpose, but to the breaking up o f the reality concerned and  its 
replacement by a more adequate one (although o f course this requires a 
redefinition o f purpose on the part o f the effective agents  in  history)  ...  Certain 
historical  forms o f life are shown to be prey  to inner contradiction because they 
are defeating the purpose for which they exist"7
The difficulty here is that the starting point, the certain purpose, is imputed 
and this imputation seems far from undeniable. For Taylor, Hegel's most successful 
historical dialectics seem successful because they ‘fit well* as an interpretation of a 
historical period, but the imputation of the purpose that directs them cannot be 
justified or viewed as self-authenticating “ (P)rior to the total unfolding of history"8. 
The contrasting point of this second form of dialectic then, is that it convinces only by 
the plausibility of interpretation, and it is just this second form of dialectic,  fay lor 
claims, that we find in B. and throughout the remaining sections of the 
Phenomenology.
Now. Taylor thinks that if the strict dialectic of A. can establish “ that there is 
no independent finite being, but that all is held together in the Idea, the formula of 
rational necessity which creates its own external manifestation"9, then the certain 
purposes imputed in the historical dialectics, e.g. “ the imputation of the drive for 
recognition'’1 0  in the master-slave dialectic, or the “ purpose of realising a 
consciousness and wav of life which is universal"1 1   in his account of the breakdown 
of the Greek city state, w ill be legitimately available as starting points because they 
have been “ established previously by a strict dialectic"1 2 . That is. if Hegel can 
establish his “ central contention that the world of things only exists as an emanation 
of Geist. and therefore that spirit knows itself in knowing it"1' first, by strict dialectic, 
then the historical types of dialectic will be legitimated. Taylor doubts whether this is
7   Ibid.
K   Ibid.  p.218.
y  Ibid.  p.219.
1 0  Ibid.  p.217.
1 1   Ibid.  p.218.
1 2   Ibid.  p.219.
n  Ibid. p.221.
12possible and thinks that the strict dialectic of the Phenomenology is far too meagre to 
support the historical one that rests on top of it1 4 .
Taylor's account of the transition from A. to B. as essentially a failed attempt 
to ground a weakly founded dialectic on a more secure one. stands in stark contrast to 
that of Robert Pippin's1 5  description of the transition in terms of explicitly Kantian 
notions. For Pippin the ‘Force and the Understanding’ chapter of A.
“presents us  with a  Kantian statement o f the basic epistemological  problem  and a 
Kantian suggestion about  its resolution  ...  The required  link  between the 
nonsensible and the sensible, or. put another way,  between  pure concepts and the 
sensory manifold,  is supplied  by  the understanding itself.  And this  is the  problem 
and solution that defined  Kant's critical  period and that generally  repeats his 
solution. The essence o f appearances, the origin o f the unity and order o f 
appearances,  is not some beyond, or some  law  like generalization,  but  the self- 
conscious activity  o f the understanding  itself'1 6
The transition from A. to B. is then given in the realisation that the object is a
construction of the subject, and so moving from a consideration of mere
consciousness in which knowledge is taken to be essentially passive and receptive, to
a consideration of self-consciousness, in which the subject's responsibility for or
active role in constituting its object is realised, seems natural enough.
But such a Kantian reading remains a long way from appeasing everyone1 7 .
Taken simply in its function as a reading of the transition, as R. Stern has pointed
out1 8 , it is not clear that it can account for the necessity of the transition in terms of the
consciousness observed. ‘We' as observers of that consciousness are the group that
come to realise that 'the essence of appearances'  is ‘the self-conscious activity of the
understanding', but it is far from clear in the text that the consciousness observed and
undergoing the transition is supposed to arrive at this realisation at this point1 9 .
N Tayor suggests that the mature  Hegel probably  also thought that a much  larger, strict dialectic was 
required, and points to the fact that the much  longer and more difficult Logic formed the key stone of 
the mature sy stem, as evidence.
R.  B.  Pippin  1989. Ch's 6 &   7, pp.  116-71.
"■   Ibid.  p.  138-9.
1 7  For example, see K. Ameriks  1991, T.  Pinkard  1990a,  R.  Stem  ‘Hegel’s  Idealism’  (forthcoming in 
the 2n d  edition of Cambridge Companion to Hegel), S.  Houlgate 2006 pp. 137-43.  The main points of 
dissatisfaction with this account seem to be a perceived lack of accuracy to Hegel’s texts and  its 
characterisation of Hegel’s position as a species of anti-realism.
1 8   R.  Stern 2002, p.67.
“The necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth was a 
Thing, an  ‘other’ than themselves, expresses just this, that not only  is consciousness of a thing possible
13Both Taylor's reading and that of Pippin are merely two examples of a number 
of ways of approaching the Consciousness/Self-Consciousness transition20. They are, 
however, indicative of what has come to be characterised in the recent literature as the 
two predominant trends in interpreting Hegel's thought as a whole, viz. metaphysical 
and non-metaphysical approaches21. The metaphysical approach basically reads Hegel 
as being engaged in reviving a kind of pre-Kantian. Spinozistic metaphysics, as an 
account of what truly exists, while the non-metaphysical approach reads Hegel as 
sharing a much higher degree of continuity with Kant and as offering “ a non­
metaphysical philosophy devoid of existence claims and innocent of a reductionism 
opting for certain existences to the detriment of others"22. A large part of the 
motivation for the latter reading comes from a desire to defend Hegel against the 
former, which arguably leaves Hegel with an extravagant, overblown metaphysics 
repugnant to modem sensibilities, as well as leaving incomprehensible the issue of 
how Hegel could have taken himself to be a post-Kantian philosopher23.
My own approach to the A.-B. transition is to start afresh and ask whether 
clear sense can't be made of it simply by closely following the text of the 
Phenomenology and the development of Hegel's argument there -  taking it at face 
value, so to speak. The whole question of the transition turns on there not being an 
obvious and sufficient continuity between A. and B. in the text; suggestions as to how 
one ought to read the transition, e.g. as a shift in method or as a restatement of the 
principle of apperception, are made on this basis. In looking to the text for an obvious 
and immanent continuity between the sections. I will not. then, be engaging in 
detailed discussion with the various interpretations. Rather, i'll be seeking to explain 
the transition as obvious and warranted given the previous transitions already passed 
through by the reader.
There are of course those who. take the view that the picture of Hegel's
system as being closely related to that of Kant and as being an extension of it. is
evidence of Hegel's argumentative reliance on the preceding Kantian and post-
only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of these shapes.  But  it  is 
only fo r us that this truth exists, not yet  for consciousness" (PS  164, p. 102).  Much more will  be said of 
this transition  in chapter one below.
:,)For example, see  Kojeve  1969, Gadamer  1976.  Solomon  1983,  Pinkard  1994,  Kelly  1998.  Rockmore 
1997,  McDowell 2003.
:iAn  interesting discussion of the cogency of framing debate about interpreting Hegel  in these terms, 
and the contributions  of both sides to Hegel  studies can be found  in  Kreines 2006.
“ Hartmann  1972, p. 110.  Hartmann  1972  in the locus chssicus for the non-matephysical approach, 
which has now developed in a variety of directions.  For example, see Pippin  1989,  Brandom  1999. 
2,For example, see Pippin  1989. pp. 3-15.
14Kantian positions, and of the relative paucity of Hegel's own argumentation if a 
presupposed acceptance of the general trend of such positions is not present in the 
reader. I am thinking here of E. Craig's account2 4 , which has the aim of
“showing that  Hegel's thought  ...  is buoyed  up by the attraction o f the romantic 
thesis o f oneness  with the  ultimate  reality  without  it.  his argumentative 
cupboard  is quickly seen to be  bare.  What  he does,  far from  being a neutral 
refutation o f the sceptic, or o f subjectivist  theories o f knowledge,  is  more  like the 
assumption o f some such  principle and the detailed elucidation o f its 
consequences  for epistemology.  In other words,  it  is not.  as Hegel  him self would 
have us believe,  a  proof;  it  is an articulation o f one aspect o f the dominant 
philosophy  o f his tim e"25.
While my own proclivities do not tend toward such a view. Craig's reading (along 
with Pippin's) is correct to highlight the close link between Hegel's concern with 
scepticism and his reading of the Critical philosophy inaugurated by Kant26.
It does seem to be the case that, for Hegel, there is a close tie between 
scepticism and Critical philosophy -  both Westphal and Forster take Hegel's reaction 
and response to Ancient scepticism to inform his general epistemological strategy and 
its move beyond Critical philosophy. The issue of the relation between Hegel's 
thought regarding scepticism and his reaction to the Critical philosophy raises the 
second interpretative difficulty that interests me in the opening sections of the 
Phenomenology", that of determining just what Hegel means by identifying Kantian 
Idealism (in section 'C.(AA.) Reason') as “ the same kind of self-contradictory 
ambiguity  as Scepticism" (PS 238. p. 144) (albeit in the mode of a positive expression 
o f this 'ambiguity') and its implications for his project.
By  clarify ing the connection between Hegel's reading of Ancient Scepticism 
and his reaction to C  ritical philosophy, it is possible to show how insights gained in 
his reading of scepticism inform, not only his reaction to Critical philosophy, but also 
the opening transitions between A. and C.(AA.) in the Phenomenology,2\  and it is one
2 4   I-.  Craig  1987.
2'  Ibid.  pp.  186-7.
Fo r instance:  “Hegel  usually  places his discussions of scepticism  in the context of the  'Critical  Philosophy', 
that  is to say o f Kant and  his doctrine that theoretical  knowledge could only  be of appearances, or 'empirical 
reality',  not o f things in themsebes. things as they are  independently o f our wavs of experiencing or thinking about 
them".  Ibid.  p. 187.
27 Henceforth, “opening transitions" and “opening sections" will  be used to designate those transitions 
from  A.  to C.(AA .) and sections A.  to C .(A A .) respectively.
15of my overall aims to highlight a particular way in which Hegel's reading of 
scepticism in relation to his thought concerning Critical philosophy, does inform these 
opening transitions. The details of this w ill only become clear as we continue, but an 
indication of some of the features of the general account I'll be arguing for can be 
given here by way of a comparison to Forster's notion of Hegel's theory of an 
historical Ur-teilung1*.
Forster argues that Hegel explains the historical transition from pagan Greek 
to Judeo-Christian culture in the Phenomenology, in terms of the emergence of a 
sceptical culture (characterised by general equipollence difficulties of how to assess 
which claim as to matters of fact is correct when the competing claims/arguments on 
both sides appear equally strong, and a concept-instantiation problem of how to 
decide whether our concepts correspond to anything in the world) and a structural 
framework of Ur-teilung (which can be rendered as ‘judgement' but also ‘arche- 
separation' or ‘original division'). This structural framework is taken from Flolderlin 
who held a metaphysical theory in which a primordial unity. Being (Sein). is first 
divided into subject and object for human consciousness by a process labelled  Ur­
ic Hung.
"Judgement ( V rtc il)  is  in the  highest and strictest  sense the original 
separation o f the object and  subject  which are most  immediately  united  in 
intellectual  intuition, that  separation through which alone the object and 
subject  become  possible, the arche-separation ( Ur-teihm g)  ...  Being (Sein) 
expresses the connection  between  subject and  object.  Where subject and 
object are united  altogether and  not only  in  part,  that  is.  united  in such a 
manner that no separation can  be performed  without  violating the essence o f 
what  is to be separated, there and  nowhere else can  be spoken o f Being 
proper. as  is the case with  intellectual  intuition"2'.
Forster claims that Hegel adopts this idea of an original division of a 
primordial state of unity and (via the influence of Schelling) applies it to events within 
human history. He notes, that “ Hegel does not actually use the word Ur-teilung to
:K   M.  Forster  1989,  Part  II. pp.47-94.
F.  Holderlin  1988.  Part of Holderlin's aim  in this text was to criticize Fichte’s notion of a self- 
positing, self-conscious subject as constituting a first principle or starting point  for philosophy. 
Fxpressed as 'I  am  F,  Fichte's principle  for Holderlin cannot be one of unity, but must rather be one of 
separation (such a self-consciousness  is constituted by the separation of itself from  itself -  the subject 
becomes aware of itself as object), and  is  itself predicated on an apprehension of a more fundamental 
unity (Being).  See Y.  Yovel 2005.  pp.47-9. T.  Pinkard 2000a, pp. 133-6 and 2000b, pp. 162-3.
16refer to a historical division of an original unity, reserving the term for his ahistorical 
logic instead'"0  but that Hegel does envisage such a division occurring in the form of 
“ a division of the objects of human consciousness into ... a social and natural world 
having a harsh, objective character and  ...  a remote, inscrutable, and despotic 
divinity"31. Forster thinks that this can be seen most clearly in the ‘Spirit' chapter of 
the Phenomenology', where an internal division of Spirit into Culture (Bilclung) on the 
one hand and Faith (Glauhe) on the other is described. But he readily acknowledges 
(following Lukacs) that the Phenomenology' involves three treatments of the whole 
course of history , each under a different aspect.
“First,  there  is a treatment o f the whole o f history  under the aspect o f the  individual 
consciousness  in the chapters  'Consciousness'.  'Self-Consciousness', and  'Reason'.
Then there is a second  treatment  ...  under the aspect o f the developing social  order in 
the  'Spirit'  chapter.  Finally,  there  is a third treatment  ...  under the aspect o f the 
developing artistic, religious, and  philosophical  views o f men  which express the 
Absolute  in the chapters  'Religion'  and  'Absolute  Knowing'.  Thus the  historical 
event  described  in the  'Spirit'  chapter as the division o f the harmonious unity  o f 
Ethical  Life into the realms o f Faith and Culture  is treated  at other points  in the 
Phenomenology' as w e ll" 2.
1  his would suggest that the course of an historical  Ur-teilung could also be traced 
through other sections of the Phenomenology> . besides the chapter on 'Spirit', and in 
what follows I outline the role of such a separation or division in helping to account 
for the difficult transition from A. to B..
Insofar as the move from A. to B. describes the kind of division similar to that 
of the Holderlinian Ur-teilung. it is a move from Being, in which there is no real 
separation or antithetical relation between subject and object, to a position where 
there seems to be such a radical separation between these elements that the subject is 
left with access only to itself -  its own thought. The general course of the 
demonstration then traces a path from this thought back to Being -  the separation or 
division coming to be seen as an internal division of the Absolute and not a 
fundamental division of two separate and opposed elements. Basically put. my own 
contention is that what we witness in the transition from A. to B. is part of a
Op. Cit.  p.50.
"  Ibid.
Ibid.  p.5 I .
17demonstration or proof of sorts, of the Hegelian view that there can be conceptual and 
demonstrative knowledge of the Absolute.
Now, there are further elements in Forster's account that will allow me outline 
this contention more clearly. In Forster's account, Hegel explains such a division in 
terms of the emergence of what Forster calls a 'sceptical culture', in which difficulties 
of equipollence and concept-instantiation are raised, and the “ intellectual 
preconditions of raising these difficulties are established"33. Accordingly. Forster 
provides an account of Hegel's identification of various intellectual causes for the 
disruption of the harmonious, unified Greek culture, which establish the intellectual 
preconditions for raising the sceptical difficulties'4. His account identifies two themes 
concerning both the intellectual preconditions of the sceptical difficulties and the 
difficulties themselves: the first, taken from the 'Stoicism' and 'Scepticism'  passages 
of B.. is that of an awareness of a sharp distinction between thought and reality 
(being), and the second, to be found in the later 'Spirit' and 'Religion' chapters, is a 
contextually sensitive recasting of the first which yields awareness of an equipollence 
problem. The preconditions are simply those necessary for the form of consciousness 
observed to be able to raise the sceptical difficulties in one form or another, to become 
explicitly aware of the division that is involved in this, in one way or another.
What 1  think about this is that, while 1  agree with Forster that the precondition 
focussed on in the Stoicism/Scepticism sections of B. is that of a sharp division 
between thought and being. I believe that part of what Hegel is attempting to 
demonstrate in A. through B. is that the division is inherent in consciousness's mode 
of cognition. The distorted view that this division is insurmountable has its source in 
the insufficiently critical acceptance of this mode as true. Holding fast to this mode as 
true, rather than following its own necessary developmental path through or beyond 
itself to the truth of matters, perpetuates the distorted view that thought and being are 
irreparably sundered -  that a demonstration or proof of their unity cannot be given.
f urther clarification of my contention will come in the course of what follows, 
but 1   would like to note here that while scepticism for Hegel represents the negative 
philosophical view par excellence. it also involves and brings forth an implicit 
awareness of the falsity of the distorted view. Scepticism is seen, in some sense, to be 
based on principles that involve such distortion and it reduces these principles, along
”  Ibid.  p.48. 
u  Ibid.  Ch 4..  pp.55-76.
18with itself, to nullity. In this regard scepticism for Hegel is “just as little directed 
against philosophy as for it” (RSP p.30/p.330). Proper philosophical consideration of 
scepticism then should aid one in seeing beyond the putative distortion of 
consciousness's mode of cognition. Such consideration is lacking, according to Hegel, 
in Critical philosophy and in many other recognisable philosophies. Accordingly, one 
might expect that any putative demonstration of Hegel's will minimally need to 
provide an account of the development of the distortion and a means, via scepticism, 
to move beyond it.
Obviously such a general indication of my account and some of its facets can 
do little more than give a rough overall impression of the scope of my aims in what 
follows, and by way of clarification it should be said that I only hope to garner 
enough evidence to suggest that my general interpretation of the opening sections of 
the Phenomenology' (A. through to C.(AA.)) is at least, in principle, philosophically 
viable. I cannot hope to establish the success or failure of Hegel's project (as 1  see it) 
in these sections -  such an aim would require a much larger volume -  though 
naturally, observations w ill be made regarding the likelihood of success or failure. I 
take myself to be primarily inv olved in a task of laying an interpretation of these 
opening sections which provides a solid basis for critical assessment.
The strategy I have adopted to achieve this is one of focussing on the various sections 
of a number of Hegel's works and of drawing connections between them in order to 
build up a picture of his intent in the transition from A. through B.. and a model of its 
workings. The most obv ious merit of such an approach is its reliance on textual 
evidence, minimising the temptation to read something into the transition from 
outside of Hegel's work. Such an approach also stresses a certain coherence in 
Hegel's thought over time -  a common thread in the conception of his project over a 
range of works.
An inev itable concern that arises with the employment of such a strategy is 
that Hegel's dense prose will be left inaccessible to the reader in the course of the 
account. That is to say. stylistically Hegel's work presents problems for the modern 
reader; it is often difficult and dense with many themes or issues being given 
simultaneous treatment, and when compared to modern works it can often appear 
unclear, imprecise and quite alien. Its difficulty and density however, are also part of 
its beauty and one must be careful to avoid oversimplification for clarity’s sake in the 
exposition of it.
19In light of this I attempt, in chapter one, to present prima facie evidence for 
my contention that in the transitions of A. and B. of the Phenomenology we witness a 
separation of thought from being which is shown to be inherent in consciousness's 
mode of cognition, such that, far from being irreparable, this separation rests on an 
insufficiently critical acceptance of this mode of cognition as true or accurate, and is 
actually just a moment or stage in the unity of thought and being. I allow passages of 
Hegel's own texts to build up a picture of the general project and schematic outline of 
the transitions in A. and B.. drawing out a general interpretive model or working 
hypothesis of the function of these transitions, which is to be tested. In chapter two. I 
change focus to the issue of clarifying Hegel's identification of Critical philosophy 
and scepticism. Understanding this identification allows us to better appreciate 
Hegel's motivation for his own project and the function of the opening transitions. In 
chapter three I return to the working hypothesis, clarifying the link between this 
hypothesis and Hegel's concerns regarding scepticism and Critical philosophy. I 
derive a number expectations from comments made in other works of Hegel, that the 
material of the opening transitions of the Phenomenology ought to meet if our 
hypothesis regarding it is to be confirmed, and I carry out the comparison of those 
expectations with that material to see whether or not they are fulfilled.
20Chapter One: Opening Transitions of the Phenomenology
It is in the famous ‘Preface' to the Phenomenology that Hegel outlines his conception 
of the nature of the philosophical project that he intends to undertake. This outline is 
stated in terms which can be difficult to understand, terms which seem both general 
and abstract". In starting here, however, I believe that they will prove sufficiently 
perspicuous to offer some motivation for the perhaps equally general contentions 
stated in the above introduction. My intention in this chapter is to make a prima facie 
case for a general interpretive model of my reading of the opening sections of the 
Phenomenology’ using Hegel's texts. First. I aim to draw out a general picture of a key 
philosophical difficulty that I think the opening transitions of the Phenomenology are 
designed to dissolve, the difficulty providing the basis for the general model to be 
tested. Insofar as I am only concerned with making a prima facie case for the model 
here. I  will not be concerned with all its details -  these will be filled in as we progress 
through subsequent chapters -  and so I ask. temporarily, for the reader's indulgence in 
what will require cutting some fairly broad swathes through dense material without 
the aid and comfort of every detail. That being said, the model w ill be treated simply 
as a working hypothesis, to be established. Second. I will consider whether, and if so 
in what way. this hypothesis can be said to fit the opening transitions of the 
Phenomenology\ initially the transition from A. to B. and subsequently that from B. to 
C.(AA.).
1. The Appearance of Dichotomy
The difficulty that Hegel identifies concerns the current state of philosophy as he sees
it. and the attempt to provide actual, true knowledge, as distinguished from
knowledge which ultimately can only be said to be subjectively true (true for us) or
knowledge whose truth cannot be demonstrated. Hegel sets himself the task of
providing such knowledge, of bringing philosophy “ to the goal w here it can lay aside
"  The  ‘Preface’,  insofar as  it serves the aims of preparation to and. to a degree, summary of what  will 
follow after it,  is not, strictly speaking, a text containing genuine philosophical or systematic content.
Its content  instead concerns philosophy,  is about philosophy, and  in  this capacity  it  involves the use of 
many  linguistic devices or modes of expression designed to be provocative to the reader, or to serve as 
an aid to memory  for what  follows.  Such  modes are general and abstract  in the sense that they do not 
display genuine systematic content and their true meaning can only be gleaned  in the exposition o f 
Hegel’s system -   in the exposition of their complete, developmental context.  For more on the  linguistic 
devices and modes of expression  Hegel  employs see Y. Yovel  1996.
21the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing” (PS 5, p.3). He simply asserts in 
the ‘Preface’ (in lieu of the proof his system is to provide) that truth is conceptual or 
notional, to be precise: “ that the truth has only the Notion as the element of its 
existence" (PS 6. p.4). and he notes that this assertion contradicts the prevalent view 
of his time, which instead takes truth to be delivered in. or as. intuition (Ibid.)7 6 . If this 
prevalent view is correct, then what is required in philosophy is not a discursive 
account of truth as essentially conceptual, but rather just the intuition of truth.
" ( I) f ...  the True exists  in what, or better as  what,  is sometimes called  intuition, 
sometimes  immediate knowledge o f the Absolute,  religion or being  ...  then  what 
is  required  in  the exposition o f philosophy  is,  from this viewpoint,  rather the 
opposite o f the  form o f the Notion.  For the Absolute  is not supposed to be 
comprehended,  it  is to be felt and  intuited" (Ibid.)
Hegel takes such a view to be motivated by the stage currently reached by 
philosophical thought. Such thought has led to the questioning of initial certainties 
that consciousness presumed or accepted on faith'7 , and has indeed resulted in the 
loss, along with the consciousness of this loss, of such certainties. Far from wishing to 
allow philosophical thought to continue in this vein, a recovery of what has been lost 
is called for. and from the perspective of the prevalent view
"Philosophy  is to meet this need,  not by opening  up the fast-locked  nature o f 
substance, and  raising this to self-consciousness,  not  by bringing consciousness 
out o f its chaos back to an order based on thought, nor to the simplicity o f the 
Notion,  but  rather by  running together what thought has put asunder,  by 
suppressing the differentiations o f the Notion and  restoring the feeling of 
essential  being:  in short,  by  providing edification  rather than  insight.  The
6  This prevalent  view  is. perhaps, most straightforwardly  identified with the  views of Jacobi and 
Schelling. and their respective appeals to  immediate,  irrational  faith and an experience of intellectual 
intuition, to ground the absolute truth of knowledge.  But of course.  Hegel's target  is wider than that and 
may be taken to include various members of the post-Kantian romantic scene,  for instance.  Holderlin, 
Schlegel. Novalis.
Hegel characterizes such certainties  in  a general way  in  the ‘Preface’, speaking of "the certainty that 
consciousness then had. of its reconciliation with the essential being, and of that being's universal 
presence both within  and without" (PS 7. p.4).  It  is obvious here that the ‘reconciliation with' and 
‘universal  presence’ of the  ‘essential  being’ can be construed not only  in religious terms, where the 
essential  being would be God, but also  in  metaphysical  terms, where it would be absolute substance, 
and epistemological terms, where  it would be true absolute knowledge.  Hence references  in  the same 
paragraph to “that  lost sense of solid and substantial  being" and the restoration of "the feeling of 
essential being" (my emphasis).
22'beautiful’, the  'holy', the  ‘eternal’,  ‘religion’, and  ‘love’  are the bait required to 
arouse the desire to bite;  not the Notion,  but ecstasy, not the cold march of 
necessity  in the thing itself,  but the ferment o f enthusiasm, these are supposed to 
be what sustains and continually extends the wealth o f substance” (PS 7, pp.4/5).
Obviously Hegel does not think that the need, the recovery of what has been lost, can 
be met by a renewed faith in. or reliance on. intuition. It is just such faith that has 
been put into question by thought in the first place, indeed, one may wonder whether 
it isn't just this faith that has led to the sense of loss to begin with.
The important feature here, in this prevalent view, is just what this motivating 
sense of loss consists in. or what it derives from. The sense of loss certainly seems to 
develop in the progress or use of thought, and insofar as the progress of thought is to 
be identified by Hegel with the emergence of culture, this progress is viewed 
generally to be a movement away from ’’the immediacy of substantial life toward 
general, i.e. universal, principles and conceptions" (PS 4. p.3).That is. the use of 
thought appears to involve the emergence of the universal from the immediate, the 
conceptual or notional from the intuitive or merely sensuous, the emergence of 
increasingly detailed or determinate comprehension from mere apprehension.
For Hegel, w ith the development of general principles and conceptions comes 
the introduction of fixed limits and distinctions. The emergence of thought from 
immediacy involves the conceptualization and categorization of things, which is 
achieved through the division of a whole into parts, as with a class into mutually 
exclusive, jointly exhaustive subclasses (or a genus into species), on the basis of 
differentiae -  distinguishing marks or properties. Such differentiae delimit the 
members of a class from one another and are taken to belong to those members.  This 
process is then, one of the introduction of distinction and opposition, and. more 
broadly speaking, the development of various dichotomies'8, according to Hegel. It is 
in the development of such dichotomy that the loss mentioned above occurs.
Dichotomy, for Hegel. ” is the source of the need of  philosophy: and as the 
culture of the era. it is the unfree and given aspect of the whole configuration" (DF, 
p.89). The development of various dichotomies in cultures always involves ’’the
“The cultures of various times have established opposites  ...  which were supposed to be products of 
Reason and absolutes,  in  various ways, and the  intellect has  laboured over them  as such  ...  With the 
progress of culture they have passed over into such forms as the antithesis of Reason and sensibility, 
intelligence and nature and. with  respect to the universal concept, of absolute subjectivity and absolute 
objectivity" (DF p. 90).
23appearance of the Absolute’’ becoming “ isolated from the Absolute and fixated into 
independence.” (Ibid.). This development of dichotomy, this isolating and fixating, is 
taken to arise from the conceptualizing activity of thought. Now. this conceptualizing 
activity is identified with the Understanding or intellect (Verstand), and so it is this 
faculty and its capacity to distinguish by fixing limits that gives rise to the source of 
the need of philosophy. As Hegel puts it:
"The intellect  [ l'ersiand\. as the capacity to set  limits, erects a  building and 
places it  between  man and the Absolute,  linking everything that man thinks 
worthy and  holy  to this building.  The entire totality  o f limitations  is to be found 
in  it. but  not the Absolute  itself. The Absolute  is  lost  in the parts,  where  it drives 
the  intellect  in  its ceaseless development o f manifoldness.  But  in  its striving to 
enlarge  itself into the Absolute, the  intellect only  reproduces  itself ad infinitum 
and so mocks  itself.  Reason  [Vennmft]  reaches the Absolute only  in stepping 
outside o f this manifold o f parts" (D F pp.  89/90).
A clear understanding of this process and the sense in which the Understanding 
(lerstand) mocks itself will only come with further explication and a consideration of 
the movements within the Phenomenology. But. so far. what should be plain enough 
is that the limiting ability of the Understanding (Verstand) -  which is to be 
distinguished from Reason (Vernunft) -  is the source of the apparent loss which 
motivates the prevalent view's favouring of intuition. Presumably, the limiting 
activity of the Understanding is seen to give rise to a dichotomy that appears 
insurmountable, such that it precipitates the loss of certainty that motivates the 
prevalent view. Given the nature of the loss glossed by Hegel in the ‘Preface' and the 
characterisation in the quote above, such a dichotomy would be one between 
‘essential being' or the ‘Absolute' and thought, insofar as thought is identified with 
the limiting activity  of the Understanding. Intuition is then seen as one way of 
‘stepping outside of this manifold of parts', of moving beyond the fixed limits of the 
Understanding and the dichotomy that they give rise to. Hence the prevalent view that 
what was required in philosophy was the suppression of the ‘differentiations of the 
Notion', via some kind of intuitive access to the truth.
Given the appearance of such a dichotomy, the awareness of it reached by the 
prevalent view of Hegel's time and Hegel's stated contradiction of the strategy of this 
view in his conception of truth as fundamentally notional, then Hegel will, at the very
24least, have to provide an etiological explanation of the appearance of such a 
dichotomy, along with a discursive dissolution of it. if he is to begin to make good on 
his assertion that the prevalent view is mistaken in its strategy. We are told that this 
w ill involve the task of “ freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity so as to give 
actuality to the universal" (PS 33. p.20). that is. Hegel diagnoses the problem with the 
limiting of the Understanding to consist in its fixity, it is the ‘fixation into 
independence' from actuality of the determinations employed by the Understanding 
that creates difficulties'0. Accordingly, this putative fixity and its opposition to 
‘actuality' should play the key role in the required etiological explanation of the 
appearance of the dichotomy.
Just such an etiological account is. in part, what we will witness in the 
transitions from A. to C'.(AA.) of the Phenomenology\ but before we go on to consider 
these transitions we should recall that much of what has been brought out thus far, in 
quite general terms, from Hegel's comments is supposed to be identifiable, in a 
relatively straightforward manner, w ith features of Kantian and Post-Kantian 
philosophy. For example, the distinction of Understanding and Reason, the 
determining activity of the Understanding, awareness of the loss and dichotomy itself, 
insofar as in the Kantian philosophy things as they are in-themselves remain a beyond 
inaccessible to cognition, and the move to a renewed faith in intuition to recover a 
sense of what has been lost. Consequently, it is not surprising to find a form of a re­
statement of the dichotomy that occasions the loss, and Hegel's reaction to it. in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic in the discussion o f‘Critical Philosophy' (Part I. B. II)40. The re­
statement is given in terms of a discussion of Kant's Dialectic and his characterisation 
o f the notion of God as deriving from the ‘Ideal of Pure Reason'4 1  -  that from which 
all things derive the material of their possibility -  along with his critique of the proofs 
of God's existence.  Hegel states that, in this account:
'*  While much  more w ill be said of this process throughout what  follows,  it may be helpful to note here 
that,  in respect of the generation of the dichotomy of thought and being, the  idea  is that the differentiae. 
which are usually taken  to belong to or to  inhere in the members of the class that they differentiate, 
come to be seen as  independent  from  those members, to have a form of existence of their own. through 
the judging activity of the  Understanding.  That  is. they come to be seen as an external contribution of 
the Understanding,  rather than an  internal  determination of things themselves.
C.f.  Part  I, C.  ‘Immediate  Knowing': “ In the Critical  Philosophy, thinking is  interpreted as being 
subjective, and  its ultimate,  unsurpassable determination  is abstract universality, or formal  identity: 
thus thinking is set  in opposition to the truth, which  is inwardly concrete universality" (EL §61. 
p. 108/9).
4 1   See CPR A568/B596-A583/B611.
25“God ...  has to be cognised,  i.e. determined by thinking.  But as opposed to 
simple identity, all determination  is  for the understanding only  a restriction, 
i.e. a negation as such.  Hence, all  reality  is to be taken only  without 
restriction,  i.e., as indeterminate, and God, as the essential  sum  o f all  realities 
or as the supremely  real  Essence,  becomes the simple abstraction:  while the 
only  determination that remains available  for him  is the just as strictly 
abstract determinacy o f being.  Abstract identity (which  is what  is here also 
called “concept") and being are the two moments that  reason seeks to unify"
(E L  §49.  p.94).
That is. Reason wants to unify ‘abstract identity'  i.e. the determinations of the 
Understanding in thought, or ‘concepts', which are opposed to simple identity insofar 
as they always involve positing a restriction, or a difference, with being, which is just 
a simple abstraction, indeterminate insofar as it is an all inclusive category. To get a 
grip on what this unification would involve we should note that a simple abstraction is 
still a determination of thought and involv es limitation or difference of a type, though 
it is of a peculiar nature insofar as it is the most general, inclusive determination and 
as such seems to be no determination or involve no limitation. To unify the two 
elements would be to introduce determination into this simple abstraction, to fill out 
its content. Alternatively, it would be to unify determinations under one category. 
Accordingly. Hegel believes there are two ways in which this can be achieved; they 
differ insofar as each adopts a different starting point -  the end point of each being the 
starting point of the other.
"Two ways or forms are admissible for this  unification:  we can  begin  with being 
and  pass on  from  there to the abstraction o f thinking’ ,  or  ...  we can effect the 
passage  from abstraction to being" (EL  §50.  p.94).
The re-statement of the dichotomy here is given by the fact that there appears to be an 
obstacle standing in the path of each wav of unification. This obstacle is that 
determination in thought always involves positing a difference such that ‘being' or 
‘God', or the ‘Absolute' always remains untouched by. different from, or beyond our 
thought determinations and so no content can be seemingly introduced. It seems that 
there is always a difference held fixed between ‘being’ and the ‘abstraction of 
thinking'. As Hegel puts it when comparing both ways of unification:
26“(W )hat the understanding sets against this second way  is in-itself the same as 
was alleged  before,  namely  that just as the universal  is not  found to be present  in 
the empirical,  so. conversely, the determinate is not contained  in the universal -  
and the determinate here  is “being” .  In other words, “being” cannot be deduced 
from  the concept or analysed out o f it." (EL  §51.  p.98).
This statement may seem particularly unclear, and Hegel is using terminology here 
established earlier in his discussion in the Encyclopaedia Logic. By ‘universal’  Hegel 
means to refer to one element of experience, which is taken to be contributed by 
thought, viz. determinations of universality and necessity, or the form of things. 
Distinct from this is ‘the empirical', by which he means the manifold material 
sensuously given in intuition, which constitutes the other element of experience. What 
the Understanding sets against both ways of unification is the difference or mutual 
exclusivity of these elements of experience. The moment ‘the empirical', as being, is 
determined in thought, it is changed. We don't have ‘the empirical' or being as it 
stands alone, but only what thought makes of it.
As we have mentioned, Hegel thinks that such a dichotomy of thought and 
being is far from insurmountable. It is the result of the Understanding's process of 
distinction and its fixing of differentiae. We have also suggested that A. to C.(AA.) of 
the Phenomenology is. in part, to provide an eitiological explanation of the 
appearance of such a dichotomy as part of a discursive dissolution of that dichotomy . 
What the comments from the Encylopaedia Logic provide, is the form of such a 
dissolution. A dissolution of this dichotomy would require a demonstration of the 
admissibility of the two ways of unification mentioned in the Encyclopaedia: it would 
require a demonstration that we can. in fact, begin with being and pass on from there 
to the abstraction of thinking, and also make the return trip. The etiological 
explanation of the appearance of such a dichotomy would fit into such a 
demonstration insofar as the process of distinguishing, that seemingly leads to the 
dichotomy, is. for Hegel, on the contrary, a process whereby the unification of 
thought and being can be demonstrated. That is. the movement through which the 
dichotomy apparently occurs is actually part of the movement through which 
unification is demonstrated. As Hegel warns in respect of the stage that philosophy 
has reached in his day:
27“(T)he fact that the object represented becomes the property o f pure self- 
consciousness,  its elevation to universality  in general, is only one aspect o f 
formative education, not  its fulfilm ent" (PS 33, p. 19)
What I am suggesting as a working hypothesis, is that the admissibility of the two 
ways of unification is to be established, in principle, in the opening transitions of the 
Phenomenology, the moves through A. and B. to C.(AA.). My claim is that in A. we 
witness the “ emergence from the immediacy of substantial life" (PS 4, p.3) to a 
standpoint of universality in which consciousness becomes self-consciousness and the 
“object represented becomes the property of pure self-consciousness" (PS 33, p. 19). 
This establishes, in principle, the admissibility of the first way for "us" as readers of 
the Phenomenology. Section B. then follows and demonstrates the admissibility of the 
second way. such that ‘we* can see that the two ways are. in essence, the same -  each 
leading into the other and developing out of its other, forming a circle. The connection 
of the methods is given by the fact that:
"thinking the empirical  world essentially  means altering its empirical  form, and 
transforming it  into something-universal; so thinking exercises a negative activity 
with regard to that  foundation as well:  when the perceived  material  is determined 
by  universality  it does not remain  in  its first, empirical  shape.  W ith the removal 
and negation o f the shell, the  inner import o f what  is perceived  is brought out 
(c.f.  §‘s  13, 23)." (EL  §50.  p.  96).
T his connection ‘we' will witness in the transition from A. to B.. a new starting point 
w ill be given and a passage into the inner import of what is perceived will be 
achieved, there will be a removal and negation of the shell, of appearance, or as Hegel 
puts it in the Phenomenology: “(T)his curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner 
world is ... drawn away" (PS  165, p.  103).
I have repeatedly mentioned that what I am suggesting is established in these 
transitions, is so established only ‘in principle'. I make this qualification because, for 
Hegel. “ (T)he True is the whole" (PS 20, p.l 1). That is, a true demonstration of the 
movement from being to thought or thought to being, must be complete in terms of 
content, and the movement provided in A. through C.(AA.) is certainly not complete 
in terms of content (and in that regard a dichotomy results and the dialectic of the
28Phenomenology is driven on through new sections). However, the structure of a true 
demonstration is present insofar as we witness a movement from being to thought 
which is shown to be a movement from thought to being. In this respect the prevalent 
view’s favouring of intuition appears mistaken and the possibility of providing a 
demonstration or presentation of true knowledge becomes viable. The complete 
content of such a presentation remains, at that point, to be filled in.
Before we consider whether the hypothesis is borne out by Hegel's text, a word 
or two should be said about an issue that has thus far been passed over. It might be 
claimed that employing sections from the Encyclopaedia Logic to help construct a 
hypothesis regarding the Phenomenology may be an ill-founded strategy, the worries 
being the difference in scope of the two works and contention surrounding the precise 
role of the Phenomenology as an introduction to or preparation for the Encyclopaedia 
Logic.
First, it should be noted that the hypothesis by no means relies solely on the 
quotes borrowed from the Encyclopaedia Logic. but draws on. and I believe is in 
accordance with, a number of Hegel's writings, and in the first instance develops from 
the Phenomenology' itself. Second, the part of the Encyclopaedia Logic that is drawn 
on is situated between Hegel's outline of a ‘preliminary conception' of the task, 
function and structure of the Logic and his arrival at a more precise conception and 
division of the Logic. which is meant to help “ ...clarify the meaning of the Logic and 
to lead into the standpoint that is here given to if ’ (EL §25. p.64). being a “ further 
introduction" {Ibid.) to the standpoint of the Logic. Hegel helpfully provides a 
synopsis of the relation of the Phenomenology to this new introductory passage (EL 
§'s26-78):
“In  my Phenomenology o f  Spirit,  which was  ...  described, when  it was 
published, as the first  part o f the system  o f science, the  procedure adopted was to 
begin  from  the first and  simplest appearance of the spirit,  from  immediate 
consciousness, and to develop  its dialectic right  up to the standpoint of 
philosophical  science, the necessity o f which  is shown by the progression.  But 
for this purpose  it was  not  possible to stick to the formal  aspect o f mere 
consciousness;  for the standpoint o f philosophical  knowing  is at the same time 
inwardly  the richest  in  basic  import and the most concrete one; so when  it 
emerged as the result  [o f the development],  it presupposed also the concrete 
shapes o f consciousness, such as morality, ethical  life, art, and  religion.  Hence,
29the development o f the content, or o f the subject matters o f special  parts of 
philosophical  science, falls directly  within that development o f consciousness 
which seems at first to be restricted just to what  is formal; that development has 
to take place behind the back o f consciousness so to speak,  inasmuch as the 
content is related to consciousness as what  is in-itself This makes the 
presentation  more complicated, and  what belongs to the concrete parts [of the 
System]  already  falls partly  within that  introduction— The examination that w ill 
be undertaken here  ...  is to contribute to the insight that the questions about the 
nature of cognition, about/a/V/7 and so on. that confront us in the  [realm  of] 
representation, and which we take to be fully  concrete, are  in  point o f fact 
reducible to simple determinations o f thought, which only get their genuine 
treatment  in the  Logic.” (EL  §25, pp.64-65)
So. the Phenomenology already comprises some content that will be more properly 
explicated in the individual parts of the system like the Logic, and the new 
introductory passage here in the Logic is to supplement the preparatory work already 
carried out in the Phenomenology, contributing to insights reached there. We should 
not be surprised then, to find certain congruencies between the content of the 
Phenomenology and the content of this further introduction.
2. From Being to Thought
It now remains to be seen whether our hypothesis regarding the transitions from A. to 
C.(AA.) fits Hegef s text. In the first instance we need to compare the first way or 
form of unification, beginning with being and passing onto the abstraction of 
thinking, with the movement through A. to B. in the Phenomenology', that is. with the 
movement through ‘Sense-certainty'. ‘Perception', and ‘Force and the 
Understanding'. Perhaps the most important transition here, and not to mention the 
most difficult and confusing, is the latter one. that o f‘Force and the Understanding' 
into B.. and it is for that reason that the lion's share of the discussion in this section 
has been given over to the ‘Force and the Understanding' and its famous example of 
the ‘inverted world'.
Now. obviously the starting point of the first way of unification is being, and 
as Hegel notes in the Encyclopaedia: “ (A)s far as beginning with being is concerned,
30this being, as what is immediate, presents itself as determined as an infinite manifold, 
as a world in all its fullness” (EL §50, p.94). In ‘Sense-certainty’, the first form of 
consciousness observed in A., the starting-point is the same: immediately presented 
being, preserved in all its fullness:
“(T)he knowledge or knowing which  is at the start or is immediately our object 
cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge o f the 
immediate or o f what simply is  ...  Because o f its concrete content sense-certainty 
immediately appears as the richest kind o f knowledge,  indeed a knowledge of 
infinite wealth  for which no bounds can be found" (PS 90/91, p.58)
Sense-certainty holds that consciousness has an immediate access to being, that is to 
say. it holds that what is immediately given in sense-experience is actual being and not 
some mediated presentation of it. Accordingly, in experiencing an individual sense- 
object such as ‘this house' or ‘this tree', consciousness is here certain that the 
particular individual house or tree is simply given without any form of mediation. 
What is putatively given therefore, cannot be reduced to any properties or qualities 
shared by a whole range of objects, it is not something predicable of anything else, 
rather what is given is the unique essence of that individual thing, prior to any 
conceptualisation of it. In this respect the knowledge provided in Sense-certainty is to 
be seen as wholly intuitive.
“All  that  it says about what  it knows is just that  it is; and  its truth contains 
nothing but the sheer being o f the thing [Sache]. Consciousness,  for its part,  is  in 
this certainty  only  as a pure  T ;  or I  am  in  it only  as a pure  ‘This', and the object 
similarly only  as a pure  ‘This’.  I, this  particular 1, am certain o f this particular 
thing  ...  here neither I  nor the thing has the significance o f a complex  process of 
mediation; the  T   does not have the significance o f a manifold  imagining or 
thinking;  nor does the  ‘thing'  signify something that has a host o f qualitites. On 
the contrary, the thing is, and  it is, merely  because  it is.  It is; this is the essential 
point  for sense knowledge, and this pure being, or this simple  immediacy, 
constitutes  its truth.  Sim ilarly, certainty as a connection is an immediate  pure 
connection:  consciousness is  ‘ I', nothing more, a pure  ‘This’; the singular 
consciousness knows a pure  ‘This’, or the single  item.  (PS 91,  pp.58-9).
31Insofar as Sense-certainty claims that consciousness enjoys immediate access to being, 
there is at the outset, no antithetical or oppositional relationship here between 
consciousness and being. However, while this is what Sense-certainty is supposed to 
be. we find that when we attend to an actual instance of it this far from being the case. 
Instead we find that pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two 
‘Thises'. one ‘This' as T . and the other ‘This' as object'’ (PS 92, p.59), and 
furthermore, the T  is taken in Sense-certainty to be unessential and mediated: it is. 
only as a knowing, which depends upon the object as that which is true or essential 
(PS 93. p.59).
The problem that then develops for this form of consciousness is one 
concerning the content of its object, of the unique essence of the individual thing it 
apprehends, the ‘This' as object. It seems that the content constantly changes from 
something which is. to something which is not. and that what abides throughout is a 
universal, indifferent to change. For example. Hegel notes, if the ‘This' is the object 
simply as it is ‘here' and ‘now‘. then ‘here'  might be a tree or ‘now' might be night, 
but if I turn around ‘here' is not a tree but something else, say a house, and if I check 
later to see i f ‘now' is still night, it is not, instead it has changed into morning (PS 
96/98, p.60-1). Hegel's point is that Sense-certainty's This' as object, as the unique 
essence of the individual thing it apprehends, is far from unique, instead it seems that 
the ‘This' shows itself to be “a mediated simplicity, or a universality" (PS 98, p.61).
So, if consciousness remains committed to Sense-certainty it seems that knowledge of 
the unique essence of an individual thing will be unattainable; apprehension, it seems, 
w ill fail to reach such a unique essence.
Now. Hegel allows Sense-certainty to respond before drawing any firm 
conclusion and we witness Sense-certainty adjusting its position to maintain this 
unique essence as something unique to an individual. At first the ‘This’ of the object is 
maintained as a unique essence because it is my object, because it is unique to this T . 
this subject's experience (PS  100. p.61).  but here the T   is just as universal as ‘This', 
and the unique essence is again found to change from something which is to 
something which is not. while what abides throughout is the T . T  might assert that 
‘here’ is a tree, but another T  might assert that ‘here’ is not a tree but a house, and 
both have the same immediacy, certainty and assurance, both have the “ same 
authentication” . Consequently, “ the one truth vanishes in the other” (PS  101, p.61) and 
what remains is precisely what is not unique: the I as universal (PS  102, p.62).
32A final attempt is made to maintain the unique essence of the individual object 
by restricting the apprehension of it to a pure act of intuiting in which other times, 
places and subjects are ignored. In this pure act, all the previous distinctions and 
oppositions that have developed throughout the chapter are suppressed, and what we 
are presented with is a self-identical, instantaneous and purely immediate relation (PS 
103/4. pp.62-3). The putative knowledge of such a pure act. the unique essence, can 
only be expressed ostensively, it can only be pointed to. The difficulty that Hegel 
brings out here is essentially the same as was noted before, viz. the instant the unique 
"This* is pointed to as ‘here' and ‘now' it is no longer ‘here' and ‘now', instead ‘here' 
and ‘now' is a ‘This' which is not the unique ‘This' that was pointed to. If Sense- 
certainty insists that the ‘This' remains the same, acknowledging that ‘This' can be 
applied over a variety of instances and hence can be pointed out, then it equally 
acknowledges that ‘This' is a universal, indifferent to the unique essence that Sense- 
certainty claims is given in its immediate relation to things.
It is only after this final attempt to maintain its view of its relation to. and 
knowledge of. being as immediate, that Sense-certainty is willing to acknowledge that 
the individual things it encounters in sense-experience cannot coherently be said to be 
immediately given unique essences. Instead it seems that what is. what does not pass 
away into non-being, is the universal, and consciousness, in the form of Perception, 
now readily accepts that what is sensuously present to it is to be taken as a universal 
(PS  111. p.67).
Before we consider Perception however, a word or two should be said about 
the movement of Sense-certainty in relation to our hypothesis. We observed that the 
starting point of Sense-certainty aligned with the starting-point of the first way of 
unification, that is. both started with being ‘as what is immediate'. But Hegel provides 
more detail about this first way of unification in the Encyclopaedia than we have thus 
far noted. He claims that “ in the first way being is common both sides, and the 
antithesis concerns only the distinction between what is singularised and what is 
universal" (EL §51. p.98). That is. insofar as an oppositional relationship between two 
elements, or a dichotomy, is seen to develop along this first way. it is not one that 
appears to be between thought and being, but rather one between the singular and 
universal. This observation certainly seems to fit the movement we have witnessed in 
Sense-certainty and it will be seen to fit the general movement through A. to B.
33In Sense-certainty “(0)ur approach to the object m ust... be immediate or 
receptive', we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself’ (PS 90, p.58), and 
thus in apprehending a sensuously presented individual there is to be no abstraction 
from its unique essence, no taking of it as a universal, the individual must be 
apprehended qua singular, unique essence. O f course, Sense-certainty believes this to 
be possible and so views the universal, the ‘This’, ‘here’, ‘now, and the ‘I’, to be 
opposed to the singular. What we witness in Sense-certainty then, is the development 
of this opposition of singular and universal to a point of apparent resolution -  
Perception -  and though there is a distinction made between ‘This’ as object and T . 
being is. throughout, ‘common to both sides'.
Now, Perception accepts that what is sensuously present to it is a universal, 
that is to say, it has learned the lesson of Sense-certainty. What that lesson taught was 
that this universal resulted from the failure of Sense-certainty to immediately 
apprehend the ‘This’, it resulted from the constant passing over of the ‘This' into a 
‘not This'. Perception's acceptance of the universal as that which is sensuously present 
to it, is the acceptance of the ‘This' as ‘not This'-as not being the ‘unique essence' of 
Sense-certainty; it is the establishment o f‘This’ (universal) instead as a simple 
togetherness of a plurality of ‘Thises* (universals), as a plurality of spatial and 
temporal instances. In other words, the universal present to Perception is “ in its 
simplicity a mediated universal" (PS  112. p.67) and its mediated nature is expressed 
sensuously in the form of properties “one being the negative of the other” (PS  113, 
p.68). each a simple universal, indifferent to the others.
The singular being of Perception then, is an “ abstract universal medium” that 
may be characterised as an “Also” (PS  113. p.68-9) -  a kind of focal point in which 
multiple mutually indifferent properties are co-instantiated, but with the proviso that 
this is nothing over and above a mere focal point for this collection of properties, 
which are themselves indifferent to it. Here the object is wholly identified with the 
various properties, it is an ‘Also'. As Hegel puts it:
“(T)his abstract universal  medium, which can be called simply  ‘thinghood'  or 
‘pure essence',  is nothing else than what  Here and Now have proved themselves 
to be,  viz. a simple togetherness o f a plurality;  but the many are, in their 
determinateness, simple universals themselves.  The salt is a simple  Here, and at 
the same time manifold;  it  is white and also tart, also cubical  in shape, o f a
34specific gravity, etc. A ll these many properties are in a single simple  ‘Here’, in 
which, therefore they  interpenetrate; none has a different Here from the others, 
but each is everywhere,  in the same Here in which the others are. And, at the 
same time, without being separated by different Heres, they do not affect each 
other in this interpenetration.  The whiteness does not affect the cubical  shape, 
and neither affects the tart taste, etc; on the contrary, since each  is  itself a simple 
relating o f self to self it  leaves the others alone, and  is connected to them  only  by 
the  indifferent Also.  This Also  is thus the pure universal  itself, or the medium, 
the  ‘thinghood*, which holds them  together in this way" (PS  113.  pp.68-9).
This characterisation of the object of Perception as an Also quickly unravels however, 
as the properties are said to be determinate and this conflicts with their putative 
mutual indifference;
" if the many determinate properties were strictly  indifferent to one another,  if 
they were simply and solely  self-related, they  would not be determinate;  for they 
are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from  one another, 
and relate themselves to others as to their opposites.  Yet; as thus opposed to one 
another they cannot be together in  the simple unity of their medium,  which  is just 
as essential to them as negation" (PS  114.  p.69).
The difficulty is that in being determinate, properties like ‘white* and ‘tart* cannot 
merely be indifferent to one another, but must stand in a contrapostive relation to one 
another. It is only in virtue of this contraposition that they are determinate. But if this 
is the case, then the basic focal point of these properties must be something over and 
above such a simple medium. After all. the harmony of the various properties (white, 
tart, etc.) in a single focal point depended on the indifference of the properties to each 
other and to this focal point. The focal point remained single because of this 
indifference. However, if the properties are independent, distinct or contraposed to 
one another, they cannot all be identified with a single focal point, unless this focal 
point is actually something over and above the properties -  a substratum.  say -  which 
supports the properties and in which they inhere. Accordingly, the ‘abstract universal 
medium* of Perception can be characterised as more than a simple indifferent unity, 
more than mere ‘thinghood’. it is a One as well -  a singular Thing exclusive of the 
properties, a substratum:
35“the differentiation o f the properties,  in so far as it is not an  indifferent 
differentiation but  is exclusive, each property  negating the others, thus falls 
outside o f this simple medium; and the medium, therefore,  is not merely an Also, 
an  indifferent unity, but a One as well, a unity which excludes an other. The One 
is the moment o f negation;  it  is  itself quite simply a relation o f self to self and  it 
excludes another; and  it is that by  which  ‘thinghood'  is determined as a Thing"
(Ibid.).
The object of Perception then, is both an Also and a One. That is, it is both a plurality 
of universal properties and a singular thing, and these two interrelated but 
incompatible ways of characterising the object quickly leads consciousness, in the 
form of Perception, into trouble. We do not need to consider all the details of 
consciousness' difficulties here, it is sufficient to note that the moment consciousness 
takes one characterisation of the object to be correct, a discrepancy arises such that 
the other characterisation seems correct and is adopted.
This cycling between the characterisations leads consciousness to realise that 
perceiving is not simply a pure apprehension of the truth, but rather that it alters the 
truth (PS 118, pp.71-2). Consciousness then simply needs to “ hold fast" to the object 
in “ its true character" and “ if. in the course of perceiving it. something turns up which 
contradicts it, this is to be recognised as a reflection of mine" (PS  119. p.72). i.e. of 
consciousness as Perception. Naturally, the problem that consciousness runs into with 
this new strategy, is that of determining which characterisation, the One or the Also, 
accords to the true character of the object and which accords to the delusive influence 
of Perception. Is the object truly a One and Perception responsible for dividing this 
unity into independent exclusive properties, or is the object truly an Also and 
Perception responsible for unifying the plurality of properties into a One? As before, 
no clear answer is forthcoming as the moment the true character is taken to be one 
way. it cycles or comes to be seen as being the other way. Consciousness's strategy of 
accepting responsibility for the untrue aspect in its perceiving of things doesn't help it 
to render the two characterisations of the thing consistent.
Consciousness as Perception then tries a different tack. It takes the object to be 
both unified and diverse, but makes a distinction regarding the relative essentiality of 
the unity and diversity. The plurality of properties are taken to be inessential, but. as 
before, it is realised that it is only these properties that give the object any 
determinacy, that distinguish it from anything else. They are then necessary to the
36object as a singular thing, and the new distinction of essential and unessential 
collapses. The object is both unified and diverse, the various characterisations of the 
object seem equally true, each constantly giving way to the other, and consciousness’s 
attempts to hold fast to one characterisation over against the other all come to nought.
The overall problem in this to-ing and fro-ing of Perception is that 
consciousness's conception of universality in relation to singularity is inadequate:
“Thus the singular being o f sense does indeed vanish  in the dialectical  movement 
o f immediate certainty and  becomes universality,  but  it  is only  a sensuous 
universality. M y ‘meaning*  has vanished, and perception takes the object as it  is 
in itself, or as a universal  as such.  Singular being therefore emerges  in the object 
as true singleness, as the in-itself o f the One, or as reflectedness-into-self.  But 
this  is still a conditioned being-for-self alongside which appears another being- 
for-self, the universality  which  is opposed to. and conditioned by singular being.
But these two contradictory extremes are not  merely alongside each other but  in 
a single unity, or in other words, the defining characteristic common to both,  viz. 
‘being-for-self,  is burdened with opposition generally,  i.e.  it  is at the same time 
not a  ‘being-for-self. The sophistry o f perception seeks to save these moments 
from their contradiction, and  it seeks to lay  hold on the truth, by distinguishing 
between the aspects. by  sticking to the  ‘Also*  and to the  ‘in so far*, and finally, 
by distinguishing the  ‘unessential*  aspect from  an  ‘essence*  which  is opposed to 
it.  But these expedients,  instead o f warding o ff deception  in the process of 
apprehension, prove themselves on the contrary to be quite empty; and the truth 
which  is supposed to be won  by  this logic o f the perceptual  process proves to be 
in one and the same respect the opposite [of itself) and thus to have as its essence 
a universality which  is devoid o f distinctions and determinations'* (PS  130,  p.77).
In the movement from Sense-certainty to Perception, consciousness learned to accept 
the singular unique essence as a universal. But in grasping the singular essence as 
universal, consciousness merely conceived of universality in terms of abstract self- 
identity. that is. it conceived of universality in terms of the suppression of 
differentiation, merely as the result of negation or mediation of the negative. After all, 
consciousness only had the experience of Sense-certainty behind it and this was all it 
learnt of the universal there -  the universal is that which was seen to result from the 
passing over of the ‘unique essence' of Sense-certainty into non-being, and in that 
sense was determined by that passing as that which remained irrespective of it -  that
37which is indifferent to such passing or fluctuation, that which abides in spite of it and 
is.
It is this limited conception of universality as resulting from, but exclusive of 
negation that leads Perception into difficulty. Each of the sensuous properties, as a 
universal, is treated as “ a simple relating of self to self’ which “ leaves the others 
alone" (PS  113. p.69) and the focal point in which they interpenetrate, as a universal 
medium, is equally indifferent -  an Also. However, as Hegel notes. “(I)n the 
relationship which has thus emerged it is only the character of positive universality 
that is at first observed and developed" (PS  114. p.69). that is to say. there is more to 
this universality than the suppression of differentiation, than indifference. It is also the 
result of differentiation, is determined by it. and as such, this universality itself 
differentiates -  it is not the fleeting content of Sense-certainty, it is that which abides 
in sense-experience. In other words, insofar as this universality is determined as 
abstract self-identity, it is exclusive.  It is not the all-inclusive object of Sense-certainty 
from which nothing is to be omitted. But if this universality is characterised simply as 
an Also of indifferent properties, if this particular piece of salt is nothing more than 
the collection of indifferent properties that constitute it. then it's not clear in what 
sense this salt is determinate or exclusive. That is. if the properties as universals 
themselves, fail to differentiate themselves from one another, fail to be exclusive. then 
this piece of salt as their universal medium, fails to have any determination in virtue 
of which it can be differentiated from any other collection of properties. At that point 
it's not clear that we're dealing with universality at all and not simply the all inclusive 
object of Sense-certainty. So, in accordance with its conception of universality, 
consciousness must take the properties as exclusive, as differentiating themselves 
from one another and relating themselves to others as to their opposites. However, in 
being true to its conception of universality as that which results from differentiation, 
the differentiation cannot be allowed to fall within the universal, and so this piece of 
salt, as the universal medium of the differentiated properties, must be exclusive of 
those properties, it must be something over against them, a substratum or One. As 
Hegel puts it:
“as thus opposed to one another they  [the properties] cannot be together in the
simple unity o f their medium, which  is just as essential to them  as negation;  the
differentiation o f the properties,  insofar as  it  is not an  indifferent differentiation,
38but is exclusive, each property negating the others, thus falls outside o f this 
simple medium; and the medium, therefore, is not merely an Also, an  indifferent 
unity, but a One as well, a unity which excludes an other” (PS  114, p.69).
O f course, the One or substratum itself, in being exclusive or independent from its 
properties, proves to be indeterminate and the familiar to-ing and fro-ing of 
Perception then ensues as consciousness attempts to maintain, as it did in Sense- 
certainty. the coherence of its conception. The overall point is that, in being conceived 
of as abstract self-identity, universality is taken internally to admit no differentiation -  
as an Also it is indifferent to the differentiation of the properties and as a One it is 
exclusive of their differentiation, it only results from differentiation which is external 
to it, and it is this partitioning off or fixing of the differentiating aspect in something 
external to universality which fails to take us far beyond the all-inclusive, 
indeterminate object of Sense-certainty. What consciousness learns through the failure 
of its conception here is precisely that the differentiation is to be located within 
universality, that the indifference of the Also and the exclusivity of the One are not to 
be located in different sustaining elements, but are instead to be located in a single 
unity, or put another way, that universality is both self-differentiating and constant in 
this differentiation, that which abides through it. As Hegel expresses it. in this new 
conception “what we now have is unconditioned absolute universality. and 
consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of the Understanding" (PS 
129. p.77).
Now. before we go on to consider the developments of the ‘Force and the 
Understanding' chapter of the Phenomenology we should note the importance of 
Perception in regard to our hypothesis. We will recall that in Perception, while being 
is still the object of consciousness and this being is still given sensuously, 
consciousness at first assumes that it simply apprehends its object, but subsequently 
comes to learn instead that it takes its object to be a certain way (PS  118. p.71 -2). It 
takes responsibility for one of the two incompatible characterisations of its object, 
separating pure apprehension of its object from the deceptive way it takes the object 
to be, and in this way hopes to maintain its conception of the universal as abstract 
self-identity. That is to say. that here as we move away from the immediacy of Sense- 
certainty. we begin to see a clear example of the fixity of consciousness’s conceptions 
or thoughts and their role in the generation of a dichotomy of thought and being.
39Consciousness’s conception of the universal as abstract self-identity leads it to 
make the distinction between a pure or true apprehension of its object and the object 
as it appears to consciousness, or put another way, the object as it is for itself and as it 
is for another. This distinction is essentially a separation of being from thought, or. at 
least, a separation of being as the object of Perception from thought as the activity of 
reflection attributed to consciousness in Perception. Consciousness either accepts 
responsibility for breaking up an intrinsic unity (One) into a plurality of independent 
properties, thereby taking itself as the medium or the Also (PS  119, p.72). or it 
accepts responsibility for uniting (synthesising) a plurality of diverse properties (Also) 
into a unity, thereby taking itself as such a unity, a One (PS  121. pp.73-4). In each 
case however, by taking either the diversity or unity to be external to the object, 
consciousness is holding to the truth of its conception of universality as abstract self- 
identity. After all, both the options: accepting the true nature of the object as a One or 
accepting it as an Also, involve maintaining that that which differentiates the object as 
truly a One or truly an Also, is extrinsic to it. In sticking to the presumed truth of its 
conception of universality as abstract self-identity, consciousness prevents any 
determinacy from entering the object itself, and thereby perpetuates its own 
discomfort.
If we look more closely at the separation here, then we will see that it accords 
to the re-statement of the dichotomy in the Encyclopaedia Logic mentioned earlier. In 
the terms of the re-statement “(A)bstract identity ... and being” as the ‘simple 
abstraction' “are the two moments that reason seeks to unify" (EL §49. p.94). These 
elements are dichotomous  insofar as abstract identity is an identity in virtue of an 
opposition or difference, an identity that results from difference, “a negation as such” 
(Ibid.), whereas simple abstraction is rather an abstraction from all opposition or 
difference. Now. the starting point of Sense-certainty as immediate being in its 
‘perfect entirety' appears as the simple abstraction and the object of Perception that 
results from the movement through Sense-certainty. as a universal is an abstract 
identity, that is, it is the identity of what remains constant in the dissolution of Sense- 
certainty's object. In fact, as such, as that which is determined through the dissolution 
of Sense-certainty’s object or as the truth of Sense-certainty’s object, it is equally the 
negation of that object; were it not for the universal, the ‘This', T , ‘Here’ and ‘Now’, 
Sense-certainty’s ‘unique essence’, the “ sheer being of the thing” (PS 91. p.58) would 
remain as true. As the negation of Sense-certainty’s object, as not that object, the
40universal as abstract identity is set in opposition to simple abstraction. According to 
Hegel’s demonstration in Sense-certainty, however, the universal is what Sense- 
certainty reveals itself  to be, i.e. this universality is not to be taken as independent 
from the simple abstraction which characterises the starting point, rather this simple 
abstraction is seen to involve negation, to be internally differentiated. We may no 
longer characterise it as simple abstraction, but the important point is that we haven’t 
here moved from one kind of being to another, diverse kind; we remain with what was 
characterised as ‘simple abstraction', only now we see this as being internally 
differentiated. So. in holding fast to its conception of universality as abstract self- 
identity. refusing to allow its object to be internally differentiated, consciousness in 
Perception, maintains the dichotomy of being and thought, and is for that reason 
unable to reconcile its taking of its object as equally an Also and a One.
It is the ‘Force & the Understanding’ chapter that brings about the major 
transition from section A. to that of B. and. according to our hypothesis, the 
connection of the two wavs admissible for the unification of being and thought is to 
be found in this transition. Here then we should expect to see a culmination of sorts to 
the first way of unification, and a transition to a new starting point constituted by the 
‘abstraction of thinking’.
As Understanding, consciousness has improved upon its conception of 
universality as abstract self-identity and now, at least implicitly, conceives of 
universality as unconditioned. Accordingly, its object is no longer the Also of 
indifferent properties that passes over into the opposing unity of the One, rather 
consciousness's object is now this movement or passing over as an essential and 
necessary movement -  as constitutive of consciousness’s object. As such, this object 
is Force:
“In other words, the “matters" posited as independent directly  pass over into their 
unity, and their unity  directly  unfolds its diversity, and this once again reduces 
itself to unity.  But this movement  is called force" (PS  136, p.81).
This object is not then directly or immediately present in sense-experience, rather it is 
developed or revealed through sense-experience. It is an internal connection of the 
matters of Perception, one could say, their deeper underlying unity, and accordingly 
the world of perception remains for consciousness, by and large, unchanged.
41However, this is not to say that Force and the expression of Force are two 
substantially diverse elements. O f course, there is a distinction to be made between 
them and as distinguished Force is an exclusive unity or One, diverse from the matters 
of its expression, but this Force is only determined as such in contradistinction to the 
diversity of its expression, that is. it owes its being to its expression -  it only is as a 
unity through being expressed. Likewise, the expression of Force is only determined 
as such in contradistinction to Force as an exclusive unity. In such a distinction then, 
the moments distinguished constantly pass into their other, they do not stand firm as 
opposite extremes.
“Consequently, these moments are not divided  into two independent extremes 
offering each other only  an opposite extreme: their essence  rather consists 
simply and solely  in this, that each is solely through the other, and what each thus 
is  it  immediately  no longer is, since  it is the other.  They  have thus,  in fact, no 
substances o f their own which  might support and maintain them. The Notion o f 
Force  rather preserves  itself as the essence in  its very actuality.  Force, as actual. 
exists simply and solely  in  its expression, which at the same time is nothing else 
than a supersession o f its e lf...  Thus the truth o f Force remains only the thought 
o f it; the moments o f its actuality, their substances and their movement, collapse 
unresistingly  into an  undifferentiated unity  ...  This true essence o f things has 
now the character o f not being  immediately  for consciousness; on the contrary, 
consciousness has a mediated  relation to the  inner being and, as the 
Understanding, looks through this mediating play o f  forces into the true 
background o f Things" (PS  141 /143, p. 86).
So. as Understanding, consciousness grasps that the truth of Force, this inner being of 
things, is not the sensuously immediate, but rather is notional and mediate (PS  143, 
pp.86-7). As a result the sensuous, perceived world takes on a negative significance 
for consciousness; the truth of consciousness's object lies beyond the sensuous world 
in a supersensible inner realm.
"W ithin this inner truth, as the absolute universal which has been purged o f the 
antithesis between the universal  and the  individual  and has become the object o f 
the  Understanding, there now opens up above the sensuous world, which  is the 
world o f appearance, a supersensible world  which henceforth  is the true  world.
42above the vanishing present world there opens up a permanent beyond' (PS  144, 
p.87).
As notional in nature, this supersensible inner realm is not alien to consciousness, not 
some beyond which cannot be accessed, as if it were some intrinsically diverse kind 
of being. On the contrary, as notional this supersensible inner is of the same nature as 
consciousness and. strictly speaking, in looking into this inner realm consciousness is 
self-consciousness.
Nevertheless, this notion in its nature is determined as nothing but the expression it 
receives through appearance, viz. the constant and immediate movement or passing of 
differentiated elements into their opposite, and as such, at least taken immediately, 
seems to lack any determinateness beyond its universality. That is, consciousness fails 
to see anything in it. least of all itself, and it appears as a merely empty beyond of the 
object.
“The  inner world  is.  for consciousness, still  a pure beyond.  because 
consciousness does not as yet find  itself in  it.  It  is empty,  for it  is merely the 
nothingness o f appearance, and  positively the simple or unitary universal” (PS 
146, p.88).
Now. of course, if nothing more is said of the inner world then it would remain 
forever an empty and therefore unknowable beyond, and there would seem to be a 
permanent divide between being and thought. In fact, as we will see, consciousness as 
Understanding comes to a view somewhat similar to this by the end of the chapter, but 
not because the inner world is a mere beyond, rather because, yet again, its conception 
of universality is lacking.
There is. then, more to be said regarding this inner world. As Hegel notes 
“ (T)he inner world ... comes from the world of appearance which has mediated it; in 
other words, appearance is its essence and. in fact, its filling'’ (PS  147. p.89). That is 
to say, as being simply the expression it receives through appearance, this inner world 
is what remains constant or abides throughout appearance, the truth of appearance, 
which is universal difference. T his is just what consciousness has learned through its 
experience of Sense-certainty and Perception: in the dissolution of its object in Sense- 
certainty consciousness discovered immediate being as universality, and in the
43dissolution of its perceptual object consciousness discovered this universality to be 
internally or self differentiated, and present to consciousness only through this 
differentiation, i.e. mediately. As this mediation or self-differentiation constitutes the 
essence of the inner, supersensible world, or this inner supersensible world essentially 
is this self-differentiation, this world is universal difference.
Hegel is quite clear in putting matters this way, that “ (W)e completely 
misunderstand this if we think that the supersensible world is therefore the sensuous 
world, or the world as it exists for immediate sense-certainty and perception" (PS  147. 
p.89). rather this supersensible world, as universal difference, is the world of sense- 
knowledge and perception “ posited as superseded or as in truth an inner world"
(Ibid.). That is. the immediate completely transformed or revealed as being, in truth, 
universal or conceptual.
Understanding initially conceives of this universal difference in terms of the 
laws of natural phenomena:
“(T)his difference  is expressed  in the law ,  which  is the stable  image o f unstable 
appearance. Consequently, the supersensible world  is an inert realm o f laws 
which, though beyond the perceived world -  for this exhibits  law only through 
incessant change -  is equally present in  it and  is its direct tranquil  image.
This realm o f laws  is  indeed the truth for the  Understanding, and that truth  has  its 
content in the law” (PS  149/150, pp.90-1).
However, in conceiving of the inner world in this way. consciousness falls into 
difficulty. Basically stated the problem is that the inner realm of laws does not “ fill 
out the world of appearance", it is not “the entire presence of appearance" (PS  150. 
p.91). instead appearance seems to retain an aspect not captured in the inner realm of 
laws. This is due. again, to consciousness's conception of universality. Here 
universality as that which abides or remains constant throughout Perception is the 
truth or essence, and it is conceived of simply, as a stable or constant unity which is 
internally differentiated, but conceived of in this way. universality is indifferent to the 
specific nature of the differentiation through which it is constituted. This universality 
is internally differentiated, and so the contrapostive relation of the differentiated 
moments taken individually, must be internal to a unity, these moments must 
constitute a unity as that which abides or is stable through their mutual difference.
44Each differentiated moment is not then preserved in its determinacy, or each 
particular difference is not preserved, rather, what each particular difference is 
essentially, or in truth, is just universal difference -  this unity. That is, the nature of 
the differentiation in law is left indeterminate, it is merely stable differentiation. 
Accordingly, law as such universality, as a stable image of unstable appearance, is 
indifferent to actual appearance that constitutes it. “with every change of circumstance 
the law has a different actuality'’ (Ibid.) but the law qua universality remains the 
same.
This defect shows up in the realm of laws itself in the form of a collapse of 
specific, distinct laws into one unified, overarching law as their truth, in which the 
determinateness of the specific laws is dissolved. That is to say. the defect becomes 
manifest in consciousness's object -  the realm of laws -  in the form of a collapse of 
that object's own. internal determinacy. As a law. law involves determinacy. it can be 
contrasted with other laws. But this contrast collapses because as law. i.e. as internally 
differentiated universality. it is indifferent to the determinacy of its constitutive 
moments, the moments are merely implicit essentialities, and so the difference of one 
particular law from another collapses. There may be indefinitely many distinct laws, 
but:
“this plurality  is  itself rather a defect;  for it contradicts the principle o f the 
Understanding for which, as consciousness o f the simple inner world, the True is 
the  implicitly  universal  unity.  It must therefore  let the many  laws collapse  into 
one  law, just as. e.g.  the  law  by which a stone falls, and the  law by  which 
heavenly bodies move,  have been grasped as one law” (Ibid.)
So. in allowing the laws to thus coincide in a unity as their essence or truth, the 
specific, determinate character of the laws is overcome, the unity is indifferent to the 
specific nature of the differentiation through which it is constituted:
“what  is found  is,  in  fact,  not the  unity o f these specific laws,  but a law  which 
leaves out their specific character; just as the one law which combines  in  itself 
the laws o f falling terrestrial  bodies and o f the motions o f the heavenly bodies,  in 
fact expresses neither law. The unification o f all  laws in universal attraction 
expresses no other content than just the mere Notion o f law itself...  Universal
45attraction merely asserts that everything has a constant difference in relation to 
other things" (Ibid.).
This Notion of law is then, for consciousness here, the true inner being. But it lacks 
the determinateness of specific laws, which therefore remains outside the 
supersensible inner being, in the sensuous world. This determinateness cannot be the 
true or the essential then, it is instead a vanishing moment and the Notion of law is 
indifferent to it. So, we see the same problem here, that the determinateness is that 
through which the Notion is constituted, the determinateness is its expression, its 
being, and yet the Notion seems indifferent to the determinateness -  the 
determinateness seems to be inessential to the Notion.
This indifference then, as the defect, masks the inner truth of law. which is 
that the unstable appearance or the particular difference of its moments, are essential 
to it.
“in the law the difference  itself is grasped immediately and taken  up into the 
universal, thereby, however, giving the moments whose relation  is expressed  by 
the  law a subsistence  in the form o f indifferent and  [merelyj  implicit 
essentialities" (PS  151.  p.92).
As indifferent, implicit essentialities, the moments are overlooked by Understanding, 
and this is just what the indifference of law to actual appearance consists in. Law 
then, is constituted as a duality. On the one hand, the determinate differences are 
present in it as overlooked, implicit essentialities, that is, as merely indifferent, 
independent moments, lacking any necessary connection to one another within the 
unity, and on the other, it is the unity or ground of these moments, their essence.
“The  law  is thereby  present  in a twofold  manner:  once, as law  in  which the 
differences are expressed as independent moments; and also in the form  o f a 
simple withdrawal  into  itself, which again can be called Force  ...  In this sense, 
simple electricity, e.g.  is Force; but the expression o f difference falls within  the 
law", this difference is positive and  negative electricity  ...  Electricity, as simple 
Force, is indifferent to  its  law -  to be positive and  negative;  and  if we call the 
former its Notion  but the  latter its  being, then  its Notion  is  indifferent to  its being.
46It merely has this property, which just means this property  is not in itself 
necessary to it” (PS  152, pp.92-3).
The Force may have been expressed in another way to the way in which it was, that 
is, there doesn’t seem to be any necessary connection between the law in truth, i.e. 
Force, and the differences expressed as independent moments in the law. But if the 
Force is indifferent in this way to the law. then it seems that it is not clear there is any 
substantive content to it as constitutive of the inner being of things. Hither the Force 
does not necessitate the differences expressed as independent moments in the law. in 
which case we cannot be sure that these differences are differences belonging to the 
Force, and therefore that Force is their essence, or the independent moments, the 
differences as expressed, themselves remain indifferent to one another -  they are not 
necessary for one another, and then, equally, we cannot be sure that Force as their 
unity constitutes their essence (PS  152/153. pp.92-4). Put another way. either the 
Understanding is responsible for the independence of the moments in which the 
differences are expressed, or it is responsible for the unity of Force as the essence of 
the moments. In either case “ (T)he difference ...  is not a difference in its own self: 
either the universal. Force, is indifferent to the division which is the law. or the ... 
parts, of the law are indifferent to one another'*, it is “ not a difference belonging to the 
thing itself' (PS  154, p.94).
In a certain sense, what is occurring here is a replay of the difficulties 
encountered in the sensuous world with Perception, although now at the level of the 
supersensible world. In Perception consciousness's object characterised as the 
universal medium of indifferent properties, the Also, stood in opposition to that 
object's determinacy as an exclusive One. Flere. in ‘Force and the Understanding’, the 
supersensible inner realm as consciousness's object, displays an analogous internal 
opposition. This realm as law is an internally differentiated universal, and in its unity 
or as an internally differentiated whole. it is indifferent to the determinacy of its 
differentiation. But as indifferent to this determinacy, there appears to be no internal 
or necessary link between the whole and the determinate, differentiated moments, that 
is, they seem to stand opposed to one another and consciousness falls back into its old 
strategy of taking responsibility for the deceptive appearance of opposition, in order 
to hold fast to its conception.
47“this inner difference still  falls, to begin with, only within the Understanding, and 
is not yet posited in the thing itself.  It is, therefore, only  its own necessity that  is 
asserted by the Understanding; the difference, then,  is posited by the 
Understanding in such a way that, at the same time,  it is expressly stated that the 
difference is not a difference belonging to the thing itself This necessity,  which 
is merely verbal,  is thus a recital o f the moments constituting the cycle o f 
necessity. The moments are  indeed distinguished,  but, at the same time, their 
difference is expressly  said to be not a difference o f the thing itself, and 
consequently  is itself immediately cancelled again.  This process  is called 
'explanation'. A  law  is enunciated;  from  this,  its  implicitly  universal element or 
ground  is distinguished as Force; but it  is said that this difference is no 
difference, rather the ground  is constituted exactly  the same as the  law. The 
single occurrence o f lightning, e.g.,  is apprehended as a universal, and this 
universal  is enunciated as the law o f electricity; the 'explanation' then condenses 
the law into Force as the essence o f the  law. This  Force, then,  is so constituted 
that when  it is expressed, opposite electricities appear, which disappear again 
into one another; that  is. Force is constituted exactly the same as law:; there  is 
said to be no difference whatever between them. The differences are the pure, 
universal expression o f law, and pure  Force;  but both have the same content, the 
same constitution.  Thus the difference qua difference o f content, of the thing,  is 
also again withdrawn" {Ibid.  pp.94/95).
This strategy, far from solving the difficulty, exacerbates it by refusing to let the 
opposition fall within consciousness's object. Instead, consciousness locates the 
appearance of opposition between the object's unity and determinacy. in a sustaining 
element that is diverse from its object, viz. in the Understanding. This does not imply 
that consciousness's conception of its object as an internally differentiated 
universality has changed, the aim of the strategy is. rather, to maintain this 
conception, but what it does imply is that this internal differentiation cannot by 
grasped in its determinacy by consciousness as the Understanding42. Here then, in
A 1
~   The issue of delineating an  internal or necessary  link between the whole and its differentiated 
moments can be otherwise expressed in terms of a problematic relation of grounding.  It seems that the 
Notion of the law that constitutes the inner being of things is  inferred and derived from  specific 
instances or manifestations of law  in the sensuous world. That  is to say, this Notion, though 
distinguished from the instances as their ground,  is only understood on the basis of those  instances it is 
supposed to ground. So it seems that there are two interrelated grounding relations present: one which 
runs from  instances as ground to Notion as grounded, and the other which runs from Notion as ground 
to instances as grounded. (Or,  if we take the sensuous world as what is, as being, and the Notion as 
thought, then we have one relation  in which being is the ground for thought and another in which 
thought is the ground for being.) Now,  in claiming responsibility  for being unable to find a necessary 
link between the Notion of law and  its determinate  instances, i.e.  in claiming that it necessarily makes  a
48taking responsibility for the deceptive appearance of opposition, in asserting that the 
difference between the unity and the determinate moments which constitute it is not a 
difference of the thing itself.’ consciousness fixes its object as an internally 
differentiated beyond, the differentiations of which it cannot know. That is, what 
initially seems to be a qualitative difference, a difference in content, is taken to be a 
merely formal difference in explanation. In other words, consciousness can know this 
inner or beyond as the truth, but cannot know the internal constitution of this truth, its 
determinacy. It is an internally differentiated but inert substrate in a sensuous 
covering.
Here then, we see again a clear example of the fixity of consciousness's
conceptions that Hegel alluded to in his ‘Preface' as well as the Difference essay, and
its role in the generation of a dichotomy of thought and being. We may recall that in
the latter essay he noted that the Understanding or intellect (Verstand) is the source of
dichotomy, through its determining action of setting limits: he also noted that “ in
striving to enlarge itself into the Absolute, the intellect only reproduces itself... and
so mocks itself' (DF. p.90). what it seeks remains forever beyond the differences and
antitheses it delineates, differences which here it holds do not belong to the thing
itself. In the former text we were told that the “task nowadays consists ... in freeing
determinate thoughts from their fixity” (PS 33. p.20), and again in the Difference
essay “ (T)he sole interest of Reason is to suspend such rigid antitheses” (DF. p.90).
The viewpoint of the Understanding then, at this juncture of the Phenomenology must
be mistaken and indeed, if what we have witnessed so far is an emergence from
immediacy or the first way of unification, then were the Understanding to be correct
in its outlook here, such a way would be inadmissible -  it would lead only to a point
distinction between the Notion and instances which,  in truth,  is no distinction. Understanding 
acknowledges that what has been distinguished as ground and grounded collapses, or is in truth the 
same. That is to say it acknowledges that there is a necessary  link between the two grounding relations, 
though  it fails to comprehend the determinate nature o f the link. As Hegel puts it in the Science of 
Logic:
"in this mode of explanation the two opposite directions o f the ground relation are present without being apprehended 
in their determinate relation  The ground is  ...  that from which the phenomenon is to be understood; but conversely,  it is the 
ground that is inferred from the phenomenon and the former is understood from the latter.  I he main business o f this reflection 
consists . . .  in finding the grounds from the phenomenon, that  is. converting the immediate phenomenon into the form of 
reflected being; consequently the ground,  instead of being in and for itself and self-subsistent. is. on the contrary, the posited and 
derived.  Now  since in this procedure the ground is derived  from the phenomenon and  its determinations are based on it. the 
phenomneon certainly  flows quite smoothly and with a favourable wind from its ground.  But in this way. knowledge has not 
advanced a step;  its movement is confined within a difference of form which the same procedure inverts and sublates." (SI., 
p.459  ‘Remark:  f ormal  Method of explanation  from Tautological  Grounds").
The result is confusion and misapprehension: “ ...one finds oneself in a kind of witches’ circle 
in which determinations of real being and determinations of reflection, ground and grounded, 
phenomena and phantoms, run riot in  indiscriminate company and enjoy equal rank with one another” 
(SL, p.461). This  is just the kind of result we will see in the Phenomenology with consciousness as 
Understanding.
49where we can comprehend the functioning of the Understanding, but where such 
Understanding cannot grasp the object itself in its true determinacy. It seems the 
Understanding would serve only to isolate us from being. The implication is that ‘we’ 
as observers of this movement (re)traced in ‘A. Consciousness’ can see that the 
Understanding is mistaken in its viewpoint and is in error in sticking “to the inert 
unity of its object” (PS  155. p.95). That is, we are here witnessing an etiological 
account of the appearance of a dichotomy of thought and being, a dichotomy that is 
to be dissolved, though not by some kind of intuitive access to the truth or by 
“ running together what thought has put asunder, by supressing the differentiations of 
the Notion" (PS 7. p.5), rather it will be brought about via the very movement of 
differentiation, the formal movement of Understanding in explanation, and form and 
content will collapse into one another.
Indeed, ‘we’ as observers see in the Understanding's process of explanation 
just what was missing from its conception of the inner being of things. The inner 
being of things was constituted by consciousness’s conception of universality that 
developed throughout A., it was an internally differentiated but stable universality, an 
"inert realm of laws', the 'direct, tranquil image’ of the ‘incessant change' of the 
perceived world, and ‘equally present in it’. That is, while equally present in the 
perceived world, this inner realm failed to encompass all aspects of that world, it left 
the differentiating movement of the incessant change outside of itself in the perceived 
world. This inner realm was internally differentiated, but as lacking the movement of 
the differentiation the internally differentiated moments could not be discerned in 
their determinacy -  there seemed to be no intrinsically necessary link between the 
independent moments of law and their unity. Force. However, in the movement of 
explanation ‘we’ see the precise movement that was absent from consciousness's 
conception. ‘We’ see that in explaining. Understanding apprehends the singular as a 
universal which is enunciated as law. for example. “(T)he single occurrence of 
lightning ...  is apprehended as a universal, and this universal is enunciated as the law 
of electricity'’ (PS  154, p.94), and then distinguishes the ground or essential moment. 
Force, from the law. This distinction or difference though, is then cancelled as 
Understanding takes sole responsibility for it, this difference is not a difference of the 
object itself, of content, rather the ground or essence is constituted exactly the same as 
law, it is merely a formal difference, and these moments have the same content. So,
50the law of electricity in its independent moments -  positive  and negative electricity -  
is. in truth, no different from its simple essence. Force or simple electricity43.
That is, in this movement of the Understanding ‘we’ see the full differentiating 
movement of the incessant change of the perceived world. We witness a movement 
which (a.) makes a differentiation which is no real differentiation, and (b.) is a 
differentiation which the movement itself cancels as a differentiation. In such a 
movement then, what is present “ is not merely a bare unity in which no difference 
would be posited, but rather a movement in which a distinction is certainly made but. 
because it is no distinction is again cancelled" (PS  155, p.95). We have here a unity 
in which a differentiating movement is present, but through which the differentiation 
made is cancelled, as it is no real differentiation -  the moments differentiated do not 
belong to separate sustaining elements, but are internal to a unity.
Now. consciousness as Understanding, insofar as it takes itself to be 
responsible for the difference of Force and law. takes this movement as its own 
process of explanation, and not as a movement of the inner world -  it takes 
explanation as its own, merely formal movement, and the oppositions or differences 
that arise through it as being purely formal. But just such a difference is the difference 
between the explanation of Understanding and its object as it is in truth. Force, and so 
this difference too must be merely formal. Force then, in its true content must be 
constituted the same as the movement of explanation:
"change is not yet a change o f the thing  itself,  but rather presents itself as a pure 
change by the very fact that the content o f the moments o f change remains the 
same.  But since the Notion, qua Notion o f the  Understanding,  is the same as the 
inner being of things, this change becomes for the Understanding the  law o f the 
inner world" (PS  156,  p.95).
Consequently, the distinction between form and content here collapses -  the formal 
movement of the Understanding in explanation is, in truth, the movement of the 
content and vice versa.
43
This explaining is just then the whole movement of consciousness that ‘we’ have witnessed 
throughout A.  In Sense-certainty we watched consciousness apprehend the singular as universal, as 
Perception we watched consciousness struggle with the dual characterisations of this universal, the 
Also and the One, which resulted  in consciousness’s conception of internally differentiated universality 
as  law. As  Understanding we watched consciousness struggle with dual aspects of its object,  Force and 
law, which resulted in consciousness cancelling this duality, claiming that it maintained the difference 
or opposition between these aspects.
51This collapse then, is also a collapse of the distinction between the sensuous, 
perceived world and the supersensible world of laws:
“Through this principle, the first supersensible world, the tranquil kingdom o f 
laws, the  immediate copy o f the perceived world,  is changed  into its opposite.
The  law was,  in general,  like its differences, that which remains selfsame;  now, 
however,  it  is posited that each o f the two worlds  is really the opposite o f itself.
The selfsame really  repels  itself from  itself, and what  is not selfsame really posits 
itself as selfsame.  In  point o f fact,  it  is only when thus determined that the 
difference  is inner difference, or the difference in its own self' (PS  157,  p.96)
So, the sensuous, perceived world is truly as it was considered to be, a stable. 
selfsame supersensible world, but this supersensible world is, just as much as the 
sensuous, perceived world, the opposite of itself, i.e. not a stable, selfsame 
supersensible world, but the dynamic, ever-changing sensuous world.
“ W ith this, the  inner world  is completed as appearance.  For the first 
supersensible world was only the immediate raising o f the perceived world  into 
the universal  element;  it had  its necessary counterpart  in this perceived world 
which still  retained for itself the principle o f change and alteration.  The first 
kingdom  o f laws lacked that principle, but obtains  it as an  inverted world.” (PS 
157,  pp.96/97).
This 'kingdom' has. of course, now obtained that principle and accordingly 
Understanding has a new conception of the inner world; what Hegel calls a second 
supersensible world or the inverted world has arisen for consciousness as 
Understanding.
Now. 'we' are here reminded that this new world is another supersensible one, 
that it resulted from the movement of Understanding in explanation, in fact, it both 
essentially is and is mediated by this movement. For us, there is an identity of the 
explanation of Understanding and the new supersensible inner world, that is, there is 
the identity of thought and being. Accordingly, ‘we' then have a new conception of 
universality as an internally, self-differentiating movement, which involves and 
essentially is singularity. 'We' grasp that the difference between the sensuous, 
perceived world and the supersensible is an internal difference of the new
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has at the same time overarched” the world of appearance “ and has it within it; it is 
for itsalf  the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in 
one unity (PS  160, p.99). There is, in fact, no difference outside this new world, 
nothing standing over against it, rather, it is the Absolute, it is the ‘simple abstraction' 
or ‘sheer being' that we started with in Sense-certainty. but now internally filled out 
with an infinity of difference. Understanding, on the other hand, does not yet share 
this conception, instead it becomes caught up in the experience of this new 
supersensible world as an inversion of its first supersensible world.
This second world, as supersensible, is the opposite of the first supersensible 
world, it is the first world stood on its head, and to see this we need only compare the 
first world with the second. According to Understanding's initial conception of the 
first supersensible world as truth, what appeared as diverse in the sensuous, perceived 
world was. in truth, not diverse but selfsame. Now. with the second supersensible 
world as truth, this is turned on its head -  what in the sensuous, perceived world is 
diverse, and therefore in the first supersensible world is selfsame, is now in the 
inverted world, in truth, not selfsame, diverse.  The truth of the sensible, perceived 
world in the first supersensible world, is here inverted.
“Expressed  in determinate moments, this means that what  in the  law o f the first 
world  is sweet,  in this inverted  in-itself is sour, what  in the former is black  is,  in 
the other, white  ...  what  in the first  law  is the oxygen  pole of electricity becomes 
its other, supersensible essence,  hydrogen pole;  and conversely,  what  is there the 
hydrogen pole becomes here the oxygen pole" (PS  158, p.97)
Accordingly, it is tempting to treat the inverted world as simply being the opposite of 
the first world as its truth -  what is sweet in one is. in truth or in-itself. sour. etc. -  and 
as such the first supersensible world would simply be the true world as it is for 
another, or as it appears.
“Looked at superficially, this inverted world  is the opposite o f the first  in the 
sense that  it has the  latter outside o f it and  repels that world from  itself as an 
inverted actual world: that one  is appearance, but the other the in-itself; that the 
one is the world as it  is for an other,  whereas the other is the world as  it  is for 
itself'(P S   159, p.97).
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the previous position of the Understanding:
“But such antitheses o f inner and outer, o f appearance and the supersensible,  as 
o f two different kind o f actuality, we no longer find here. The repelled 
differences are no  longer shared afresh  between two substances such as would 
support them  and  lend  them a separate subsistence: this would  result  in the 
Understanding withdrawing  from the  inner world and  relapsing  into its  previous 
position" (Ibid., p.98)
That is, Understanding would return to a position in which, on the one hand, there 
would be the sensuous, perceived world and on the other, as the essence or truth of the 
perceived world, there would be the inner world. But. if we recall Understanding's 
earlier conception of the inner world here, we see that this inner world is thought of as 
"just such a sense world as the first" only “ in the imagination" (Ibid.); as the essence 
of the perceived world it is equally present in it. it just “'could not be exhibited as a 
sense-world" (Ibid.). As such, the determinate moments of this inner world are things 
just as much as those of the perceived world: “ sourness which would be the in-itself 
of the sweet thing is actually a thing just as much as the latter, viz., a sour thing ... the 
oxygen pole which is the in-itself of the hydrogen pole is actually present in the same 
voltaic pile" (Ibid.). In claiming that the in-itself or truth is here just as much a thing 
as the sweet thing of the sensuous, perceived world, Hegel is referring to the tension 
or duality present in Understanding's earlier conception that we saw worked through 
in the dialectic of Force and law. Law, as the inner being of things was equally 
present in the perceived world, but it failed to be the “ entire presence of appearance” 
(PS  150. p.91). as a stable unity it proved indifferent to the constant movement of 
differentiation present in the perceived world. That is to say. Understanding failed to 
conceive of this equal presence in the appropriate way. and law presented itself as a 
duality, as Force and law. the dual elements of which lacked any necessary internal 
connection.  This lead to Understanding taking responsibility for the seeming 
opposition between these elements, i.e. acknowledging their equal essentiality, but in 
doing so it simply maintained its conception rather than changing it. In arriving at the 
result that the inner world and the perceived world are equal without an according 
alteration in its conception. Understanding places the truth over there, in an inner
54world, and the appearance of difference over here, in itself. But then its difficulties 
simply start all over again, the constant movement of differentiation essential to the 
inner world is not permitted to penetrate into it. That is, Understanding w ill once 
again face the dialectical opposition of the inner world and its expression, of Force 
and law. that it has already passed through and that lead to the inversion of the inner 
world as truth in its acceptance of responsibility for the difference between these 
elements.
The point is that it is only the strategy of “ fixing the differences in different 
sustaining elements" (PS  160, p.99), evinced by consciousness throughout A., that is 
preventing Understanding from arriving at kour’ conception of the inverted world as 
overarching the sensuous, perceived world and being present in it -  being 
simultaneously itself and this other, or put another way, grasping being and thought as 
a unity. In constantly fixing the differences in different sustaining elements, for 
example, in taking itself to be responsible for the opposition of Force and law. 
consciousness as Understanding maintains itself as the merely formal movement of 
explanation which gives rise to the inversion of the inner world as that which is true. 
This ‘fixing' then, constitutes a cycle in which Understanding's truth is constantly 
inverted: the first supersensible world is inverted, and this inverted world then 
becomes the truth as opposed to the first supersensible world. But then, this new 
supersensible world, as the truth, is the inner world and not the world as it appears or 
is for another. However, as the essence of the world as it appears, and present through 
this appearance, this inner is equally present in it. and its determinate moments are 
things just as much as those present in the world of appearance. That is, the 
distinction between the two worlds once again collapses. Consciousness comes to 
discover the distinction between the worlds is no real distinction and the supersensible 
world, as the truth, inverts once more. In this cycling then, consciousness does indeed 
find itself in a kind of “ witches' circle in which the determinations of real being and 
determinations of reflection, ground and grounded, phenomena and phantoms, run riot 
in indiscriminate company and enjoy equal rank with one another" (SL, p.461).
Consequently. Hegel urges:
“From the idea, then, o f inversion, which constitutes the essential  nature o f one
aspect o f the supersensible world,  we must eliminate the sensuous idea o f fixing
the differences in a different sustaining element; and this absolute Notion o f the
55difference must be represented and  understood purely as inner difference, a 
repulsion o f the selfsame, as selfsame, from  itself, and likeness o f the unlike as 
unlike.  We have to think pure change, or think antithesis within the antithesis 
itself or contradiction  ...  Only thus is  it difference as inner difference, or 
difference in its own self or difference as an infinity" (PS  160,  pp.98-9).
It is only in thinking ‘pure change’ that the inverted world can be grasped as the 
‘absolute Notion*: “the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal 
blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but 
rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession" (PS  162, p. 100). But this 
direction is aimed at ‘us* as readers and observers, and as far as the Understanding is 
concerned the direction w ill fall on deaf ears. The direction highlights the precise 
shortcoming in Understanding here, that o f‘fixing the differences in a different 
sustaining element*, which if not avoided can make the whole process of explanation 
appear fruitless. That is. it can make the whole process of distinguishing or 
differentiating ground from grounded, supersensible from sensible, truth from 
appearance, etc.. seem like a mere movement of the Understanding which expresses 
no other necessity that that of the Understanding, i.e. is purely subjective. This 
seeming is just what motivated the turn to intuition which, as we saw in section 1. 
Hegel wishes to reject, and the diagnosis of the problem with the Understanding there 
matches the shortcoming here. In respect of providing an etiological account then, of 
the kind of dichotomy, and its source, that motivates the call for a move to intuition, it 
seems that A. provides such an account.
In failing to grasp its error, consciousness as Understanding does not then set 
aside its explaining or give it up. While “ in the contrary law. as the inversion of the 
first law. or in the inner difference, it is true that infinity itself becomes the object of 
the Understanding" (PS  164. p. 101-2). Understanding consistently “ falls short of 
infinity as such, since it again apportions to two worlds or to two substantial elements, 
that which is difference in itself’ (Ibid.. p. 102). That is. it merely keeps discovering 
that the distinctions or differences that it took to be intrinsic to its object are such as to 
be no real distinctions, i.e. are its own, and the movement itself whereby this came 
about is to the Understanding “ a [mere] happening” (Ibid.).
56“the movement as such is not the Understanding’s object, on the contrary, in this 
movement the Understanding has as objects positive and negative electricity, 
distance, force o f attraction and a thousand other things which constitute the 
content o f the moments o f the movement. The reason why  ‘explaining’  affords so 
much self-satisfaction  is just because  in  it consciousness is, so to speak, 
communing directly  with  itself, enjoying only  itself; although  it seems to be busy 
with something else,  it is in fact occupied only  with  itself' (PS  163,  p. 101 )44.
In consistently ‘fixing the differences in a different sustaining element’, ‘we' can see 
that Understanding is consistently giving itself to itself in the form of an other -  
consistently affording itself the opportunity to discover itself once more in this other45. 
Through this action, however. Understanding maintains this other as “ an object in a 
sensuous covering'’, as far as it is concerned, here, “the selfsame and the unlike are 
predicates. whose essence is an inert substrate” (PS  164. p. 102).
This is the situation as ‘we’ leave the ‘Force and the Understanding' chapter 
behind to consider Understanding as it truly is. i.e. as a Self-Consciousness, in B.. But 
before we turn to B. we should note that here by the end of A., being and thought 
appear to have been, in principle, unified, as per our hypothesis. We have here 
witnessed a culmination to the first way of unification, and yet at the same time the 
consciousness observed seems to itself, in its own experience, to be consistently cut 
off from being. That is, to echo the terms used in the Encyclopaedia. it surely seems 
to it that the universal and determinate are mutually exclusive, that the universal is its 
own addition and is not to be found present in the empirical, taken in itself.
44  C.f. “Along with the formal  business of this mode of explanation from grounds, we at the same time 
hear it repeated -  in spite of all the explaining based on well-known  forces and matters -  that we do 
not know the inner nature (Hesen) of these forces and matters themselves. This amounts only to a 
confession that this assigning of grounds is  itself completely  inadequate; that something quite different 
from such grounds is required. Only then  it  is not apparent why this trouble is taken with  such 
explaining, why the something quite different  is not sought for. or at least why this mode of explanation 
is not set aside and the facts  left to speak for themselves." (SL, p.46l).
45
This is the process Hegel  referred to in the passage from the Difference essay, quoted earlier, “in  its 
striving to enlarge itself into the Absolute, the intellect [ Verst  and] only reproduces itself ad injinitum 
and so mocks itself.  Reason [Vernunft] reaches the Absolute only in stepping outside of this manifold of 
parts” (DF pp. 89/90). The ‘fixing' is a self mocking because it allows Understanding only a negative 
self-satisfaction, to discover itself only as a  falsehood and not as the truth or the Absolute. The 
Understanding then, does indeed “erect a building  ...  between man and the Absolute” (Ibid.).
573.  From Thought to Being
I have made the claim that A. demonstrates the admissibility, in principle, of the first 
way of unification mentioned in the Encyclopaedia Logic. It putatively achieves this 
by sketching a kind of etiological account of a dichotomy of thought and being, 
which, very simply put, consists in consciousness misconceiving its object and its 
relation to its object. I take it that by now I have established, at least a prima facie 
case for this claim through the previous consideration of A. Now. I have further 
suggested that the first way of unification develops or leads into the second, and that it 
is in B. that the move is made back from the ‘abstraction of thinking' to being. It 
remains to be seen then, if at first sight, this further suggestion also fits Hegel's text.
In order to see if there is indeed a fit here, we should first consider the 
characterisation of the new form of consciousness under observation at the opening of 
B. and whether this new form of consciousness can be said to constitute the new 
starting point of the ‘abstraction of thinking'. Second, we should consider the general 
course of the movement of B. to see whether it can be said to encapsulate a movement 
from such a starting point to being.
Before we turn to these two tasks some general qualifying comments should 
be made regarding them. Section B., and in particular chapters IV and IVA, of the 
Phenomenology are some of the most discussed, and in some ways, perplexing parts 
of the text, and they have proved amenable to a number of varying interpretations 
over the years46. The aim here is not to trump or engage in detailed discussion with 
such interpretations. Rather, in line with the general aims of this first chapter, it is 
simply the task of assessing whether there is a prima facie fit between the text and our 
hypothesis. In this regard I've opted to limit discussion here primarily to the 
introductory preamble to B. -  the sections prior to IVA and IVB. This preamble is a 
synopsis of the results of A. as well as a preview of the content of what lies ahead in
B.. and serves primarily to help the reader understand the transition from A. to B.. 
orienting ‘us’ to the new form of consciousness and its object that results from the 
transition. As such, most of what we need to carry out the prescribed tasks is present 
here.
46  For example, c.f.  Kojeve  1969, Gadamer  1976 pp.54-74.  R.  Pippin  1989 pp. 131-62, G.A.  Kelly 
1998, J.  McDowell 2003.
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consciousness that we are to encounter by harking back to the course of the previous 
section: A.
“(I)n the previous modes o f certainty what  is true for consciousness is something 
other than  itself.  But the Notion o f this truth vanishes in the experience o f it.
What the object  immediately  was in itself  -  mere being in sense-certainty, the 
concrete thing o f perception, and  for the Understanding, a  Force -  proves to be  in 
truth, not this at all;  instead, this in itselfturns out to be a mode in which the 
object is only  for another...  now there has arisen  what did not emerge in these 
previous relationships, viz.  a certainty which  is identical  with  its truth;  for the 
certainty  is to  itself its own object, and consciousness is to itself the truth.  In this 
there is indeed an otherness; that  is to say consciousness makes a distinction,  but 
one which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction.” (PS  166, 
p. 104).
Hegel here is drawing out the results of the previous chapter on Force and the 
Understanding. There ‘we’ arrived at the realisation that consciousness is its own 
truth, that the movement of consciousness in explanation is precisely what its object 
consists in. The ‘absolute Notion', the ‘simple essence of life', being, is just this 
movement as a unified whole. In looking to its other as truth, consciousness was 
really just looking to itself, the distinction between consciousness and its other, as no 
real distinction, collapsed. In truth then, consciousness is self-consciousness and this 
was the result of A.
“The necessary advance from the previous shapes o f consciousness for which 
their truth was a Thing, an  ‘other'  than themselves, expresses just this, that not 
only  is consciousness o f a thing possible only  for a self-consciousness, but that 
self-consciousness alone is the truth o f those shapes” (PS  164,  p. 102)
This truth, self-consciousness, is what ‘we’ start with in B.
However, consciousness, as we will recall, did not attain ‘our' viewpoint in 
A.. Instead consciousness remained in the cycling action of consistently giving itself 
to itself in the form of an other by ‘fixing the differences in a different sustaining 
element’. Its object or other was essentially an inert, unknowable substrate cloaked in
59a sensuous covering. ‘We’ have seen self-consciousness show itself to be the truth of 
consciousness, and yet consciousness as it appears here remains a consciousness of 
something distinct from itself, which it negates as merely appearance. There is, then, 
here an antithesis between self-consciousness as the truth, and the appearance of this 
truth as consciousness. Now, as consciousness is essentially self-consciousness, this 
antithesis between its appearance and its truth falls within self-consciousness, and the 
new form of (self) consciousness we are faced with, what we can call immediate self- 
consciousness. is both of these moments -  it is constituted by this antithesis.
“otherness is for it  in the form o f a being, or as a distinct moment;  but there  is  for 
consciousness the  unity of itself with this difference as a second distinct moment.
W ith that  first moment, self-consciousness is  in the form of consciousness, and 
the whole expanse o f the sensuous world  is preserved  for it, but at the same time 
only as connected  with the second  moment, the unity o f self-consciousness with 
itself; and hence the sensuous world  is for it an enduring existence which, 
however,  is only appearance, or a difference which,  in itself,  is no difference.
This antithesis o f its appearance and  its truth has,  however, for its essence only 
the truth, viz. the unity o f self-consciousness with  itself...  Consciousness, as 
self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is the immediate object, 
that o f sense-certainty and perception, which however /o r self-consciousness has 
the character o f a negative; and the second, viz.  itself which  is the true essence, 
and  is present  in the first  instance only as opposed to the first object." (PS  167. 
p. 105).
So, immediate self-consciousness as it appears here cannot be explicitly aware of its 
object as being itself (or. what is the same, of itself as self-consciousness), rather this 
truth can only be implicit in it. After all. its object is the immediate object of sense- 
certainty and perception as negated, as an abstract, empty beyond: a negative, and its 
own self is present here only as opposed to this object. It is then, rather, the immediate 
conviction or certainty that the object is itself. Consequently, its self awareness is 
completely abstract. That is to say, this self awareness is completely undifferentiated 
and indeterminate, self-consciousness is here present simply as an undifferentiated all 
encompassing T 47.
47 C.f.  PM  §424 Z. p. 165: “This unity of the  T   and the object which constitutes the principle of mind 
is, however, at first only abstractly present  in immediate self-consciousness, and is known only by  us 
who reflect on  it. not as yet by self-consciousness itself.  Immediate self-consciousness has not yet for 
its object the  I—I, but only the ‘1’; therefore,  it  is free only for us, not for itself,  is not as yet aware of its
60As such an abstract and immediate certainty of itself, this form of (self) 
consciousness bears resemblance to the starting point of sense-certainty. In sense- 
certainty
“(C)onsciousness, for its part,  is in this certainty only as a pure  ‘I'; or I  am  in  it 
only as a pure  ‘This’, and the object similarly only as a pure  ‘This'.  I, this 
particular I, am  certain o f this  particular thing  ...  here neither I  nor the thing has 
the significance o f a complex process o f mediation; the  M'  does not have the 
significance o f a manifold  imagining or thinking; nor does the  ‘thing'  signify 
something that has a host o f qualitites.  On the contrary, the thing is, and  it is, 
merely because it is  ...  this pure being, or this simple  immediacy, constitutes its 
truth.  Similarly, certainty as a connection  is an immediate pure connection: 
consciousness is  T ,  nothing more, a pure  ‘This': the singular consciousness 
knows a pure ‘This*, or the single  item. (PS  91, pp.58-9).
That is, there is an immediate awareness of like by like. ‘This- by ‘This-, no 
mediating process is involved, and as a consequence sense-certainty proves 
completely abstract, devoid of determination. To recall the terminology of the 
Encylopaedia Logic, it appears as the ‘simple abstraction-, “the essential sum of all 
realities’-, “ the supremely real essence” (EL §49, p.94). and accordingly, the moment 
we consider an actual instance of sense-certainty
“(A)mong the countless differences cropping  up here we find  in every case that 
the crucial  one is that,  in sense-certainty, pure being at once splits up into what 
we have called the two ‘Thises\ one  ‘This'  as  T ,  and the other ‘This’ as object.
When we  reflect on this difference,  we find that neither one nor the other is only 
immediately present  in sense-certainty, but each  is at the same time mediated:  1  
have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and  it, similarly,  is in 
sense-certainty  through something else, viz. through the  ‘I'.
It  is not just we who make this distinction  between essence and  instance,  between 
immediacy and mediation; on the contrary, we find  it within sense-certainty 
itself, and  it  is to be taken  up in the form  in  which  it  is present there'' (PS 92/93, 
p.  59).
freedom, and contains only the foundation of it, but not as yet freedom that is truly actuaT\
61Now, in immediate self-consciousness the situation is similar. As an immediate, 
abstract self-certainty, an all encompassing ‘I’, it appears as the ‘simple abstraction’, 
the ‘essential sum of all realities’ or ‘the supremely real essence’. But here too, there 
is a distinction present between that self-consciousness's essence, and instances of it. 
Its essence is simply to be immediate, abstract self awareness, an immediate awarenes 
of like by like: simply T. in which there is no distinction or mediation present. But in 
its instances it is merely consciousness, in which it is faced with a distinct object or 
the ostensible negation of that object, to which its own essence, as immediate self- 
consciousness, is opposed.
The key difference from sense-certainty here is that, of course, ‘we' have 
already seen self-consciousness as essence, to be not merely abstract, devoid of 
differentiation or determination, but to be a self-determining, self-mediating 
movement, a selfsame unity that consists in the differentiation of itself from itself and 
the cancellation of this differentiation. That is. ‘we' are here already aware that the 
abstract self-consciousness constituting the essence of immediate self-consciousness 
is not. truly speaking, self-consciousness -  the ‘absolute notion', or ‘supremely real 
essence'. ‘We’ have seen this true essence through, and in fact as, the movement of 
consciousness in A., but consciousness did not accept this movement as the true or 
supremely real essence, rather the movement was simply its own and therefore not a 
real movement, only one which contained false distinction, and so. for consciousness, 
the real essence stood opposed to this movement as an inert substrate. T his substrate, 
as in truth just the movement exhibited by consciousness, and as the real essence, is 
self-consciousness. Therefore, in cancelling or negating the movement as the true 
essence, determining it as an inert substrate, ‘we’ can see that consciousness sets itself 
in opposition to its truth, determining this truth falsely as an inert or static, abstract 
substrate, hence the presence of immediate self-consciousness, as the antithesis of 
self-consciousness falsely construed as abstract and static, with consciousness.
So, from the outset here we can see that our new starting point, the abstract 
self-consciousness of immediate self-consciousness, is merely the ‘abstraction of 
thinking’, and that what it lacks -  the self-differentiating movement -  remains in its 
opposed element, viz. consciousness. In fact, we can see that the ‘simple abstraction’ 
mentioned in the Encyclopaedia. that which is all inclusive and representative o f‘the 
essential sum of all realities’ or ‘the supremely real essence’, is equally, merely the 
abstraction of thinking and completely inadequate to represent the truth of the matter.
62As a notion or concept it is inadequate to the subject it represents. The point of 
inadequacy here is the same as that found throughout A., viz. the movement of 
differentiation or determination, what could be called the moment of negation, is not 
permitted to fall within that which constitutes the essence, and this is the same 
whether we take the essence to be sensuous and empirical, or thought.
From this we can see that implicit in Hegel’s characterisation of immediate 
self-consciousness and the transition from A. to B. as a whole, is a criticism of the 
general approach of many of his post-Kantian contemporaries and of Kant him self8. 
For the abstract self-consciousness of immediate self-consciousness bears close 
resemblance to the formal unity of Kant’s apperceiving transcendental ego. The 
abstract self-consciousness here is not the empirical self of introspection -  the object 
of immediate self-consciousness does not simply present itself explicitly as being 
itself -  and this abstract self-consciousness also stands opposed to the nominal 
negation of the immediate object of Sense-certainty and Perception, i.e. to the inert, 
indeterminate substrate taken by consciousness as Understanding to be the truth of its 
object. Rather, such a substrate is not the truth of something distinct from 
consciousness, but is simply itself, T . or the abstract self-consciousness of immediate 
self-consciousness. Further, one might even say that this abstract self-consciousness, 
while being taken to be the essence or ground of the objective consciousness, here 
also only appears through or in objective consciousness's determination of its object, 
i.e. through or in A. We have seen though, via A., that such a construal of self- 
consciousness is inaccurate and based on the erroneous practice of refusing to let the 
"moment of negation’, the movement of determination, fall within the essence of 
things, and that it is because of this inaccuracy that such self-consciousness appears 
merely as the abstraction of thinking or as purely subjective49. Put another way, if 
such self-consciousness is taken as a principle of subject-object identity, then
48
Hegel  names no names here, though he certainly makes it clear that he. at least, has Fichte  in mind 
by  invoking Fichte’s formulation of the first principle of his system -  1   am  1  -  in the characterisation of 
immediate self consciousness. See PS  167, p. 105.
49 As 1   have mentioned the criticism here is only  implicit.  Hegel holds off making direct reference to 
Kant and apperception until C.(AA.). The reason being that immediate self-consciousness only 
possesses such abstract self-awareness implicitly, whereas in the Kantian system  such self-awareness is 
explicitly worked out as the ground for the unity of the object. The criticism there, however,  is much 
the same as here -  it is the abstractness that causes difficulty, and results in the requirement of “an 
extraneous impulse, in which first is to be found the multiplicity of sensations and ideas” (PS 238,
p. 144) as essential, which  is opposed to the unity of apperception that was asserted to be essential.
“This idealism  is involved in this contradiction because it asserts the abstract Notion of Reason to be 
the True” (PS 239, p. 145).
63precisely because it lacks the relevant movement in and through which the identity is 
constituted, it will fail as an accurate principle and will appear merely as an 
abstraction of thought, or a subjective, purely extrinsic approximation of the truth of 
the matter. So, Hegel would not only claim that Kant failed to accurately represent the 
truth about the ground of the unity of objects, by grounding them in the formal unity 
of the transcendental ego. but also that any system which bases itself on such an 
abstract formal unity, e.g. that of Fichte, w ill appear subjective at base. We have 
grasped that this kind of abstract self-consciousness is not truly self-consciousness, 
and although in immediate self-consciousness we face the antithesis of self- 
consciousness as this abstract essence, with itself as consciousness, Hegel claims that 
“ (I)n this sphere self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this 
antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it" (PS 
167, p.105)50.
We should now turn our attention to this movement itself and the way in 
which it is said to remove the antithesis, in order to see if it would represent a 
movement from the abstraction of thinking to being. A concise outline of this 
movement is given by Hegel in his Phenomenology’ of Mind, the third part of his 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.
“The contradiction here outlined  must  be resolved, and the way  in which this 
happens is that self-consciousness which has  itself as consciousness, as  T ,   for 
object, goes on to develop the simple  identity o f the  T   into a real  difference, and 
thus by superseding  its one-sided subjectivity gives itself objectivity; this process 
is  identical  with  its converse, by which the object  is at the same time given a 
subjective determination by  the  T .   is  immersed  in the inwardness o f the self, and 
in this way the dependence o f the  ‘ I'  on an external  reality which  is a feature o f 
consciousness is destroyed.  Self-consciousness thus reaches a stage where  it does 
not  have consciousness alongside  it.  is not externally connected with  it. but truly 
pervades  it and contains  it dissolved  within  it." (PM   §425. Z,  p. 166).
And, also, in §425 proper. Hegel says of immediate self-consciousness that.
50 Certainly then, for Hegel, an appeal to some kind of intuition of the truth  is uncalled for and would, 
in any case, be ineffectual.  Basically, such an appeal would  involve committing  the the same kind of 
error counciled against by  Hegel: to treat the truth as  immediate and abstract.
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nature, by giving its abstract self-awareness content and objectivity, and  in the 
other direction to free itself from  its sensuousness, to set aside the given 
objectivity and to identify  it with  itself. The two processes are one and the same, 
the identification of consciousness and self-consciousness” (PM   §425,  pp. 165-6).
This is what we get in section B. of the Phenomenology: immediate self- 
consciousness develops the ‘simple identity' of the ‘I' into a ‘real difference', i.e. the 
differentiating movement, the moment of negation, falls within the ‘I’ and the 
difference of itself from itself, necessary for self-consciousness, ceases to be no real 
difference, instead it becomes a difference which possesses being or is actual. In so 
doing immediate self-consciousness overturns its negative, oppositional relation to the 
immediate object of Sense-certainty and Perception that it has as consciousness. As 
the truth of consciousness it is no longer simply an indeterminate, abstract substrate 
and does not merely find itself as such a substrate. rather it ‘gives itself objectivity' 
and comes to find itself in the immediate object of Sense-certainty and Perception, not 
simply as beyond or opposed to it. Consequently, via this process of development, 
immediate self-consciousness ceases to be merely abstract and becomes true self- 
consciousness. That is. it ceases to be the mere abstraction of thinking and becomes 
the supremely real essence, or the absolute Notion as ‘we' have seen it. Therefore, 
though we have not yet seen just how this process is to achieve this transformation of 
immediate self-consciousness into true self-consciousness, it is plain that as such a 
transformation, the process is a movement from the abstraction of thinking to being.
Now. as we can already see from Hegel's statements concerning B. in the 
preamble and in the Phenomenology of  Mind, that the course of B. is to follow the 
second way admissible for the unification of thought and being. I feel it unnecessary 
to follow every development and transition of this movement here. A brief 
explanation of how the movement is to achieve its end. however, should be given. 
Hegel provides a schematic explanation of this in terms of desire or appetite 
(Begierde) and recognition.
Immediate self-consciousness, in accordance with its implicit nature as simply 
i \  is the impulse to overcome the opposition of its object. Such self-consciousness, 
in being certain of itself as the truth or essence of the object, is certain of the untruth 
of the opposition or independence of its object. Such independence or opposition -  the
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However, this certainty of itself as being the truth of the object, is only implicit here, 
that is, immediate self-consciousness is not aware that it is essentially this certainty -  
it is only aware of itself in opposition to its object, as a singular thing opposed to 
another singular thing, and as such, this certainty receives no determination in 
thought. It is, rather, immediate and abstract -  an impulse. As Hegel puts it. “ self- 
consciousness is Desire in general (Begierde iiberhaupt)"’  (PS  167, p.105)51.
Desire, or this impulse, is the impulse to overcome the independence of 
immediate self-consciousness's object by destroying it. and via the satisfaction of this 
impulse immediate self-consciousness makes its abstract, self-certainty explicit for 
itself. In the destruction of the object it is affirmed that the object is truly nothing, not 
real and independent of immediate self-consciousness, nothing over against it.
“Certain o f the nothingness o f this other,  it explicitly affirms that this 
nothingness is fo r it the truth o f the other;  it destroys the  independent object and 
thereby gives itself the certainty o f itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has 
become explicit for self-consciousness  itself in an objective manner." (PS  174, 
pi 09).
It is important to understand why the desire here is a desire to destroy (vernichtet) the 
object, for one might be tempted to think that mere possession or physical 
manipulation of the object would suffice to overcome its independence. Immediate 
self-consciousness can only satisfy itself in the destruction of its object because the 
self-awareness constituting its essence is abstract and immediate. It is an 
undifferentiated T , there can be no other distinction but T , and so to realise its 
essence, to give itself to itself as this undifferentiated, pure T . all other opposing 
determination must be nullified -  the object must perish. O f course, in pursuing the 
satisfaction of its desire, immediate self-consciousness may take possession of or
51  Cf. “appetite (Begierde) is that form  in which self-consciousness appears on the first stage of its 
development  ...  appetite has as yet no further determination than that of impulse -  so far as this  is not 
determined by thought -  directed towards external object in which  it seeks to satisfy itself...  the 
necessity for the appetite so determined to exist in self-consciousness,  lies  in the fact that self- 
consciousness  ...  is also its immediately antecedent stage, namely, consciousness, and is aware of this 
internal contradiction. Where a self-identical something bears within  it a contradiction and is charged 
with the feeling of its intrinsic self-identity as well as with the opposite feeling of its internal 
contradiction, there necessarily emerges the impulse to remove this contradiction” (PM  §426, Z,
P. 167).
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short of destruction w ill52.
The problem for immediate self-consciousness here is that the independence 
of the object is a necessary condition for the satisfaction of desire and hence of its 
self-identity. That is, the independence of the object is a necessary condition of 
immediate self-consciousness.
“Desire and the self-certainty obtained  in  its gratification, are conditioned by the 
object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other:  in order that this 
supersession can take place, there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness, by 
its negative relation to the object,  is unable to supersede it;  it  is really  because o f 
that relation that  it produces the object again and the desire as well." (PS  175. 
p. 109)
Immediate self-consciousness might destroy or consume a particular object, but the
satisfaction thereby gained is fleeting and it must continue in its destruction and
consumption in order to maintain its self-identity, its individuality.
In fact, in a sense, immediate self-consciousness never really succeeds in
completely overcoming the independence of its object, as Hegel points out. self-
consciousness ‘by its negative relation to the object is unable to supersede it', rather it
consistently produces the object and the desire all over again. It may seem strange
here to say that “ it” , i.e. self-consciousness, produces the object again, but this claim
refers to the fact that consciousness, which is confronted by an independent object as
its truth or essence, is an essential component of self-consciousness, one that the
abstract essence of immediate self-consciousness, as simply T . fails to include. That
is. as essentially just T , immediate self-consciousness is opposed to consciousness.
But it is only through consciousness taking its essence or truth to be an independent
object that immediate self-consciousness becomes actual. Immediate self-
consciousness only attains self-certainty, only explicitly becomes a self-consciousness
or actualises itself as such, through the destruction of the independent object. So the
action of consciousness as Understanding in ‘fixing the differences in different
52  Elsewhere in the preamble Hegel uses other terms such as “A n fz e h re n usually rendered ‘to 
consume’ or ‘to exhaust’-  in similar connections (see  Werke 5., p.  141).  Such terms are often taken 
literally and I do not wish to preclude any  literal sense to Hegel’s use of them, or that such activities 
would satisfy desire, by here focussing on destruction as the only activity that will satisfy desire.  It is 
clear that ‘to consume’ or  ‘to exhaust’ an object, is equally to destroy it in the required sense of 
reducing it to nothing.
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truth is, in fact, an essential feature or function of self-consciousness. Self- 
consciousness, in truth, produces the independent object for itself in this way53.
Accordingly, through its merely fleeting satisfaction in the destruction of its 
object, immediate self-consciousness becomes “ aware that the object has its own 
independence” (PS  175, p. 109). Now, externally, or as immediate self-consciousness 
appears, this makes no difference: “ it is no less absolutely for itself’ and it is so only 
by superseding the object; and it must experience its satisfaction, for it is the truth” 
(Ibid.). But implicitly or internally, immediate self-consciousness is changed. The 
self-awareness or self-satisfaction it experiences -  its self-identity -  is not, in truth, an 
abstract, immediate one. but instead necessarily involves the independent object, it 
comes only through an independent other which is identified with itself. So. while the 
desire remains unaltered, the implicit self-awareness, far from being merely abstract, 
is conditioned by the independent object. True self-consciousness will out. so to 
speak.
“the sense o f self which the ego gets in the satisfaction does not remain  in 
abstract self-concentration or in mere individuality; on the contrary -  as negation 
o f immediacy and  individuality the result involves a character o f universality and 
o f the identity o f self-consciousness with  its object” (PM   §429, p. 170)
Now. insofar as the independent object is produced by self-consciousness, self- 
consciousness negates its own immediacy.  This is essentially true self-consciousness, 
in which we have the movement of differentiation and subsequent cancellation which 
was absent from the object in Understanding and absent from the abstract self- 
awareness of immediate self-consciousness.
But this truth is here still implicit, and the desire remains. Therefore, it seems 
that satisfaction of the desire will only be forthcoming if the object displays itself as 
internally self-negating.  That is. self-consciousness will only come to recognise its 
truth, will only achieve explicit self-awareness in another self-consciousness.
“A  self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is  it in fact self- 
consciousness; for only  in this way does the unity o f itself in  its otherness
53  In regard to the separation of thought from being that Hegel brings out through A., we can see that 
this is in fact a necessary movement in the unification of thought and being.
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‘object’; the object o f Desire, however,  is only  independent, for it is the universal 
indestructible substance, the fluid self-identical  essence. A self-consciousness, in 
being an object, is just as much  ‘ I’  as ‘object’.  W ith this, we already have before 
us the Notion o f Spirit (Geist).  What still  lies ahead for consciousness is the 
experience of what Spirit  is- this absolute substance which is the unity o f the 
different  independent self-consciousness's which,  in their opposition, enjoy 
perfect freedom and  independence:  ‘I ’  that  is  ‘W e’  and  ‘W e’ that  is  T Y ' (PS  177,
P-l 10)
The development of this explicit and true self-consciousness which is only through an 
other independent self-consciousness is traced through B.. Such self-consciousness 
involves a structure of mutual recognition, in which individual self-consciousnesses 
come to recognise its object as a self-consciousness and be recognised by it as such.
In fact, it is only as such a structure of mutual recognition that it is true self- 
consciousness.
Strictly speaking, the details of the development need not concern us here. We 
have already seen that in this development the abstract self-consciousness we started 
with, the simple T  or 'abstraction of thinking' develops itself into an independent 
object for itself, an object which is just as much ‘I’ as object. That is, the summary of 
what went before in A. and the preview of what is to come in B. provided by Hegel in 
his preamble to B., seems to fit the hypothesis that B. accords to the second way 
admissible for the unification of thought and being. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
clarity it is worth providing a cursory account of some of the major steps in the 
development.
The steps I am concerned with are traced in ’B. (a.) Independence and 
Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage’5 4. The first is what has 
come to be called ’the life and death struggle’ and the second ’the master slave 
dialectic’, though strictly both constitute a single subsection of Hegel’s text. Hegel is 
clear about his intent in this subsection: “ (W)e have now to see how the process of 
this pure Notion of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness, 
appears to self-consciousness” (PS §185, p.l 12). So, we are to begin to see the 
realisation of true self-consciousness from immediate self-consciousness.
MPS §'s  178-96, pp.  111-9.
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consciousness:
“Self-consciousness is, to begin with, simple being-for-self, self-equal through the 
exclusion from  itself o f everything else  ...  What  is 'other'  for it  is an unessential, 
negatively characterised object.  But the 'other'  is also a self-consciousness; one 
individual  is confronted by another individual. Appearing thus  immediately on the 
scene, they  are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes  ...  they 
have not as yet exposed themselves to each other in the form o f pure being-for- 
self, or as self-consciousnesses” (PS  § 186,  p. 113).
We will recall, such immediate self-consciousness is desire in general, or as Hegel re­
phrases matters here: it “consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective 
mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence” (PS §187, p.l 13). 
Its self-certainty is only realised in destroying what is other than it. Now. as here there 
are two such individual self-consciousnesses their action as desire is twofold. First, 
insofar as they act toward the other, they attempt to destroy the other: “each seeks the 
death of the other" (Ibid.). Second, insofar as each seeks to destroy the other, each 
risks destruction by the other; the first action involves the staking of life. Thus a life 
and death struggle ensues. It is only through such a struggle that immediate self- 
consciousness can realise its self-certainty and prove to itself that how it immediately 
appears -  as an opposed other -  is not essentially how it is (Ibid., p.l 14).
The problem is. of course, that such a struggle forcloses the possibility of 
recognition. Throughout, the other is treated as an ordinary object, and just as with 
desire the destruction of the object puts an end to the self-certainty gained through it, 
so too the death of the other “does away with the truth that was supposed to issue 
from it.... with the certainty of self generally" (PS §188. p.l 14).
Through the experience of such hollow victories it is learned that “ life is as 
essential" to self-consciousness “as pure self-consciousness" (PS §189, p.l 15). Once 
an individual self-consciousness grasps this the life and death struggle need no longer 
occur. Instead, this individual, in refusing to stake his life, confirms to the other that 
he is not an independent self-consciousness5 5 . That is, this individual shows the other 
that he is not independent by being completely subservient to the desire and will of
” Cf.: “The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognised as a person, but he has not 
attained to the truth of this recognition as an  independent self-consciousness” (PS  §187, p.l 14).
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or slave to master develops.
In such a relationship it at first appears as if the lord realises a stable self­
certainty, overcoming the independence of things, via the bondsman who is not 
independent and whom the lord sets to work on the independent things in the service 
of his desire:
“What desire failed to achieve,  he succeeds  in doing, viz. to have done with the 
thing altogether, and to achieve satisfaction  in the enjoyment o f it.  Desire failed to 
do this because of the thing's  independence;  but the lord, who has  interposed the 
bondsman between it and  himself, takes to him self only the dependent aspect o f 
the thing and  has the pure enjoyment o f it.  The aspect o f its independence he 
leaves to the bondsman, who works on  i f  (PS  §190. p.l  16).
However, the bondsman, by not being independent from the lord, is not an 
independent self-consciousness in the eyes of the lord, but rather a dependent one 
reliant upon the lord. Therefore, the lord's own self-certainty depends upon something 
other than an independent self-consciousness: it cannot be a pure .vc//:certainty. but is 
mediated by something other and as such undermines the lord's self-certainty. In other 
words, there is only one-sided recognition present here. The lord is recognised by the 
bondsman as an independent self-consciousness while the bondsman is not so 
recognised by the lord, and accordingly the recognition achieved by the lord cannot be 
maintained.
Contrary to first impressions, Hegel argues, the situation of the bondsman is 
more promising as far as the realisation of true self-consciousness is concerned. The 
bondsman entered servitude out of fear of death -  he realised that life is essential to 
self-consciousness and dared not stake his own. This fear continues in servitude 
where the lord represents the absolute power. Yet in relinquishing himself to the lord, 
in grasping the essentiality of life to self-consciousness, the bondsman has a less 
immediate relation to natural existence than the lord. Through his service for the lord 
“ he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail” (PS 
§194, p.l 17), he gives up his own desires and is no longer driven by them or 
dependent upon them. Moreover, in being set to work on things for the lord, the 
bondsman cannot simply destroy, consume or otherwise exhaust these things, but
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bondsman employs his own creativity, objectifying it in the new form and shape 
imparted to the things he works on. The result is that the bondsman comes to identify 
and recognise his own independence in those things: “ (I)t is in this way ... that 
consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its 
own independence” (PS §195, p.l 18).
The bondsman then realises a form of independent self-consciousness that is 
very different from the lord. He realises a self-consciousness through otherness, one 
that is not opposed to the independent existences around it, but which understands 
them as essentially its own independence: itself. We can therefore see in the 
development of the bondsman, in his fear, service and work, a result which “ involves 
a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousness with its object” 
(PM §429. p. 170. cf. p.69 below). The bondsman has discovered that he possesses 
'universal formative power' (PS §196. p.l 19). that the world is not simply independent 
from and opposed to himself, or beyond thought, but that it is open to his ideas, 
capable of being shaped. That is, we can see that through B. there is a movement from 
the 'abstraction of thinking', as immediate self-consciousness, to a realisation of its 
identity with being, as the determinate existences it initially finds itself confronted 
with, and we thus find here:
“self-consciousness in a new shape, a consciousness which  ...  is aware o f itself as 
essential  being, a being which thinks or is a free self-consciousness.  For to think 
does not mean to be an abstract T , but an T  which has at the same time the 
significance o f intrinsic being, o f having itself for object, or o f relating  itself to 
objective being in such a way that its significance is the being-for-self o f the 
consciousness for which  it is [an object]" (PS  §197.  p. 120)
The remaining subsections of B. (some of which will be addressed in the next 
chapter) essentially serve to show the development of this new shape, which in its 
immediate form is only the abstract principle belonging to stoicism that 
“consciousness is a being that thinks, and that consciousness holds something to be 
essentially important, or true and good only insofar as it thinks it to be such” (PS 
§198. p. 121). As we will see (chapter 2: 3. Scepticism as a Form of Consciousness) 
this principle proves too abstract, and stoicism is unable to fully realise the identity of
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indifferent to individuality.
4.  Reason and Critical philosophy
We can see then, that by section C.(AA.). where for the first time consciousness 
becomes Reason and “ its thinking is itself directly actuality, and thus its relationship 
to the latter is that of idealism'’ (PS 232. p. 139). there is a certain point of completion 
to this process. Here consciousness is once more returned to the formula of ‘I am I’ 
though now
“the  'I'  that is object  for me,  is not merely  an  empty object  in general, as  it  is 
for self-consciousness as such  ...  on the contrary  it  is for self-consciousness 
an object such that any other object whatever is a non-being.  But self- 
consciousness is all  reality,  not merely fo r itselfbut also in itself on\y 
through becoming this reality, or rather through demonstrating itself to be 
such.  It demonstrates itself to be this along the path in which first,  in the 
dialectical  movement of'm eaning', perceiving and understanding, otherness 
as an intrinsic being vanishes.  Then,  in the movement through the 
independence o f consciousness  in  lordship and  bondage, through the 
conception o f freedom, through the liberation that comes from  Scepticism 
and the struggle for absolute  liberation  by the consciousness divided against 
itself, otherness in so far as it  is only fo r consciousness, vanishes for 
consciousness itself There appeared two aspects, one after the other:  one in 
which the essence or the True had for consciousness the determinateness of 
being, the other in which  it had the determinateness o f being only fo r 
consciousness.  But the two reduced themselves to a single truth,  viz. that 
what is. or the  in-itself, only  is  in so far as  it  is fo r consciousness, and  what  is 
fo r consciousness  is also in itself or has intrinsic being." (PS  233, 
pp. 140/141).
This all fits the suggestion that Hegel demonstrates the two ways admissible for 
unification mentioned in the Encyclopaedia Logic, in the opening transitions of the 
Phenomenology from A. to C.(AA.).
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affected by his interpretation of scepticism through a discussion of Hegel’s 
identification of Critical philosophy with a positive expression of scepticism. But first 
we will do well to say a few more preparatory words about the connection of the 
putative demonstration of the Phenomenology to the initial problem and the 
connection of this problem to the Critical philosophy of Kant and others.
If we cast our minds back to the preface of the Phenomenology and the loss 
which motivated the ‘prevalent view’ of truth as intuition described there, we w ill 
recall that the demand for a recovery of the lost truth via intuition was placed, by 
Hegel, in the context of the stage that self-conscious spirit had currently reached.
Hegel notes there that:
“it is clear that Spirit has now got beyond the substantial  life  it formerly  lead 
in the element o f thought  ...  It has not only gone beyond all  this  into the 
other extreme o f an  insubstantial  reflection o f itself into  itself but  beyond 
that too” (Ibid)
This locates the demand for the recovery of what has been lost as issuing from a point 
after this ‘insubstantial reflection’ has occurred. Now. both the ‘substantial life’ (in the 
element of thought) and the ‘insubstantial reflection' (of itself into itself) can be 
recognisably identified with the positions of the consciousness observed in A. and B. -  
in A. consciousness in its emergence attempted to grasp being in thought and had not 
yet lost its sense of solid and substantial being, the oppositions always being between 
what is singularised and universal, whereas by B. consciousness found only itself in its 
immediate object and being as the truth or essence was an inert unknowable substrate 
-  a beyond. ‘We' grasped this substrate as simply a determination of consciousness -  
‘we’ grasped consciousness as. in truth, self-consciousness. As immediate self- 
consciousness however, this self-consciousness was an insubstantial reflection of itself 
into itself, for it only had itself as truth in the form of an empty, inert substrate, in the 
form of the simple abstraction of thinking.
Given this identification and the point of completion reached by C.(AA.), we 
may well ask what it is that prompts the demand for a recovery at this point. Hegel has 
shown the incorrectness of the misapprehensions of various forms of consciousness up 
to this point, and we could certainly understand the demand for a recovery issuing
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the opening of B., but why would the demand issue from a point at which this 
recovery has, in principle, been completed?
The answer to this is straightforwardly presented in Hegel’s description of the 
dialectical method in the ‘Introduction’ to the Phenomenology and it is the same as we 
witnessed in the transition from A. to B.: the movement of the dialectic goes on behind 
the back of consciousness, so to speak, and consciousness does not comprehend that 
whereby its new object originated. That is to say. a new form of consciousness always 
comes on the scene immediately, for example, in B. consciousness initially appeared 
as ‘immediate self-consciousness’, not aware of the course of A. through which it 
became what it is - not explicitly aware of its implicit essence or truth'6. It is no 
surprise then, that at the opening of C.(AA.) we find only immediate Reason, not 
aware of its own true provenance:
"The consciousness which  is this truth has this path  behind  it and  has 
forgotten  it, and comes on the scene immediately as  Reason;  in other words, 
this Reason which comes immediately on the scene appears only as the 
certainty\ Thus it merely asserts that  it is all  reality, but does not  itself 
comprehend this; for it is along that forgotten path that this immediately 
expressed assertion  is comprehended. And equally anyone who has not 
trodden this path  finds this assertion  incomprehensible when he hears it  in 
this pure form  ...The idealism that does not demonstrate that path  but starts 
o ff with this assertion  is therefore, too, pure assertion which does not 
comprehend  its own self' (PS 233/234, p.  141).
My purpose, however, in posing this question of ‘why a demand for recovery 
at this point?' was to highlight a sense in which the progression through the ways 
admissible for unification must, in principle, be complete, that is. a sense in which 
they have been shown to be admissible before the demand for recovery can be made. 
The paths traced by A. and B. constitute a pre-requisite to the idealism which is the 
first, immediate appearance of Reason. It is through the separation of thought from
'6 In  fact, as such it was Desire, which can  itself be considered as a kind of demand for a recovery of 
what has been  lost, albeit a transient one. Obviously, the demand here is only  in the form of an  impulse 
to destroy its independent other.  In the form of immediate self-consciousness, self-consciousness is not 
yet explicitly aware of the essentiality of the independent object to its truth and as such it only 
experiences the loss of its truth, the loss of its self-satisfaction, in the independence of this object. The 
demand, as Desire, only arises in the independence of its object.
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as in truth ‘the supremely real essence’, comes to realise itself. This realisation of itself 
in B. involves its separation from itself as a distinct opposed element. Only as such 
does consciousness become Reason, the first immediate appearance of which is the 
idealism mentioned above. This idealism which, as we will see, is to be identified with 
Critical philosophy, is presumably the general point which motivates the ‘prevalent 
view's’ demand in the preface for a recovery via intuition.
This throws light on the comments that Hegel makes regarding this idealism in
C.(AA.). This idealism, he says, is “ pure assertion which does not comprehend its own 
self’ (PS 234, p. 141) because it is ignorant of its own provenance, of that movement 
by which it came to be. Such idealism starts from the unity of apperception but fails to 
correctly derive or demonstrate this unity and as a result the “ I am I” that it asserts 
fails to be truly absolute. For Hegel, “ self-consciousness is all reality  ... only through 
becoming this reality, or rather through demonstrating itself to be such'’ (PS 233, 
p. 140). but this idealism has ‘forgotten' this path by which self-consciousness became 
or demonstrated itself to be all reality. Instead of being absolute then, the immediate 
certainty of “ I am I” retains an opposition. As Hegel notes, this idealism:
“claims an immediate certainty which  is confronted by other immediate 
certainties, which have, however, been  lost on that same path.  With equal 
right, therefore, the assertions o f these certainties, too, take their place 
alongside the assertion o f that certainty.  Reason appeals to the self- 
consciousness o f each and every consciousness:  7  am /,  my object and my 
essence is F; and no one will  deny  Reason this truth.  But in basing itself on 
this appeal  Reason sanctions the truth o f this other certainty, viz. that there  is 
for me an  ‘other’; that an other than  T   is object and  essence for me, or,  in 
that  1   am object and essence to myself.  I  am only so by drawing back  from 
the  ‘other’  altogether, and taking my  place as an actuality alongside  it. Not 
until  Reason comes on the scene as a reflection from this opposite certainty 
does its affirmation about  itself present itself not merely as a certainty and  an 
assertion, but as a truth; and not merely alongside other truths but as the sole 
truth.  Its immediate appearance on the scene is the abstraction o f its actual 
presence, the essence and the in-itselfof which  is the absolute Notion,  i.e. 
the movement which has brought it into being." (PS 234, p. 141).
76This idealism therefore, Hegel claims, fails to escape the sensuous, empirical world of 
‘meaning’, ‘perceiving’ and the Understanding (i.e. of A.) as an essential, extraneous 
other. It asserts ‘I am I’, that all things are sensations or ideas, but it fails to properly 
demonstrate this and hence its assertion remains without substantive content. Instead it 
requires an “extraneous impulse, in which first is to be found the multiplicity of 
sensations and ideas" (PS 238, p i44) in order to fill out its empty assertion with 
content. The result is that:
"It  is involved  in a direct contradiction;  it asserts essence to be a duality o f 
opposed factors, the unity o f  apperception and equally a Thing; whether the 
Thing is called an extraneous impulse (Anstofi), or an empirical or sensuous 
entity, or the Thing-in-itself {Ding an sich),  it still  remains in  principle the 
same, i.e. extraneous to that unity” (PS  238, p. 145)
It is obvious from these comments that this type of idealism is to be identified with 
that of the Critical Philosophy of Hegel's own time, that of Kant and Fichte, and 
whether we are considering a Kantian ‘Ding an sich’ or Fichte's "Anstofi'. for Hegel, 
this other essential element or other thing remains empty of content and stands in 
opposition to the assertion of the truth of the unity of apperception. Here then, in 
Critical philosophy, in spite of being explicitly certain of itself as truth, in asserting ‘I 
am I’, we have a position which, for Hegel, still commits the error o f‘fixing the 
differences in a different sustaining element' because it fails to be sufficiently aware 
of its grounds. One might say that in Hegel's view. Critical philosophy fails to be 
sufficiently critical, it fails to properly demonstrate its ground, or that it takes some 
grounding element for granted.
Naturally, more must be said about Hegel's criticisms of Critical philosophy 
and particularly of its putative failure to properly demonstrate its grounds. However, 
we have not yet considered the effect of Hegel's interpretation of scepticism upon his 
reaction to Critical philosophy and the impact this has on his thought concerning the 
two ways putatively traced in the opening transitions of the Phenomenology. It is in 
this interpretation of scepticism that we find the seed of the criticism of Critical 
philosophy outlined here, and of Hegel’s own belief that the two ways are admissible. 
So, it is towards Hegel’s interpretation of scepticism that we w ill now turn our 
attention, and in particular to his identification of Critical philosophy as “the same
77kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as Scepticism” (PS 238, p. 144) (albeit in the 
mode of a positive expression of this ‘ambiguity') in section C.(AA.).
78Chapter Two: Scepticism
Hegel's identification of Kantian idealism or the Critical philosophy in general, with a 
form of scepticism undoubtedly occurred, in his own mind, well before the 
publication of the Phenomenology. In amongst the twelve theses that were presented 
in advance of his 1801  Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets'  as 
part of the requirements to qualify for lecturing at the University of Jena, we find the 
following thesis: “ 7. Critical Philosophy lacks ideas; it is an imperfect form of 
Scepticism"58. Leaving aside, for the moment, the difference between this 
identification and that found in the Phenomenology. we can see that this shows Hegel 
to have been concerned with the relation between scepticism and Critical philosophy 
at that time. Such concern was of a piece with Hegel's interest in the issues 
surrounding the idea of providing the correct systematic form for philosophy raised in 
the works of Post-Kantian idealists such as Reinhold and Fichte. Indeed, shortly 
before arriving in Jena. Hegel expressed a desire to find a systematic form for his own 
thought in a letter dated November 2"d  1800 to his friend Schelling5 9  -  who was also 
present at the examination in which Hegel defended his ‘twelve theses'.
It is fair to say that concerns surrounding the issues of systematicity and first 
principles in philosophy were dominant themes in the Post-Kantian scene. One of the 
major catalysts to the philosophical investigation of such themes was G. E. Schulze’s 
anonymously published treatise Aenesidemns (1792)6 0  which pitched the new Critical 
philosophy, inaugurated by Kant and putatively advanced by Reinhold, against a 
detailed sceptical attack. The work prompted Fichte to re-assess his own thought 
regarding Kant's Transcendental philosophy6 1  and Reinhold’s re-interpretation of it, 
finally leading him to offer an initial outline of his new standpoint in a review article
‘7  For a full translation by  Pierre Adler see J.  Stewart (Ed.) 2002. pp.  173-207.
Ibid  p.  172. The sixth thesis reads: “The  idea  is synthesis of the  infinite and the finite, and the whole 
of Philosophy consists in  ideas [est in ideis]” (p.  171).
See H. S.  Harris ‘Hegel’s  intellectual development to  1807’  in  F.  Beiser (Ed.)  1993, p.35.
60 The full title is Aenesidemns,  or concerning the Foundations o f the Elementary Philosophy 
Propounded in Jena by Professor Reinhold,  including a Defence of  Scepticism against the Pretensions 
o f  the Critique o f Reason, an excerpt of which  is translated in George di Giovanni &   H. S. Harris 
(trans. &  eds.) 2000, pp. 104-35.
6 1   “[Aenesidemns] has overthrown  Reinhold in my eyes, has made me suspicious of Kant, and has
overturned my whole system  from the ground up. One cannot live under the open sky.  It cannot be 
helped; the system must be rebuilt.” This is an excerpt taken from  Fichte’s letter to H.  Stephani of mid- 
December  1793- as used in  D.  Breazeale  1988, p.56.
79of Aenesidemus in February  179462, and a more developed position in his important 
‘critique’, published in May of the same year: Uber den Begriff der 
Wissenschaftslehre (Concerning the Concept of the W  issenschaftslehre )6\  This re­
assessment of the Critical philosophy in light of such scepticism firmly established the 
relation between scepticism and questions regarding first principles and the systematic 
form of philosophy, as a philosophical topic of key importance64.
It's no surprise then that we find Hegel espousing an opinion on this relation 
as early as 1801, and giving it a much fuller treatment, specifically with regard to 
Schulze's later, more comprehensive sceptical work Critique of Theoretical 
Philosophy. in 1802 in his Verhaeltnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophic (The 
Relation of  Scepticism to Philosophy)65. This essay, more than any other, provides us 
with insight into the formulation of Hegel's, perhaps somewhat unorthodox, views 
regarding scepticism at that time, which would -  after the end of his collaboration 
with Schelling and his rejection of Schelling's notion o f‘intellectual intuition’ -  lead 
to the re-stated identification of Critical philosophy with scepticism that we get in the 
Phenomenology.
I have drawn this very rough sketch of the historical development of the 
interest in the relation of scepticism and Critical philosophy by way of an introduction 
to the historical context in which Hegel's close identification of the two was initially 
formulated. I believe that if we are to fully understand the nature of this identification 
along with some of its wider implications for Hegel’s project in the Phenomenology, 
then at least the bare bones of this historical context must be borne in mind in what 
follows66. First, we will briefly return to the identification as it appears in the 
Phenomenology to come to a better understanding of the basis for the identification.
This was published in Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung in two parts on the  1  l lh  &   12th   February  issues. 
The review can be found  in  D.  Breazeale  1988. pp. 59-79. 
h 3  Translated by  D.  Breazeale  1988. pp. 94-137.
64  In many ways the themes involved  in this topic are still  viewed as important in contemporary
epistemology.  Indeed, many of the insights of the  19,h  Century debate bear, at  least, some comparison 
to discussion regarding foundations, justification and epistemic circularity, by contemporary authors 
such as L.  Bonjour,  W. Alston and  E. Sosa.  We will note some of these connections throughout the 
chapter.
Kritisches Journal der Philosophic.  1. no. 2 (1802). pp. 1-74. A  translation of this can  be found  in 
George di Giovanni and  H.  S.  Harris (eds) 2000. pp.313-362.  Henceforth the text will  be referred to 
simply as the Relation essay, or by the abbreviation  RSP followed by the original page reference and 
the translation page reference.
66 Though more will be said of this context  in what follows, I do not  propose to engage in a detailed
discussion of Hegel’s general philosophical development  in  this  earlier period.  For an excellent account
of the development of Hegel’s thought  in this period  in reference to his contemporaries see H.  S. Harris 
1972 «&  1983.
80Second, we will consider Hegel’s general analysis of scepticism and, third, see how 
this is involved in his discussion of ‘scepticism’ as a form of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology. Fourth, we w ill relate Hegel’s analysis of scepticism back to his 
comments regarding Critical philosophy, clarifying the points of similarity between 
them and the general impact of his analysis of scepticism upon his criticism of Critical 
philosophy at the opening of C.(AA.)..
1.  The Phenomenology's Identification
The most obvious and straightforward connection between scepticism and Kantian 
Idealism in the Phenomenology is that they both succumb to the same error, they both 
hold thought and being fixed apart from one another and result in the familiar 
dialectical contradiction of asserting two contraries as truth. However, such 
involvement in contradiction will not explain why scepticism is a negative expression, 
while the idealism of Critical philosophy is a positive expression, of itself as a 'self­
contradictory ambiguity’. Any form of consciousness in the dialectic of the 
Phenomenology w ill share in being self-contradictory and so this alone cannot account 
for the strong identification of the two positions. Hegel instead makes a more specific 
claim:
“This idealism therefore becomes the same kind o f self-contradictory ambiguity 
as Scepticism, except that, while this expresses  itself negatively, the former does 
so positively;  but it fails equally with  Scepticism to bring together its 
contradictory thoughts o f pure consciousness being all  reality,  while the 
extraneous impulse or sensations and  ideas are equally reality.  Instead of 
bringing them  together,  it shifts  from  one to the other, and  is caught up in the 
spurious,  i.e.  sensuous  infinite.  Since  Reason  is all  reality  in the sense o f the 
abstract ‘mine',  and the  ‘other'  is for it something indifferent and extraneous, 
what is here made explicit  is that kind of knowing o f an  ‘other'  by  Reason, 
which we met  in the form  o f ‘meaning',  ‘perceiving'  and the  ‘Understanding’, 
which apprehends what is  ‘meant’  and  what  is  ‘perceived'.  Such a knowing is at 
the same time pronounced by the very  principle of this idealism  not to be a true 
knowing, for only  in the unity o f apperception  lies the truth of knowing.  The 
pure Reason o f this  idealism,  in order to reach this  ‘other’  which  is essential to
81it, and thus is the ‘in-itself, but which  it does not have within  it,  is therefore 
thrown back by  its own self on to that knowing which is not a knowing o f what 
is true; in this way,  it condemns itself o f its own knowledge and volition to 
being an untrue kind o f knowing, and cannot get away from  ‘meaning’  and 
‘perceiving’, which for it have no truth. (PS  238, pp.  144/5).
The basis for the identification of the two positions in the Phenomenology then seems 
to be their equal failure to bring together, specifically, “contradictory thoughts of pure 
consciousness being all reality, while the extraneous impulse or sensations and ideas 
are equally reality^ (Ibid.). This claim seems straightforward enough, but it w ill 
require quite a degree of unpacking before the details of the basis of the identification 
become clear. Before this can be done we must also note that this is simply one aspect 
of the identification as it occurs in the Phenomenology. The other aspect -  that 
scepticism negatively expresses its self-contradictoriness while the idealism of Critical 
philosophy expresses it positively -  must also be taken into account and clarified.
The key to this clarification is provided by the position of Hegel's discussion 
of scepticism in B. relative to the position of this identification in C.(AA.). The 
positioning would suggest that while scepticism represents a form of consciousness 
that is to some degree self-aware or self-conscious, it is not self-conscious to the same 
degree as the idealism discussed. In fact, as one of the immediate predecessors to 
Hegel's own absolute idealism, this ‘subjective idealism' must constitute a significant 
advance on scepticism; it is as yet undeveloped, ‘immediate Reason', it contains a 
moment of unification or genuine reconciliation though it fails itself to realise this and 
thereby relapses into being the ‘same kind of self-contradictory ambiguity' as 
scepticism. The point is that the positioning of the identification allows us to 
understand what Hegel means by labelling it as positive.
We will recall in B. that self-consciousness's object was double: on the one 
hand it had the immediate object of Sense-certainty and Perception as Understanding 
ultimately grasps it. i.e. as an unknowable beyond, a negative over against itself, as 
object, and on the other hand it had itself “ which is the true essence. and is present in 
the first instance only as opposed to the first object" (PS 167, p. 105), as object. 
Throughout B. the opposition of this double object, or to put it another way. the 
internal opposition of self-consciousness with itself, its negative self-relation, was to 
be removed and “the identity of itself with itself’ was to become “ explicit for it"
82(Ibid.). This was not to be achieved by simply destroying the otherness of its object, by 
simply removing it in this way, but through recognising this otherness, in its 
independence, to be itself. By C.(AA.) this has in principle been achieved:
“Now that self-consciousness is  Reason,  its hitherto negative relation to 
otherness turns round into a positive relation.  Up till  now  it has been 
concerned only  with  its  independence and  freedom, concerned to save and 
maintain  itself for itself at the expense o f the m  oriel, or o f its own actuality, 
both o f which appeared to it as the negative o f its essence.  But as Reason, 
assured o f itself,  it is at peace with them, and can endure them; for it  is 
certain that it  is itself reality, or that everything actual  is none other than 
itself;  its thinking is itself directly actuality, and thus its relationship to the 
latter is that o f idealism. Apprehending  itself in this way,  it  is as if the world 
had for it only  now come  into being; previously  it did not  understand the 
world;  it desired  it and  worked on  it. withdrew  from  it  into itself and 
abolished it as an existence on  its own account, and  its own self qua 
consciousness -  both as consciousness o f the world as essence and as 
consciousness of its nothingness.  In thus apprehending  itself, after losing the 
grave of its truth, after the abolition o f its actuality  is  itself abolished, and 
after the singleness o f consciousness  is for it in  itself Absolute Essence,  it 
discovers the world as its new real  world, which  in  its permanence holds an 
interest for it which previously  lay only  in  its transiency" (PS 232, 
pp. 139/40).
So, by labelling this idealism as a positive expression of scepticism, Hegel is alluding 
to the fact that here self-consciousness’s negative self-relation has been removed and 
it is now actual self-consciousness secure in the certainty of being all reality, of being 
i  am I’. Correspondingly, as a kind of photographic negative of this, scepticism 
should stand as a form of self-consciousness which is the undermining of reality and 
as such, ultimately itself, a form in which both self and object are unessential.
We have then, the outline of the two aspects of Hegel’s identification in the 
Phenomenology, one providing the point of similarity the other the point of 
difference. It seems that here Hegel’s thoughts regarding the identification have 
undergone some change since his statement of it in the theses prefacing his 
Dissertation. There Critical philosophy was an imperfect form of scepticism, here it is 
a positive expression of the same kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as scepticism.
83Has his estimation of Critical philosophy gone up in the intervening period? Perhaps 
his estimation of scepticism has fallen? While the two different identifications may 
initially seem at odds with one another in this way. we will come to see, as we clarify 
the identification made in the Phenomenology, filling in the outline of the two aspects, 
that this is not the case. The identification made in the Phenomenology is obviously 
more detailed and thorough, but it also shows itself to be inclusive of Hegel's earlier 
identification.
2.  Ancient Scepticism
As has already been noted. Hegel's views concerning scepticism are, in a sense, 
unorthodox when compared to those of his contemporaries in the post-Kantian 
tradition. While he agrees with Fichte that the Schulzian scepticism is, in essence. 
dogmatic6 7  he holds a much broader view of the history of scepticism and its 
treatment as a whole, as being a degeneration into dogmatism6 8  that sets him apart 
from the likes of Reinhold and Fichte. Hegel is obviously concerned to re-instate the 
correct view of the relation of scepticism to philosophy as “the negative side of the 
cognition of the Absolute" which “directly presupposes Reason as the positive side” 
(RSP p.l9/p.323) or as “the free side of every” genuine “ philosophy” (RSP 
p.20/p.324). and he is keen to correct the errors of the likes of C. F. Staudlin's 
Geschichte und Geist des Scepticismus(,J  which he castigates Schulze for quoting70. 
Hegel then, seems to display a much more deeply held philosophical concern for the 
true nature of “authentic scepticism” or “ genuine ancient scepticism'" (RSP 
p.30/p.330) than his contemporaries, and it is arguably such concern that in a large 
part helps shape the Phenomenology. If we are to find grounds for the putative 
similarity between the idealism of Critical philosophy and scepticism then we will 
need to investigate this unorthodox view and bring to light just where and how it 
connects with such idealism in Hegel's view71.
67 See  Fichte’s Review of  Aenesidemns in G.  D. Giovanni &   H.  S.  Harris (trans. &  eds.) 2000, p. 138.
68 RSP, pp.30-3 l/p.330.
69 Published in two volumes in  Leipzig,  1794.
7 0 RSP, p.25/p.327.
7 1  H.  S. Harris (See G.  D. Giovanni &   H.  S. Harris 2000, pp. 252-271) provides a nice  introduction to 
the topic of Hegel’s thought regarding Scepticism, K.  Westphal  1989 and  1998, provides an account of 
Hegel’s response to Pyrrhonian  Scepticism and in particular to its Problem of the Criterion, while M. 
Forster  1998 (pp.  129-192) provides perhaps one of the best introductions to Hegel’s thought on
84Much of Hegel’s knowledge of ancient scepticism came from Sextus 
Empiricus’ Outlines of  Pyrrhonism72. This work stands as a kind of text book of 
ancient scepticism, espousing and demonstrating the use of various modes of 
argument, or ‘tropes’ as they are otherwise known, against all forms of ‘dogmatic’ 
philosophy, that is, against all philosophical theories that assent to a non-evident 
proposition of some kind. While one specific target some of Sextus’ argument is the 
outlook of stoicism, broadly taken the work aims to demonstrate that any attempt to 
discern which dogmatic theory is correct ultimately results in failure, leaving 
suspension of belief or epoche as the only sensible option. The work is well aware of 
its precedents in the form of the thoughts of Pyrrho of Elis (c.360-c.270 B.C.) and the 
academic sceptics, which arose in Plato’s academy under the leadership of Arcesilaus 
(c. 315-240 B.C.) and Carneades (c.214-128/9 B.C.).
As indicated in the title of Sextus’ work it is Pyrrho who is taken to be the 
founder and figurehead of such scepticism. While little is known of Pyrrho -  he wrote 
nothing down and it is unclear whether he had any intention of founding a system of 
thought7 3  -  in the hands of Sextus his teachings become explicitly systematic: a list of
scepticism  in relation to his procedure in the Phenomenology. In an earlier work (M .  Forster  1989) he 
provides a much fuller treatment with in depth analysis of Hegel’s Relation essay amongst other 
writings. In much of what follows I am  indebted to these commentators’ research of this topic.
However, an alternative view of Hegel’s interpretation of scepticism that takes issue with 
Forster’s account has recently been offered by W.  Dudley 2003. Dudley argues that Forster is wrong to 
claim that Hegel locates the superiority of ancient scepticism in their dialectical method of 
equipollence or isostheneia. Dudley thinks that Forster reaches “this conclusion  ...  without devoting 
sufficient attention to the different strains Hegel  identifies within ancient scepticism: the Academic and 
the Pyrrhonian” (p.89). Sufficient attention  is not paid to Hegel’s thought about the different strains 
because Hegel “ultimately concludes their brands of scepticism are essentially the same" (Ibid.). 
Though the brands are ultimately the same for Hegel, Dudley believes that “attending to Hegel’s 
discussion of the variations within ancient scepticism will show that, pace Forster ...  Hegel does not 
consider equipollence to be the most advanced sceptical method, and in fact does not base his 
judgement of the superiority of ancient scepticism on methodological considerations at all” (Ibid.). 
Rather, Dudley thinks that the brands of ancient scepticism do not share a common method, what they 
do share is “a common form of sceptical consciousness” (Ibid.). That is, they arrive at the same basic 
philosophical insights through different methodologies, and it is the sceptical consciousness, rather 
than any particular method, that is the basis for Hegel’s judgement of the superiority of ancient 
scepticism.
Dudley’s argument is convincing, and while in my own account I try to show that historically 
there is some shared methodological  influence, I  locate Hegel’s claims for the potency of ancient 
scepticism as being based on two characteristics: a refusal to rely on non-evident principles and a 
recognition of the general applicability of their methods to determinate claims or assertions, which are 
in turn founded on the basic insights or standpoint achieved by scepticism as a form of consciousness 
that appears in the Phenomenology.
7 2  S. Empiricus  1933 (Vol.  1).  It is generally thought that Hegel possessed the  ‘Fabricus Edition’  of the 
text which was the best edition available at the time -  see K. R.  Westphal  1989,  ‘Notes to Chapter  1  ’ 
No. 54, page 219, and H.  S. Harris’ translation of the Relation essay {Op.  Cit.) note 52, p.359.
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Pyrrho’s general view   is encapsulated in the follow ing report by his pupil  Tim on  o f Philius (c320- 
230  B .C .):  “ ...Pyrrho shows that objects are equally indifferent and unfathomable and undeterminable because 
neither our senses nor our judgements are true or false: so for that reason we should not trust in them but should be
85ten tropes designed to induce suspension of belief on various matters7 4 . His position 
seemed to consist in the view that certain general strategies (later systematised into 
tropes) can be used to make us realise that our differing theories about the world are 
ungrounded and hence equally at fault. Once this realisation has been made we should 
cease worrying over differing theories; we ought to simply refuse to assert one theory 
over any other, instead settling for a state of calmness or quietude called ataraxia 
about such matters. This ataraxia, which opened the way for eudaimonia, constituted 
the aim or goal of Pyrrhonian scepticism, the striving for beliefs being regarded as the 
source of avoidable mental disquietude or tarache, the source of unhappiness.
The second form of scepticism -  academic scepticism -  developed quite 
independently from Pyrrhonian thought, basing itself instead on a modified version of 
the dialectic found in Plato’s early dialogues7 '. While it is difficult to generalise about 
academic scepticism as it involved at least three separate phases of development, or 
periods of academy leadership: the ‘old’ period of Plato, the ‘middle’ period of 
Arcesilaus and the ‘new’ period of Carneades. 1  think it fair to claim generally, that 
the academic sceptics cultivated precise arguments used to attack specific opponents, 
the key to these arguments being a clear understanding of their opponent's position. 
That is to say, every claim of their opponent was assessed and balanced with a counter 
claim in order to demonstrate that the subsequent refutation of their opponent’s 
overall position was a complete refutation.
While Sextus himself is careful not to identify his Pyrrhonian form of 
scepticism with the academics7 6  their influence is nevertheless present in his
without judgement and w ithout inclination and unmoved, saying about each thing that it no more is than is not or 
both is and is not or neither is nor is not.  And Timon says that for those who take this attitude the result w ill be 
first non-assertion, then tranquillity."  As reported by Aristocles in  Eusibius’ Preparation  for the Gospel 
X IV , xvii 2-4. See J. Annas &  J. Bames  1985.
74 These  10 tropes as they appear in Outlines of Pyrrhonism are generally taken to have been  invented 
by Aenesidemus of Cnossos, not Pyrrho. Aenesidemus originally belonged to the group of academic 
sceptics, though he moved away from the academy in the First Century  B.C. believing it to be too 
dogmatic and established his own sceptical movement adopting the teachings of Pyrrho and using him 
as a figurehead.
They took their cue from the  Theatetus (see Plato  1953) in which Socrates claims:
“ ...the triumph of my art  is in thoroughly examining whether the thought...is false and  lifeless, or fertile 
and true... I  resemble the midwives in being barren o f wisdom, and the reproach which  is often made against me. 
that 1  ask questions of others and have not the wit to pronounce upon any subject myself,  is very just -  the reason 
is. that the good compels me to be a midwife, but has not allowed me to bring forth." (Vol.  3. p. 245).
Indeed, not ‘bringing forth’  was to lead to the Pyrrhonian result of epoche for the Academic 
sceptics who urged that a proper understanding of both the arguments for and against a certain matter 
would lead to this result, as those arguments would be shown to be equal  in respect of their force.
7 6  See, S. Empiricus  1933, Vol.  1, pp.  133-145.  Sextus believes that the middle period under the 
leadership of Arcesilaus brought the academics closest to Pyrrhonism (see pp. 143-145) such that “his 
way of thought is almost identical with ours” (p. 143), while the new period under Carneades (and even 
later under Philo and Charmidas) places the academics at odds with the Pyrrhonian sceptics.
86philosophy via the figure of Aenesidemus, the real thinker whose namesake stands as 
the eponymous narrator of Schulze’s attack on Reinhold and Kant. Aenesidemus, who 
broke away from the academy in the 1s t Century B.C., adopted Pyrrho as the rightful 
figurehead of his own position, which nevertheless maintained the close 
argumentation of the academics. He handed down to Sextus the older ten tropes and 
therein the systematising influence of the academy on Pyrrho’s more general position.
The resultant essential core of scepticism that Sextus endorses can be 
summarised by the following tenets:
5.  Scepticism is to lead to ataraxia, this being its aim.
6.  Ataraxia is to be achieved by demonstrating that arguments for and against a 
position have equal force, which requires a clear understanding of an 
opponent’s position, its principles and assumptions.
7.  Scepticism refrains from dogmatizing. That is, it withholds assent from all 
things non-evident7 7 .
Naturally, this is not meant as a final, definitive statement of what I am calling ancient 
scepticism -  we  have not yet even reached an understanding of the way in which 
arguments for and against a position can be said to be ‘equal’ in force -  but it will 
serve, for the time being, as an adequate basis from which to explore Hegel’s 
reception of this kind of scepticism and from which to elucidate the position further.
In the Relation essay Hegel provides a critique, of sorts, of modern scepticism, 
which he views as being essentially dogmatic insofar as its attacks are predicated on 
the basis of a number of non-evident assumptions7 8 , applauding the more
7 7  See particularly S. Empiricus  1933,  Vol.  1, pp.9-13 &   15.
7 8  Foster argues that Hegel  identified three such assumptions (see M. Forster  1989, pp. 13-32). The first 
is that we have immediate, certain knowledge of facts regarding our current mental contents, the 
second is that this immediate knowledge concerns a kind of mental thing that is apprehended via some 
sort of introspection or inner perception and the third, and  I think most important for Hegel,  is that 
there exists a sharp distinction between concepts and their instances in the world, or put more 
generally: there is a division  between thought and being. This distinction  is such that there is no need 
for a concept to have a corresponding instance, nor is there a need for a concept ever to have had such a 
corresponding instance.
This is an assumption jointly shared by both modem and ancient scepticism  insofar as ancient 
scepticism exploits it in the application of its tropes in order to arrive at epoche.  When we come to 
consider the situation o f‘Scepticism’  within the Phenomenology we will see that this assumption plays 
an important role in  its supersession as it has  its basis in the finite determinations and fixed viewpoint 
of the Understanding.
It is also interesting to note that in contemporary movements in epistemology this assumption 
is still exploited as a basis for sceptical arguments in the modem style, for instance the argument to the 
effect that no mental state can serve as a foundation for knowledge. See section 4. of E. Sosa’s ‘The 
Raft and the Pyramind:  Coherence Versus  Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge’  in  P.  French et al. 
(eds.)  1980, pp.3-25.
87thoroughgoing ancient scepticism for its greater degree of philosophical potency. 1  
believe Hegel’s account brings out two sources for this potency7 9  at the heart of 
ancient scepticism. The first can be seen through a consideration what are commonly 
known as ‘the five tropes of Agrippa’. These are subsequent to the ten tropes handed 
down by Aenesidemus and were viewed by Sextus as being complementary to, but 
not superseding, the previous ten. However, for Hegel “(T)he five later tropes of 
scepticism ... make up the genuine arsenal of its weapons against philosophical 
cognition*’ (RSP p.38/p.334)8 0 . Briefly, the five tropes are as follows81:
5.  Discrepancy: is the idea that “ ...with regard to the object presented there has 
arisen ... an interminable conflict because of which we are unable either to 
choose a thing or reject it."8 2
6.  Regress ad Infinitum: is the idea that when “ .. .the thing adduced as a proof of 
the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on ad 
infinitum ... the consequence is suspension, as we posses no starting point for 
our argument."8'
7.  Relativity: is the idea that an object may only have  . .such or such an 
appearance in relation to the subject judging and to the concomitant 
percepts"84. If this is the case then any judgement as to its real nature must be 
suspended.
8.  Hypothesis: is the idea that in instances where a regress has been forced (2.) 
and a solution has been provided by taking a starting point for granted “ ...
79 C.f.  RSP pp.20-25/pp.324-327.
K 0  Hegel’s views regarding these five tropes  in comparison to the earlier ten undergo some alteration  in 
the time between the Relation essay and his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.  In the Relation 
essay he praises the earlier tropes for their utility  in combating the dogmatism of the  Understanding 
and castigates the later, more well-formed and potent tropes of Agrippa. due to a tendency of their 
misapplication against genuine  Philosophical  Science. Against such Science they are  ineffectual.  In the 
Lectures their impotence against  Philosophical  Science is noted at length, however the earlier ten 
tropes are now criticised for their crudity while the five are praised for their exhaustiveness as regards 
the determinations of the Understanding. Nevertheless, these minor alterations do not effect Hegel’s 
overriding view that the later tropes are superior to the earlier ones, a view which  remains constant 
across both works.
K l  In the following list I have adopted the headings used in Sextus’  own text: “ ...the first based on 
discrepancy, the second on regress ad infinitum, the third on relativity, the fourth on  hypothesis, the 
fifth on circular reasoning.” S.  Empiricus  1933. Vol.  1, pp. 94/95.
8 2  Ibid
8 1  Ibid.
8 4  Ibid
88simply and without demonstration” 85, then this starting point is not established 
as it has not been demonstrated and we should suspend belief on the matter.
9.  Circularity: is the idea that when the “ .. .proof itself which ought to establish 
the matter of inquiry requires confirmation derived from that matter”8 6  neither 
the proof nor the matter can be taken to establish the other and we must 
suspend judgement.
These five tropes form the basis of what has come to be known as ‘Agrippa's 
Trilemma7 . that is. if we forward a claim as grounded or justified, then the sceptic can 
force us to choose between accepting that our claim is mere assertion, accepting that it 
succumbs to an infinite regress of grounds, or accepting that it has a circular proof, 
via the application of one or more of the five tropes. In essence this trilemma is at the 
heart of the contemporary ‘Regress Argument of Justification'87. It also forms the 
backbone of the ‘Problem of the Criterion', formulated by Sextus in the following 
way:
“ ...some have declared that a criterion exists  ...  let them tell  us whereby  it  is 
to be decided, since we have no accepted criterion, and do not even know, 
but are still  inquiring, whether any criterion exists.  Besides,  in order to 
decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an 
accepted criterion by which we shall  be able to judge the dispute; and  in 
order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must 
first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form  of 
circular reasoning the discovery o f the criterion becomes impracticable, since 
we do not allow them to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer 
to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum.
And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, 
while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they  are forced  into 
circular reasoning.”88
8 5  Ibid.
86 Ibid
8 7  The Regress Argument  is usually taken to show that the only alternatives to admitting foundational, 
non-inferentially justified beliefs are circularity,  infinite regress or dogmatic assertion. The argument is 
first mentioned, in one form,  in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics,  ed. &  trans. J.  Barnes (Oxford: 
Clarendon  Press)  1975, Book  1, Ch 2-3.  For two more recent viewpoints on this argument see L. 
Bonjuor  1978 and W. Alston  1976.
8 8   S.  Empiricus  1933, V o l.l,  Book  II, Chapter IV, pp.  162-165. The problem can be further clarified 
by reformulating it as follows:
1.  To be able to identify instances of an accepted criterion and to be justified  in believing that 
they are true we must already be justified in believing of the accepted criterion that it is true.
2.  To be justified in believing of an accepted criterion that it is true we must already be able to 
identify instances of it and be justified in believing that those instances are true.
89The worry is that if we are unable to demonstrate instances in which the conditions set 
forth for justification are met then it’s not clear that the conditions aren’t simply 
assumed or arbitrary. If they are not arbitrary there should be no problem in 
highlighting instances in which they are met; after all, how did we come to be aware 
of them in the first place if not through instances in which they obtain? The problem 
is that identifying instances in which they obtain as opposed to ones in which they do 
not, can only be achieved if we already know the conditions; we can’t discriminate 
between the instances if we don't know the conditions.
At the heart of these problems and underpinning the application of the 
‘genuine arsenal of scepticism’s weapons' is the technique of isostheneia or 
‘equipollence’. Literally the term means ‘equality of power’ and is, simply put, the 
equivalence of two or more propositions in respect of their justification. To the 
ancient sceptic equipollence could be put to good use: an opposing proposition could 
be introduced into a discussion with the same justificatory  power as the original 
proposition under discussion, thus forcing suspension of belief upon the matter; this is 
how, via trope 4. we can suspend belief. Hegel himself notes this use when explaining 
the employment of the five tropes against dogmatism8 9 , claiming that in order to avoid 
circularity and regress regarding grounds we might assume a ground as “grounded in 
itself', but without adequate demonstration the “ opposite can be presupposed with
It seems that if both A. and B. are correct then we are trapped in a circle, and  if we simply 
assume a criterion or assume instances of it then we can be accused of merely begging the question.
The problem boils down to that of providing a non-sceptical solution: of denying A. or B. or providing 
some way out of the circle.
In a sense such problems can provide a focus for contemporary debates surrounding  internalist 
and externalist accounts of justification. The Problem of the Criterion often  leads epistemologists to 
question whether the sceptic’s demand for a fully reflective justification of grounds  is reasonable, a 
demand that generally has a strong grip on  internalists, but need not have any grip on externalists 
(insofar as they reject any kind of cognitive accessibility requirement).  Many epistemologists who do 
not wish to deny the rationale behind externalist accounts but nevertheless feel that something must be 
said  in  response to the sceptic, offer epistemically circular responses to the problem.  See E.  Sosa  1997 
and  W. Alston  1986 and  1980.  Feeling that something more needs to be said  in  response to the sceptic 
is an  intuition that is curiously common amongst such epistemologists and  it raises interesting 
questions regarding the philosophical value of externalist analyses of epistemic concepts and their role 
in any attempts to naturalize epistemology. An  interesting discussion of such questions can be found  in 
R.  Fumerton  1995. pp. 159-181.  Fumerton concludes:"(l)t seems to many of us that the externalist  is simply 
missing the point of the philosophical  inquiry when externalist analyses o f epistemic concepts continue to be 
presupposed as the sceptical challenge is repeated at the metalevels.  But the only explanation  for this is that the 
externalist analysis of epistemic concepts never was adequate to a philosophical  understanding o f epistemic 
concepts ' (p.  181). This explanation, it could be suggested, also accounts for the desire to say more in 
response to the sceptic amongst those who don’t wish to deny the externalist’s underlying rationale.
While 1  do not intend to discuss the issue of epistemic circularity as a response to this kind of 
scepticism  it should be noted that T.  Rockmore  1986 &   1992 argues that Hegel’s response is. 
ultimately, epistemically circular.
89 RSP pp.40-41/pp.335-6.
90equal right without being unproved or grounded” (RSP p.40/p.336). The idea then is 
that a claim that is lacking a demonstrable ground will always be open to attack by an 
equipollent contrary; an opposing claim of the same justificatory right, i.e. one that is 
also lacking a demonstrable ground. In such a case it seems that we require a way of 
deciding between the claims if we are to escape suspension of belief and whatever the 
way, its ground must be demonstrable if it is to avoid attack by equipollent contrary. 
The essential insight underpinning this use of equipollence is what Hegel calls earlier 
in the Relation essay “the principle of Scepticism: panti logoi logos isos antikeitai 
[“ against every argument there is an equal one on the other side"]” (RSP p.21/p.325).
The key feature of this technique to notice is that its proper application 
depends upon the avoidance of assertion or assumption of any principles, in line with 
tenet 3. sketched above. That is. it putatively constitutes a sceptical method which is 
not predicated on any non-evident assumptions. The tactic therefore, is one of 
immanent critique: a refutation based on the principles and grounds that the opponent 
uses. In this sense it is a form of self-refutation and it is this characteristic that 
accounts for why we lose confidence in those principles and grounds. Once all such 
principles and grounds have been shown to support equipollent contrary positions we 
are purged of any confidence in them. The ancient sceptic does not, however, assert 
any of these principles or grounds, or any other90.
However, it would seem that if we are purged of any confidence we placed in 
the principles and grounds of our opponent’s claim, then we should also be purged of 
any confidence we placed in the sceptical argumentation that brought us to this point, 
insofar as that argumentation relied on the principles and grounds of the now suspect 
claim of our opponent in order to operate. Indeed, when responding to whether or not 
the sceptic dogmatizes Sextus notes:
"When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogmatizing we do not  use the 
term "dogma" as some do.  in the broader sense of “approval o f a thing"  for 
the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which are the necessary results o f 
sense-impressions, and he would not,  for example, say  when feeling hot or 
cold “I  believe that  I  am  not hot or cold"; but we say that “he does not 
dogmatize" using “dogma"  in the sense, which some give it, o f “assent to
90 See S. Empiricus  1933, Vol.  I,  Book  1, Ch.  X X , p.l 11-113. The ancient sceptic  is very careful to 
make plain that any claims that could be viewed as assertion on his/her behalf are in fact not assertions. 
At most this sceptic may say “it appears to me that such and such” but the guiding thought is that no 
single claim  is to be asserted or established over against any other.
91one of the non-evident objects o f scientific inquiry”; for the Pyrrhonian 
philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident  ... the Sceptic does not 
posit...  formulae in any absolute sense; for he conceives that, just as the 
formula “A ll things are false” asserts the falsity o f itself as well  as o f 
everything else, as does the formula “Nothing is true”, so also the formula 
“No more” asserts that itself,  like all  the rest,  is “No more (this than that)”, 
and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And o f the other formulae we say 
the same.  If then  ...  the Sceptic enunciates his formulae so that they  are 
virtually cancelled by themselves, he should not be said to dogmatize  in his 
enunciation o f them. And,  most  important o f all,  in his enunciation o f these 
formulae he states what appears to him self and announces his own 
impression  in an  undogmatic way, without making any  positive assertion 
regarding the external realities.”9 1
This self-cancelling feature of ancient scepticism, based on the Pyrrhonisf s insistence 
not to dogmatize (which itself underpins the use of equipollence as a form of 
immanent critique) helps ensure their non-dogmatizing -  it provides a scepticism that 
overcomes itself and is truly sceptical through and through. It is this non-dogmatic 
character, or absence of a reliance on non-evident grounds that constitutes the first 
source of the ancient sceptic's potency, as I see it. for Hegel. According to this 
sceptic, this does not mean that the position is simply to be dismissed or ignored, 
rather:
“just as it  is not  impossible for the man who has ascended to a high place by 
a ladder to overturn the ladder with his foot after his ascent, so also it is not 
unlikely that the Sceptic after he has arrived at the demonstration o f his 
thesis by means o f argument proving the non-existence o f proof, as  it were 
by a step ladder, should then abolish this very argument.”92
9 1   Ibid.  Ch V II, pp. 9-11.
9 2  S.  Empiricus  1933, Vol.  II, Bk.  II, pp.487-489.  It is  interesting to compare this use of a step-ladder 
analogy to Plato’s characterisation of Reason’s ability to practice dialectic  in the Republic where 
Socrates tells Glaucon “When it takes things for granted,  it doesn't treat them as starting-points, but as basic in 
the strict sense -  as platforms and rungs,  for example. These serve it until  it reaches a point where nothing needs to 
be taken for granted, and which  is the starting-point for even thing." (Plato  1993, p. 239, 51 lb-c).  Hegel, to 
some degree, views the procedures of scepticism as acting in this manner and, as we shall see, 
ultimately views Scepticism as the form of consciousness which first becomes aware of the dialectic as 
having its source in consciousness,  instead of being external to it.
92It is such a thoroughgoing refusal to be dogmatic -  to the point of self-cancellation -  
that separates modern scepticism from ancient scepticism in Hegel’s mind93. It is what 
permits equipollence to function as a type of self-refutation, and it also provides the 
basis for the second source, viz. the generality of their procedures for attacking 
opponents.
As far as the ancient sceptic was concerned every matter of inquiry admits of 
being brought under at least one of their tropes and Hegel concurs that these later 
tropes will constitute a problem for any claim to knowledge as any attempt to ground 
such a claim will result in either regress or circularity, whereas leaving the claim 
ungrounded or positing a non-demonstrable ground for the claim licenses the 
application of an equipollent contrary. He notes:
“Scepticism does not operate by  bringing forward what  is called a difficulty, 
a possibility o f representing the matter otherwise; that would  merely  indicate 
some sort of fancy which  is contingent as regards this asserted knowledge.
Scepticism  is not an empiric matter such as this,  for it contains a scientific 
aim.  its tropes turn on the Notion, the very essence o f determinateness, and 
are exhaustive as regards the determinate  ...  These tropes are necessary 
contradictions into which the understanding falls  ...  Now, speaking 
generally, this is the method o f Scepticism, and  it is most  important.  Because 
the sceptical  conscience demonstrates that in all that  is immediately  accepted 
there is nothing secure and absolute, the Sceptics have taken  in hand all 
particular determinations o f the  individual  sciences, and have shown that 
they are not fixed  ...  this far-seeing power o f abstraction  is also requisite in 
order to recognise these determinations o f negation or o f opposition 
everywhere present in all  concrete matter, and  in all  that is thought, and to 
find in this determinate its  limits” (LH P , V o l.2,  p.365).
This scepticism is ‘exhaustive as regards the determinate’ and each ‘definite 
assertion' is ‘set over against its other'. This generality of application constitutes the
9 3   For Hegel “genuine ancient scepticism’’ or “authentic scepticism” which “maintains a pure negativity 
in relation to knowledge”, was initially “just as little directed against philosophy as fo r it”, however it 
turned against philosophy “as soon as philosophy became dogmatism” and this turning,  in  Hegel’s 
eyes, “illustrates how it (scepticism) has kept  in step with the communal degeneration of philosophy 
and of the world in general” until  it becomes modem scepticism,  in which:
“it has sunk so far in company with dogmatism  ...  that, since the extremes now touch, the great goal  is 
attained once more on their side in these happy times, that dogmatism and scepticism coincide with one another on 
the underside, and offer each other the hand o f perfect freinship and  fraternity.  Schulzian scepticism  integrates the 
crudest dogmatism into itself, and Krug’s dogmatism carries that scepticism within itself likewise" (RSP 
p.30/p.330).
93second source of ancient scepticism’s potency for Hegel94. The main feature to be 
noted regarding this is that scepticism’s tropes, for Hegel, articulate real doubts, 
“ necessary contradictions into which the understanding falls” (Ibid.), not idle, abstract 
possibilities. This scepticism offers actual arguments establishing the opposite of what 
is taken to be the case, it “demonstrates that in all that is immediately accepted there 
is nothing secure and absolute” (Ibid., my emphasis).
Now, before turning to a consideration of scepticism as a form of 
consciousness in the Phenomenology, there remains one more important aspect of its 
character to elucidate. T his aspect also stems from its insistence not to dogmatize, and 
is perhaps best described as the lack of a positive reflexive description or account. I 
do not mean by this that such scepticism is unable to describe itself in some way -  it 
may describe itself as involving adherence to something like the three tenets 
mentioned earlier -  but only that any description it gives, by that scepticism's own 
lights, will be a description that, at best, can lay claim to being only an appearance; 
the sceptic is restricted to a reflexive account that does not overstep the boundary of 
how matters merely seem to him/herself95. It seems that beyond the operations of 
ancient scepticism, which rely on the assertions and principles of other positions for 
matter to operate on, any self-description w ill be empty of content, or at least empty 
of any content that is not subject to sceptical subversion. This scepticism then, seems 
to be no real position at all, that is, it does indeed appear to maintain “ a pure 
negativity in relation to knowledge” (RSP p.30/p.330), even in relation to self- 
knowledge. It does stand as purely negative.
3.  Scepticism as a Form of Concsiousness
94 Naturally there is a sense in which any method,  insofar as as it constitutes a method, will be generally 
applicable across its domain, however, what is being highlighted here is that ancient scepticism  can be 
generally applied to assertions, claims etc.  in a way that modem scepticism,  in  Hegel’s view, cannot. 
It’s generality  is meant to be taken  in contrast to the more restricted standpoint of modem scepticism. 
This generality is, of course, a function of the ancient sceptic’s refusal to dogmatize which goes so far 
as to prove self-cancelling in  its argumentation against opponents.
9 5  C.f. “If then  ...  the sceptic enunciates his formulae so that they are virtually cancelled by themselves,  he should 
not be said to dogmatize in his enunciation of them. And. most important of all.  in his enunciation of these 
formulae he states what appears to himself and announces his ow n  impression in an undogmatic w ay. w ithout 
making any positive assertion regarding the external realities” S.  Empiricus  1933, Vol.  1,  Book  1, Ch.  X X , 
p. 111-113.
94When we turn to scepticism as a particular form of consciousness developed within 
the dialectic of the Phenomenology , as we would expect, we find both sources of 
potency invoked in the characterisation provided there.
“W ith the reflection of self-consciousness into the simple thought o f itself, 
the independent existence or permanent determinateness that stood over 
against that reflection has, as a matter o f fact, fallen outside o f the infinitude 
o f thought.  In  Scepticism, now, the wholly  unessential and non-independent 
character o f this  ‘other*  becomes explicit /o r consciousness; the  [abstract] 
thought becomes the concrete thinking which annihilates the being o f the 
world in all  its manifold determinateness, and the negativity o f free self- 
consciousness comes to know itself in the many and varied forms o f life as a 
real negativity  ...  this polemical  bearing towards the manifold  independence 
o f things will  ...  be successful, because it turns against them as a free self- 
consciousness that is already complete in its own self;  more specifically, 
because it  is thinking, or is in  its own self infinite, and  in this  infinitude the 
independent things in their differences from one another are only vanishing 
magnitudes. The differences,  which  in the pure thinking o f self- 
consciousness are only the abstraction o f differences, here become the 
entirety of differences, and the whole o f differentiated being becomes a 
difference o f self-consciousness". (PS 202, p. 123).
This passage is difficult and in need of unpacking if we are to clearly see the 
involvement of the sources of potency identified in the analysis above96. We should 
begin this unpacking by sharpening the claim that Hegel is making for scepticism 
here. His contention is that in scepticism we have a form of self-consciousness that 
will be successful in overcoming the ‘other’ in a way in which the other previous 
forms of self-consciousness in B. were not. That is, it is with scepticism that “ the
% While it is generally accepted that the form of consicousness in the Phenomenology called scepticism 
is to be identified as the genuine ancient scepticism that Hegel refers to and discusses in other works,  it 
is, in fact, not clearly labelled as this and some evidence ought to be adduced in support of this 
assumption. Some commontators point to the fact that this form of consicousness follows stoicism and 
provide a historical reading of this section as a whole.  Most attempt to establish a  link, as 1   am doing, 
between the characterisation given  in the Phenomenology and Hegel’s analyses of genuine, ancient as 
opposed to modem scepticism elsewhere. This is the point at which  Dudley’s criticisms of Forster 
(who gives a broad historical reading of the dialectical development of the Phenomenology -see 
Forster  1998) begin to get some purchase.  It  is not simply the methods of ancient scepticism (e.g. of 
Pyrrhonian, Academic Scepticism etc.), but an underlying sceptical form of consciousness (‘genuine 
ancient scepticism’ or ‘authentic scepticism’) that accounts for its philosophical potency. This is 
perhaps why Hegel discusses this form simply as ‘scepticism’  and not as ‘ancient’  or 
‘Pyrrhonian/academic scepticism’  in the Phenomenology.
95wholly unessential and non-independent character of this ‘other’ becomes explicit for 
consciousness” {Ibid.). We will recall that the general problem in B. was self­
consciousness’s negative self-relation, that is to say, instead of simply recognising 
itself in the object, the object seemed to self-consciousness to be other than itself. This 
was due to the fact that at the outset of B. we were faced with a form of (self) 
consciousness that was only implicitly self-consciousness, merely the immediate 
conviction or certainty that its object was not other than itself. ‘We’ had seen that its 
object truly was not other than itself, but for that form itself, though certain of this, its 
own self was only to be found present in opposition to its object97. Throughout B. this 
opposition was to be overcome and self-consciousness was to find itself present in 
this object, not merely present in opposition to this object. The claim here, with 
scepticism, is that this opposition is overcome: “the non-independent character of this 
‘other’ becomes explicit for consciousness” (Ibid.), though in the negative sense of 
being “ wholly unessential” ; scepticism “annihilates the being of the world in all its 
manifold determinateness".
In what way then can the sources of potency be said to be involved in this 
characterisation of scepticism? Well, the telling phrase in this regard is Hegel’s claim 
that “('W)ith the reflection of self-consciousness into the simple thought of itself, the 
independent existence or permanent determinateness that stood over against that 
reflection has, as a matter of fact, fallen outside of the infinitude of thought” {Ibid.). 
Essentially, this is a summary of sorts of the situation in stoicism that immediately 
precedes scepticism. Stoicism is given the following characterisation:
“Its principle is that consciousness is a being that thinks, and that 
consciousness holds something to be essentially  important, or true and good 
only in so far as  it thinks  it to be such  ...  Now,  it  is true that for this self- 
consciousness the essence is neither an other than itself,  nor the pure 
abstraction o f the T ,  but an  T   which has otherness within  itself, though  in 
the form  o f thought, so that  in  its otherness  it has directly returned  into itself'
(PS  198 &  200, pp. 121/2).
97 “Consciousness, as self-consciousness  ...  has a double object: one is the immediate object, that of 
sense-certainty and perception, which however  fo r self-consciousness has the character of a negative', 
and the second, viz. itself which is the true essence, and is present in the first instance only as opposed 
to the first object.” (PS  167, p. 105).
96The reason that stoicism fails to completely overcome the otherness in the way that 
scepticism does even though it internalises the otherness in the form of thought, is that 
in stoicism this thought remains too abstract and is essentially contentless. Stoicism 
recognises only pure or abstract thought as its truth and not the determinateness of the 
multiplicity of things. It thereby has ‘\W)ithdrawn from existence only into itself, it 
has not there achieved its consummation as absolute negation of that existence” (PS 
201, p. 122). This comes only with scepticism “the realization of that of which 
Stoicism was only the Notion” (PS 202, p. 123). The withdrawal is. however, what 
causes the “ independent existence” or “determinateness” to “ fall outside the infinitude 
of thought” or. in other words, it is what makes scepticism aware of the unessential 
character of this determinateness and allows it to “ annihilate” it completely.
To be more specific, in claiming that this other falls outside of the infinitude 
of thought Hegel means that it becomes finite, limited in some sense. That is, it is 
taken to have fixed, limiting boundaries. But why does such limitation permit 
scepticism to become aware of the unessential and non-independent character of such 
determination? The answer lies in the fact that if something is finite or limited then it 
is so in virtue of something else standing over against it in a limiting fashion, 
providing its boundaries. In the case of scepticism it is scepticism as the infinitude of 
thought that is doing the limiting: “ it is thinking, or is in its own self infinite” {Ibid.). 
Now insofar as this limiting other provides a lim it to, or better, delimits that which it 
stands over against, it is involved in a determining relation to that which it stands over 
against. The consequence is that a finite or limited determination fails to entirely 
contain its ground within itself, rather this ground involves the relation to that which 
stands over against it (that which is outside of it, is not it), and hence, “ in this 
infinitude the independent things in their differences from one another are only 
vanishing magnitudes” {Ibid.). As far as stoicism is concerned this is not. strictly 
speaking, the case. Stoicism is simply the withdrawal into this infinitude as its truth, 
the finite determinations it encounters in the world still, to some degree, remain alien 
or independent from itself; in their determinateness they are simply given to stoicism, 
and stoicism is not aware of that in virtue of which they prove determinate. In 
scepticism, however, the limited determinations become unessential or non- 
independent; aware of itself as their ground and limit scepticism takes such 
determinations as being both its own and as being fluid. No one appearance or 
determination is to be favoured over any other.
97Now, one might think that Hegel is here, illegitimately, making an idealism 
out of scepticism and that the sceptic would not concur with such an analysis of his 
position, i.e. that Hegel is unfairly setting up a position to deliver positive results in 
respect of self-consciousness’s development in B. which a true representation of the 
position would resist. It is of course true that Hegel is providing his reader with a 
meta-level account of scepticism located in the context of his own, wider 
philosophical concerns, mining the position, so to speak, for content relevant to self­
consciousness’s overcoming of its negative self-relation, but is there anything in his 
presentation that the sceptic could really, in principle, disagree with? This is a 
difficult question to answer to everyone's satisfaction, but it is important to note a few 
things in Hegel’s defence regarding this issue.
While ‘we' can see that the falling outside of the infinitude of thought of self­
consciousness’s other that arises from stoicism's withdrawal into itself, is what allows 
scepticism's awareness of this other as unessential or non-independent, this does not 
of itself constitute any kind of positive or dogmatic assertion on behalf of the sceptic. 
Insofar as the sceptic counsels epoche on all matters via the employment of its tropes 
and method of equipollence, it does indeed appear to constitute an awareness of this 
other as unessential or non-independent, in Hegel’s sense. This is due to the fact that 
the condition for the employment of the tropes and equipollence is the finite character 
of this other. That is. the sceptic's methods function by exploiting the relation that one 
determinate object bears to others, viz. the ground of its determination is constituted 
in this relation to others, such that if taken independently of the others its ground 
cannot be demonstrated and is non-evident. If taken independently then a contrary can 
be equipoised to it. claimed as independent with equal justificatory right. The problem 
thereby arises that, if what is being claimed as independent is finite, insofar as it has 
boundaries or limits such that there is something beyond or outside of it, then it will 
always be open to sceptical methods of attack, because its putative independence 
always stands in relation to that which is beyond or outside of it. It is only 
independent or determinate insofar as it is independent from or determinate in 
relation to this beyond, this other. As long as what is posited as a given truth is finite
98in this manner then we cannot nullify sceptical attack98, and that given truth cannot 
stand as independent or essential.
The awareness then of the non-independence or unessentiality of the other that 
is constitutive of the sceptical form of self-consciousness is, for Hegel, an implicit 
awareness of the relational character of finite determinacy. It is this implicit 
awareness that permits the sceptic’s methods to function so exhaustively “ as regards 
the determinate” (LHP Vol.2, p.365) and which allows the sceptic to avoid dogmatic 
assertion. In short, it is this awareness that at base gives rise to the potencies identified 
earlier.
It is difficult to see that the sceptic has much to disagree with in this analysis: 
after all, it is not being claimed that the sceptic asserts the relational character of finite 
determinacy as truth. Nevertheless, it does appear to be the case that the sceptic 
depends on these things or is limited to them if his/her methods are to function and the 
sceptic would freely admit to adopting the principles and assumptions of his/her 
opponent in order to demonstrate that they are self-refuting99. That is to say. this 
awareness seems to underpin the sceptic's lack of a positive reflexive description and 
its potencies alike, and given its lack of a positive reflexive description, it seems that 
such scepticism has little, if anything at all to say in opposition to Hegel’s analysis.
Hegel makes much of this limited character of scepticism in both his Lectures 
on the History of  Philosophy and the Relation essay:
“the operations o f Scepticism  are undoubtedly directed against the finite.  But 
however much force these moments o f its negative dialectic may have 
against the properly-speaking dogmatic knowledge o f the understanding,  its 
attacks against the true infinite o f the speculative  Idea are most feeble and 
unsatisfactory.  For this last is  in  its nature nothing finite or determinate  ...  in 
itself it is round,  it contains this determinate and  its opposite in their identity 
in  itself.  In so far as this  Idea, as the unity o f these opposites,  is  itself again
q g  In fact,  it seems we can only nullify such possibilities  if we are able to show that the ground of such 
determinations is not finite, does not have fixed limiting boundaries in this sense.  Hence Hegel’s talk in 
the ‘Preface’  (and elsewhere) of “freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity" (PS 33, p.20) or his 
assertion  in the Difference essay that “Reason reaches the Absolute only by stepping outside of this 
manifold of parts” (DF p.90).
w The awareness of the relational character can only be predicated on the basis of a division between 
finite/infinite, thought/being , appearance/reality and so forth, divisions which are enshrined  in the 
principles and assumptions of the sceptic’s opponents and which the sceptic adopts for the sake of 
demonstrating self-refutation.  In this sense the awareness of the relational character etc.  is already 
present (though buried) in such positions, and through his demonstration of self-refutation the sceptic 
brings out this content and its shortcomings.
99outwardly a determinate, it stands exposed to the power o f the negative; 
indeed its nature and reality  is just to move continually on, so that as 
determinate it again places itself in unity with the determinate opposed to it, 
and thus organises itself into a whole whose starting point again coincides 
with the final  result  ...  if Scepticism attempts to deal  with this properly 
speculative element,  it can in no way  lay hold o f it...the method o f its 
procedure against the rational  is this, that  it makes the latter into a 
determinate, and always first o f all  introduces into it a finite thought- 
determination or idea o f relationship to which  it adheres, but which  is not 
really  in the infinite at all; and then  it argues against the same. That  is to say 
it comprehends it falsely and then  proceeds to contradict  it.  O r it first o f all 
gives the infinite the itch  in order to be able to scratch  it” (LH P  V ol.2, 
pp.367/8).
“since these tropes all  involve the concept o f a finite  [world], and are 
grounded on that, the immediate result o f their application to the rational  is 
that they pervert  it  into something finite; they give it the  itch o f limitedness, 
as an excuse for scratching it.  The tropes are not.  in and for themselves, 
directed against rational thinking;  but when they are [w illfully] directed  upon 
it  ...  they  immediately alter the rational.”100 (R S P  p .4 2 /p .3 3 7 )
So the sceptical method is only to be properly applied to the finite deliverances of the 
Understanding and is. in a sense, limited to them. The importance of this, for Hegel, is 
that in depending on. developing from and destroying its opponent's positions, 
scepticism not only exhibits dialectical movement but is aware of itself as such 
movement:
“(D)ialectic as a negative movement, just as it  immediately  is, at first appears 
to consciousness as something which has it at  its mercy, and which does not 
have its source in consciousness itself. As Scepticism, on the other hand,  it is 
a moment o f self-consciousness, to which  it does not happen that its truth 
and reality  vanish without its knowing how,  but which,  in the certainty o f its 
freedom, makes this  ‘other  which claims to be real, vanish" (PS 204, p. 124).
1 0 0  We should note here that the echoing of this phrase in the Lectures provides evidence that  in the 
intervening period between the two works Hegel’s views on scepticism remained fundamentally the 
same. When compared to the difference between the identifications of Critical philosophy with 
scepticism  in the Dissertation and the Phenomenology this suggests that it was his views regarding 
Critical philosophy that underwent the more significant change  in this period.
100Scepticism is aware of how it counterbalances dogmatic assertion with equipollent 
contraries; it is aware of how a putative truth or reality is to be reduced to epoche and 
actively brings it about. As scepticism
“consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest, this medley o f 
sensuous and  intellectual  representations whose differences coincide, and 
whose identity  is equally again dissolved,  for it  is  itself determinateness 
contrasted with the non-identical.  But  it  is just  in this process that this 
consciousness, instead o f being self-identical,  is  in  fact nothing but a purely 
casual, confused  medley, the dizziness o f a perpetually self-engendered 
disorder.  It  is aware o f this;  for itself maintains and creates this restless 
confusion.  Hence,  it also admits to it,  it owns to being a wholly contingent, 
single, and separate consciousness -  a consciousness which  is em pirical, 
which takes its guidance from  what has no reality  for it, which obeys what  is 
for it not an essential being, which does those things and  brings to realization 
what it knows has no truth for it.  But equally  ...  it also  ...  converts  itself 
again into a consciousness that  is  universal  and  self-identical;  for it is the 
negativity o f all  singularity and all  difference" (PS  205, pp. 124/5).
It is here that Hegel diverges from that which the sceptic would, at first sight, be 
prepared to countenance. Scepticism as dialectical unrest is internally contradictory 
for Hegel, because it simultaneously claims that the application of its method 
demonstrates that we ought to suspend judgement regarding the truth or reality of the 
world -  at best things simply appear to be such and such -  and yet it is happy then to 
content itself with the world as appearance, to live according to its apparent laws, to 
acknowledge its affections1 0 1 . Now. as it stands this is not, strictly speaking, 
contradictory, but given Hegel's analysis of scepticism within the context of self­
consciousness's development in B. it translates into a contradictory state of affairs for 
self-consciousness, because here self-consciousness affirms the nullity of the 
determinations of the world and yet it is itself these determinations, i.e. this nullity. 
The other that is found in scepticism to be unessential is, nothing but its own
1 0 1   “We do not...suppose that the sceptic  is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things 
unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that 
kind” S. Empiricus  1933, Vol.  1,  Book  1, Ch X II, p.2l. This kind of mismatch between the sceptic’s 
target of epoche and his everyday behaviour toward empirical matters is well known and is usually 
developed into an objection along the lines that it is impossible to live scepticism as the ancient sceptic 
prescribes it. For an example, see M.  Bumyeat  1982.
101determinations as consciousness, and so as scepticism self-consciousness at once 
becomes both essential and unessential to itself. The experience of this, Hegel claims, 
gives rise to a new form of self-consciousness: the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’.
Naturally, the sceptic could disagree with Hegel’s characterisation by claiming 
that (s)he affirms nothing, and certainly not the nullity of the determinations of the 
sensuous world, but given that Hegel’s analysis does not have the sceptic asserting 
any truth regarding such determinations, instead it claims that the application of the 
method depends upon an implicit awareness of such unessentiality or nullity, it is 
difficult to decide who has the upper hand. If the sceptic agrees with Hegel's analysis 
of the underpinnings of his/her method, in which I've suggested (s)he has little to take 
issue with, then (s)he should acknowledge the difficulty that Scepticism engenders. 
This is, however, a big ‘i f  and I do not claim to have resolved the issue in Hegel’s 
favour, I wish only to highlight that Hegel in no way negligently sets up a form of 
self-consciousness in scepticism that unfairly moulds a historical position to his own 
end. Rather, as we would expect, he attempts to conduct a discussion about the true 
nature of that position to which an adherent of it could relate.
Scepticism's key potencies: its refusal to dogmatize and its generality of 
application stemming from this, are features which the ancient sceptic would agree 
are key to his position. Maintaining a consistent refusal to dogmatize, however, 
results in a position with no positive reflexive description and it seems the ancient 
sceptic must also agree with this. It is this lack of a positive reflexive description that 
Hegel exploits, arguing that the condition of this scepticism is an implicit awareness 
of the relational character of finite determinacy (which in the Phenomenology 
manifests itself as scepticism’s awareness of the non-independence or unessentiality 
of its other). Without this awareness of the relational character, such scepticism is not 
possible. Hegel’s strategy then, seems sensitized to a different form of scepticism than 
Kant's, insofar as Kant’s anti-sceptical transcendental arguments generally function 
by establishing that the falsity of some accepted sceptical view is a condition for the 
possibility of some accepted phenomenon. Here the scepticism in question would be 
in possession of a positive reflexive description and would accept that the 
phenomenon for which the falsity of its view is a condition, exists. In other words, 
such arguments might prove effective against what Hegel would call ‘modem 
scepticism’, but would not prove so against that scepticism’s purer ancestor: genuine 
ancient scepticism or authentic scepticism.
102Ultimately then, in the context of the Phenomenology we are presented with a 
position in scepticism that corresponds to both Hegel’s earlier analysis in the Relation 
essay and his later analysis in the Lectures. It is a position which turns the 
Understanding’s own capacity to set limits, against itself insofar as it functions by 
accepting its opponent’s assumptions and principles for the sake of demonstrating that 
they refute themselves.
4.  Scepticism and Critical Philosophy
We can now turn to Hegel’s reception of Critical philosophy and, using our analysis 
of scepticism, draw out the points of similarity which form the basis of his close 
identification of the two positions with one another. Inevitably this will involve 
drawing on texts aside from the Phenomenology. though as far as the specific 
criticisms that Hegel makes regarding Critical philosophy and their effect on the 
identification of it with scepticism are concerned, I think it best to remain within the 
confines of the Phenomenology where possible. Hegel makes many criticisms and 
comments regarding the Critical Philosophy of Kant, Fichte and others in a number of 
texts1 0 2 , but he chooses not to state them all at the point of the identification in the 
Phenomenology. Instead what we are given here are the general, or most pressing 
criticisms which account for the failure of Critical philosophy to “comprehend its own 
self’ (PS 234, p. 141) and to be based on more than “ pure assertion’ (Ibid.). as well as 
the putative identification, and so while we w ill have recourse to Hegel’s comments in 
other texts we should bear in mind their relation to those of the Phenomenology.
There are two basic points of similarity that account for the close identification
of the philosophies. The first is given in Kant's identification of Reason as the faculty
of the unconditioned -  predicated on his recognition of the limitation of the
deliverances of the understanding (CPR A293/B350-A309/B366) -  which makes the
antinomies into which consciousness falls necessary (CPR A407/B434). As we will
come to see, this is essentially what we have with scepticism. For Kant, the totality of
the conditions under which the judgements supplied by the understanding regarding
objects are true, is not to be found in experience. In experience we are given the
1 0 2  For example see: the discussion o f ‘Kantian  Philosophy'  in  FK,  ‘Notion  in General’  in SL, sections 
40-60 in EL, paragraphs 413-424 in the Berlin Phenomenology, various sections in  LHP and  DF.
103conditions individually and so if we are to discover the totality of these conditions we 
must abstract from experience, considering it as a whole or a unity. But in attempting 
to do this we come up with concepts that exceed the limits of possible experience and 
hence those of knowledge as well, because we are abstracting from the deliverances 
of the understanding. When we accept these concepts that remain beyond the limits of 
possible experience -  what  Kant calls ‘Transcendental Ideas' -  as real, as constitutive 
rather than regulative, we fall into error and contradiction. That is to say, when we 
conflate these transcendental ideas with the concepts of the understanding rather than 
recognising their proper role as guides to the concepts of the understanding, for Kant 
we overstep the limits of critical thought.
In the case of the antinomy of pure reason “ (W)e have ... presented to us ... an 
entirely natural antithetic ... into which reason of itself quite unavoidably falls” (CPR 
A407/B434). In the various forms of this natural antithetic our conflation of 
transcendental ideas with the concepts of the understanding leads to pairs of seemingly 
conflicting transcendental ideas regarding an object, which bear a striking resemblance 
to pairs of equipollent contraries that a sceptic might invoke to engender epoche. 
insofar as they share a common structure: “no one assertion can establish superiority 
over another” (CPR A421/B448) as “ the assertion of the opposite has, on its side, 
grounds that are just as valid and necessary” (CPR A421/B449) and both are 
ultimately founded on empirical cognition, i.e. cognition of the limited or finite. The 
similarity of his procedure to scepticism is, naturally, not lost on Kant and he is careful 
to delineate the point of difference between them.
“This method o f watching, or rather provoking, a conflict o f assertions, not 
for the purpose of deciding in favour o f one or the other side, but o f 
investigating whether the object o f controversy  is not perhaps a deceptive 
appearance which each vainly  strives to grasp, and  in regard to which, even 
if there were no opposition to be overcome,  neither can arrive at any result -  
this procedure,  I  say,  may  be entitled the sceptical method.  It is altogether 
different from scepticism -a  principle o f technical and scientific  ignorance, 
which undermines the foundations o f all  knowledge, and strives  in all 
possible ways to destroy  its reliability and steadfastness.  For the sceptical 
method aims at certainty.  It seeks to discover the point of misunderstanding 
in the case o f disputes which are sincerely and competently conducted by 
both sides....Reason, which does not in abstract speculation easily become
104aware o f its errors, is hereby awakened to consciousness o f the factors [that 
have to be reckoned with]  in the determination o f its principles'' (CPR A423- 
4/B451-2).
One can see in Kant’s sceptical method a precursor to Hegel’s own appropriation of 
elements of scepticism into his dialectical method which also aims at certainty and 
places Reason in a mediating role through which it will become aware of its errors, 
and Hegel is happy to highlight Kant’s contribution:
“In the perspective o f the older metaphysics  it was assumed that, where 
cognition falls into contradictions, this is just an accidental  aberration and 
rests on a subjective error in  inferring and arguing.  For Kant, on the contrary, 
it lies in the very  nature o f thinking to lapse into contradictions 
(“antinomies") when  it aims at cognition o f the infinite... we have mentioned 
that the pointing out o f the antinomies should be regarded as a very 
important advance for philosophical  cognition, because in that way the rigid 
dogmatism o f the metaphysics o f the understanding is set aside and attention 
is directed to the dialectical  movement o f thinking" (EL  §48Z, p.93).
So while Kant obviously moves beyond scepticism with the antinomies and his 
sceptical method, insofar as he attempts to account for or explicate the source of such 
contradiction for the sake of certainty, it should be clear that the source identified -  
reason as the faculty of the unconditioned -  is just what we are faced with in the form 
of self-consciousness called Scepticism in the Phenomenology. There scepticism 
becomes conscious that it is itself “thinking, or is in its own self infinite” (PS 202, 
pi 23) and it is this awareness that permits the realisation that the ground of the 
determination of a given object is constituted in its relation to others, such that if 
taken independently of the others it appears that its ground cannot be demonstrated 
and is non-evident. That is to say. a demand to surpass each individual ground toward 
a totality or ground of grounds implicitly arises, a demand which, for both scepticism 
and Kant alike is not to be met in experience. So it seems that thought will necessarily 
fall into antinomy.
This brings to light the second basic point of similarity, that Reason or thought 
so construed, in both cases is negative. In scepticism the infinitude of thought reduces 
every other to a non-independent or unessential difference of self-consciousness in a
105bid to secure its own self-certainty. It simply destroys any and every candidate for 
truth. For Kant, Reason is restricted to being employed regulatively, not 
constitutively, and we come to see the necessity of its lapsing into antinomy, though 
such antinomy is never to be completely escaped through any such awareness. 
According to Hegel. Kant’s
“exclusive reduction o f reason to abstract  identity directly  involves the 
renunciation o f its unconditionedness, so that reason  is  in fact nothing but 
empty understanding  ...  For Kant  ...  the activity o f reason expressly consists 
only in systematising the material furnished by perception, through the 
application o f the categories,  i.e.,  it consists in bringing that material  into an 
external order, and hence  its principle  is merely that o f noncontradiction.”
(EL  §52Z, p. 100).
So. whereas in scepticism the recognition of the role of thought or Reason in 
delimiting that which was apparently other than itself lead to that other being viewed 
as unessential, merely a difference of self-consciousness, with Kant this delimiting 
role is given a purely regulative, non-constitutive status: “ ‘reason’ provides nothing 
but the formal unity for the simplification and systematisation of experiences; it is a 
canon. not an organon of truth” (EL §52, p. 100). In the former position then Reason’s 
delimiting role is recognised and in the latter it is explored and characterised, but in 
neither position is it, for Hegel, given its due1 0 1 .
As we would expect, there is a sense in which Critical philosophy as 
immediate Reason, by incorporating aspects of the positions (scepticism included) 
passed through in B.. loses sight of these positions -  aspects of those positions are
103  C .f.  E L  §48. pp.  91/92:  "This thought, that the contradiction which  is posited by the determinations of the 
understanding in what is rational  is essential and necessary has to be considered one of the most important and 
profound advances of the philosophy of modern times.  But the solution  is as trivial as the viewpoint is profound: it 
consists merely  in a tenderness for the things of this w orld.  The stain of contradiction ought not to be in the essenee 
of w hat  is in the w orld:  it has to belong only to thinking reason, to the essence of the spirit.  It is not considered at 
all  objectionable that the world as it appears shows contradictions to the spirit that observes it: the way the world is 
for ...  sensibility, and for the understanding,  is the world as it appears. But when the essence of what  is in the world 
is compared with the essence of spirit,  it may surprise us to see how naively the humble affirmation has been 
advanced, and repeated, that w hat is inwardly contradictory'  is not the essence of the world, but belongs to reason, 
the thinking essence.  It does not help at all to express this by  saying that reason only falls into contradiction through 
the application o f  the categories,  fo r it is also asserted that this application  is necessary, and that for the purpose of 
cognition,  reason has no determinations other than the categories." A lso  E L  §48Z, p. 93:  "it must be noted that... 
Kant stopped at the merely negative result (that how  things are in-themselves is unknowable), and did not penetrate 
to the cognition of the true and positive significance o f the antinonies. This true and positive significance 
(expressed generally) is that everything actual contains opposed determinations within it. and in consequence the 
cognition and  ...  the comprehension o f an ob-ject amounts precisely to our becoming conscious of it as a concrete 
unity of opposed determinations".
106now implicit in Immediate Reason but are no longer explicit. That is, at least insofar 
as it comes on the scene immediately, only as the certainty of being ‘I am I’, without 
demonstrating its provenance. In that sense it manages to retain a positive relation to 
its other while the experience of consciousness in virtue of which it achieves this 
relation (such as the forms of scepticism and the unhappy consciousness) become 
sedimented and lost, forming the strata upon which Critical philosophy as immediate 
Reason rests, but which it fails to adequately mine. This relation, which accounts for 
Hegel’s claim that Critical philosophy as immediate Reason does ‘not comprehend its 
own self and is ‘pure assertion', provides the key to understanding the underlying 
rationale of Hegel’s earlier identification in the theses presented in advance of his 
1801 Dissertation of Critical philosophy as an imperfect form of scepticism. This 
identification, we have noted, may at first seem at odds with the identification and 
discussion in C.(AA.) of the Phenomenology, however, when we consider the 
blinkered aspect of Critical Philosophy as immediate Reason we will see that this is 
not the case.
In expanding on the position arrived at in C.(AA.) Hegel notes:
“(R)eason  is the certainty o f being all reality. This in-itself...  is the first 
positivity in which self-consciousness is in its own self explicitly fo r itself 
and  T   is therefore only the pure essentiality o f the existent, or is the simple 
category. The category,  which formerly  had the meaning o f being the 
essentiality o f the existent -  and  it was undetermined whether o f the existent 
as such, or o f the existent contrasted with consciousness -  is now the 
essentiality or simple unity o f the existent only as a reality that thinks  ...  It is 
only the one-sided, spurious idealism that  lets this unity again come on the 
scene as consciousness, on one side, confronted by an in-itself  on the other.
But now this category or simple unity  o f self-consciousness and being 
possesses difference in-itself...  The difference therefore is, but  is perfectly 
transparent, and a difference that  is at the same time none.  It appears as a 
plurality of categories.  Since idealism  proclaims the simple unity of self- 
consciousness to be all  reality, and  immediately makes it the essence without 
having grasped  it as the absolutely  negative essence -  only this has negation, 
determinateness, or difference within  it -  this second assertion  is even more 
incomprehensible than the first, viz. that  in the category there are differences 
or species o f categories  ...  since the difference originates in the pure  T ,   in 
the pure  Understanding itself,  it is thereby  made explicit that the immediacy,
107the making o f assertions and  [mere] finding o f differences, is here given, and 
we begin to comprehend.  But to pick up the plurality o f categories again in 
some way or other as a welcome find, taking them, e.g.  from the various 
judgements, and complacently accepting them  so, is in fact to be regarded as 
an outrage on Science.  Where else should the Understanding be able to 
demonstrate necessity,  if it  is unable to do so in  its own self, which  is pure 
necessity?" (PS 235, pp. 142/3).
The basic point is that, given the viewpoint of the rational consciousness as the 
category, as the simple unity of self-consciousness and being arrived at by this 
juncture, then (a.) it is incorrect to posit a further in-itself beyond or over against this 
unity, and (b.) while the category appears as a plurality of categories (as it possesses 
difference in itself) to take these categories from some external source, like the forms 
of  judgement (rather than comprehending their origination in the category), is to be in 
error. Given Hegel’s demonstration up to this point, (a.) and its relevance to the 
blinkered aspect of Critical philosophy as immediate Reason ought to be relatively 
straightforward; (b.) however, is a different matter. We need to see more clearly 
precisely what this criticism amounts to here.
Before expanding on this criticism however, it should be noted that it is, 
perhaps, surprising to receive such a specific criticism of a recognizably Kantian 
procedure at this point. It is by no means out of place given its location and the 
general topic of discussion in this section, but this alone is not sufficient to explain 
why this particular criticism is chosen and highlighted instead of, say. a more detailed, 
larger scale discussion of Kant’s philosophical procedures, such as that which we 
receive in the Encyclopaedia. Is this particular procedural error supposed to stand as 
symptomatic of a more widespread problem in Critical Philosophy in general? I 
believe that it is and that the nature of this problem can be brought out when placed 
against the backdrop of the philosophical debate surrounding scepticism that preceded 
the writing of the Phenomenology and occasioned Hegel’s analysis of scepticism in 
the Relation essay.
If we now turn to the Encyclopaedia Logic, we can see there a more 
perspicuous statement of the initial criticism:
“We are all  well  aware that Kant’s philosophy took the easy way  in its 
finding o f the categories. “ F \ the unity o f self-consciousness,  is totally
108abstract and completely undetermined. So how are we to arrive at the 
determinations o f the I, or at the categories? Fortunately, we can find the 
various kinds o f  judgement already specified empirically  in the traditional 
logic. To judge, however,  is to think a determinate ob-ject.  So, the various 
modes o f  judgement that have already been enumerated give us the various 
determinations o f thinking. -  It remains the profound and enduring merit o f 
Fichte’s philosophy to have reminded  us that the thought-determinations 
must be exhibited  in their necessity, and that  it  is essential  for them to be 
deduced. -  Fichte’s philosophy ought to have had at least this effect upon the 
method of presenting a treatise on  logic:  that the thought-determinations  in 
general, or the usual  logical  material, the species o f concepts, judgements, 
and syllogisms, are no longer just taken from observation and thus 
apprehended only empirically, but are deduced  from thinking  itself.  If 
thinking has to be able to prove anything at all,  if logic must require that 
proofs are given, and  if it wants to teach  us how to prove [something], then  it 
must above all be capable o f proving its very own peculiar content, and able 
to gain insight into the necessity o f this content.” (EL  §42, p.84),tM.
Hegel here summarises the procedure adopted by Kant to determine the various 
categories in the ‘transcendental logic'  of his first Critique, which, in essence, is to 
derive them from the kinds of  judgement specified by traditional (i.e. classical) 
logic1 0 5 . As Hegel notes the original criticism comes from Fichte who maintains that 
following a procedure like Kant's w ill only result in one having “no way to confirm 
that the laws of thought” postulated “actually are laws of thought and that they are 
really nothing else but the immanent laws of the intellect” 1 0 6 . The concern expressed 
is that this procedure does not rest on appropriate grounds insofar as it depends upon 
the principles and laws of traditional logic which, as Fichte himself notes are simply 
abstracted from our experience of objects1 0 7 . The acceptance of such laws and
i(M  C.f. “Kant  ...  accepts the categories  in an empiric way. without thinking of developing of necessity 
these differences from  unity. Just as little did  Kant attempt to deduce time and space, for he accepted 
them  likewise from experience -  a quite unphilosphical and unjustifiable procedure." (LHP. Vol. 3, 
p.439).
I0' That is to say, Hegel gives what we might call a strong reading of Kant’s claims in the metaphysical 
deduction (see ‘The Clue to the Discovery of All  Pure Concepts of the Understanding’, CPR A 66- 
83/B91-115). This was the standard interpretation of Hegel’s time and involves reading Kant as 
intending to prove here that these categories must be the pure concepts of the understanding, and there 
are no others.  However, a more modest reading is defensible, in which  Kant is seen as assuming the 
categories as being the most basic concepts we have and as simply showing that they correspond to the 
Aristotelian forms of  judgement as preparation for establishing them  later as the pure concepts of the 
understanding. See G. Bird,  1962, Ch 7.
1 0 6  J.G .  Fichte  1994, p.28.
1 0 7  Ibid, pp.27-8.
109principles is not such that it could serve as a basis for confirming Kant’s categories as 
the laws of thought.
Hegel arguably takes such criticism of Kant’s procedures further, questioning 
whether the very acceptance of the laws and principles of traditional logic in Kant 
does not leave Kant’s thought open to a sceptical threat. The issue is really one of 
demonstrability. That is to say. if the necessity of the laws and principles of traditional 
logic cannot be exhibited, then acceptance of them may well appear arbitrary and the 
sceptical mode of hypothesis may be called into play or an alternate set of laws or 
principles equipoised to the existing set. Kant does discuss the nature, scope and 
objects of logic in general (CPR A50/B74-A62/B86) and holds that ‘pure logic’ “ is a 
body of demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain entirely a priori' 
(CPR A54/B78). However, he does not seem to question or investigate the validity of 
the basic laws and principles of such logic -  ultimately the basic laws and principles 
of the Understanding. He discusses some of the “ technical distinctions ordinarily 
recognised by logicians" (CPR A71/B96) when outlining the division of the ‘table of 
judgements’, but the division itself does not essentially depart from these distinctions 
and this division provides the blueprint, so to speak, for the distinctions of the ‘table 
of categories’. Beyond this Kant does not seem to carry out any critical 
epistemological investigation into the generally accepted laws or principles of 
traditional logic. So, for Hegel, insofar as Kant fails to demonstrate the necessity of 
the laws and principles of such logic his position remains incomplete and open to 
sceptical attack1 0 8 .
This cashes out, in essence, to the more general criticism that Kant fails to be 
sceptical enough in his procedures. In the Encyclopaedia Logic this applies also to his 
‘sceptical method' (CPR A423-4/B451-2) in the antinomies:
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Obviously such a criticism  involves the rather contentious idea that the laws and principles of 
traditional  logic are open to attack from genuine scepticism, and while the issue of the veracity of such 
a claim  is a large one which cannot be satisfactorily addressed here, a few words should be said 
regarding it. M.  Forster (1989. note 49. pp. 193-7) has noted the influence of the lesser known  figure of 
C.G.  Bardili on  Hegel  in respect of this issue, pointing out that Bardili takes Kant to task for a 
complacency regarding logical principles, which  Bardili claims is based on the inaccurate assumption 
that such principles have not been subjected to sceptical attack.  Forster highlights that “as a matter of 
history" (p. 195) the classical  laws of logic have been subjected to sceptical attack, citing Cicero’s 
Academica (11 95-8) as an example  in which “among other things the Academic sceptic calls into 
question the law of the excluded middle by means of a version of the Liar Paradox" (ibid.).  He goes on 
to discuss several more recent suggestions made by philosophers to abandon various laws of logic, 
which he believes might be employed by a sceptic to induce epoche.  From  Forster’s evidence it 
certainly that a case can be made in support of the claim that the  laws of traditional logic are open to 
attack from ancient scepticism, and that they have received scant epistemological securing since 
Aristotle.
110“ ...Kant brings forward only fo ur antinomies. He arrived at them by 
presupposing the table o f the categories just as he did in the case o f the so- 
called paralogisms.  W hile doing this he followed the procedure, which 
became so popular afterwards, o f simply  subsuming the determinations of an 
ob-ject under a ready-made schema,  instead o f deducing them from the 
Concept... -  the main point that has to be made is that antinomy  is found 
not only  in the four particular ob-jects taken from  cosmology, but rather in 
all objects of all kinds,  in all representations, concepts, and  ideas.” (EL  §48, 
p.92)
This latter point is apprehended by self-consciousness as Scepticism in the 
Phenomenology, which “comes to know itself in the many and varied forms of life as a 
real negativity” (PS 202, p. 123), but it is lost in the immediacy of the idealism of 
Critical philosophy that “proclaims the simple unity of self-consciousness to be all 
reality, and immediately makes it the essence without having grasped it as the 
absolutely negative essence” (PS 235, p. 142). This failure to be sufficiently sceptical 
accounts for the sense in which Hegel thinks that Critical philosophy is an ‘imperfect 
form of scepticism’ in a general fashion, as well as his statement in the 
Phenomenology that it is “a pure assertion which does not comprehend its own self’ 
(PS234, p. 141). Critical philosophy’s procedures are not sceptical enough and while 
resulting from them, they partially forsake the hard won lessons learnt by self- 
consciousness in its experience as scepticism.
There is, however, a more specific implication to this criticism. We have noted 
that Hegel’s concern in this is with demonstrability in light of the sceptical threat, and 
we understand, given Hegel’s analysis of it. the nature of the scepticism constituting 
that threat. This, however, is not the scepticism found in Schulze’s Aenesidemus, 
which holds to two fundamental principles: “ 1. (Actual Fact): There are 
representations in us with certain characteristics, some of which differ while others 
agree. 2. (Rule of Judgement): The touchstone of all that is true is general logic, and 
every reasoning about matters of fact can lay claim to correctness only to the extent it 
conforms to the laws of logic” 1 0 9 . Aside from Fichte’s unmasking of Schulze’s 
scepticism as a form of dogmatism in his review1 1 0 , it should be clear that the essence
1 0 9  As qouted by Fichte in his Review o f  Aenesidemus,  in G. D. Giovanni &  H. S. Harris (trans. &  eds.) 
2000, p. 138.
1 1 0  Ibid.  p. 149.
Illo f Hegel’s worry would equally well apply to Schulzian scepticism as to Kantian 
Idealism. And although Fichte is, himself, cited in the Encyclopaedia Logic for 
highlighting the initial procedural concern with Kant’s derivation of the categories 
(where he is not in the Phenomenology), he does not escape all castigation under the 
further implication of this worry. The implication is that a philosophical system which 
demonstrates the necessity of its content on the basis of an absolute principle, concept 
or identity, must also demonstrate the validity of that absolute principle, identity etc. 
if it is to escape sceptical attack. That is, it must start, like scepticism, here and now, 
from a point of non-assertion, and work up to such a principle1 1 1 . Fichte succumbs to 
this insofar as there is something beyond or over against the unity of the simple 
category in his thought. His idealism is of the type that Hegel claims starts from the 
unity of apperception but fails to correctly derive or demonstrate this unity, instead it 
asserts “ I am I” , that all things are sensations or ideas, but it fails to properly 
demonstrate this and hence its assertion remains without substantive content. 
Accordingly, it requires an “extraneous impulse, in which first is to be found the 
multiplicity of sensations and ideas" (PS 238, p. 144) in order to fill out its empty 
assertion with content. The result is that instead of being absolute, the immediate 
certainty of “I am I” retains an opposition and it is no great matter to Hegel whether 
this opposed thing is labelled ‘an extraneous impulse’ -  Fichte’s Anstofi -  or ‘the 
Thing-in-itself -  Kant’s Ding an sich (see PS 238. p. 145). Furthermore, Fichte 
remains true to the Kantian strictures on knowledge, treating his ‘absolute ego’ as a 
‘regulative’ rather than a ‘constitutive’ principle, and in this respect he also fails to 
demonstrate “that forgotten path” along which Reason’s assertion of being all reality 
“ is comprehended” (PS 233. p. 141).
The general implications of this procedural worry for Hegel’s own system 
should be obvious enough insofar as the Phenomenology is to constitute a forepiece to 
the Encyclopaedia, a preparation of sorts, for the standpoint of philosophical science, 
and we will discuss some of these implications in relation to our hypothesis that the
1 1 1   I take it that this concern with demonstrability strongly  informs the Phenomenology's general 
strategy regarding genuine scepticism, which broadly stated is to work up to the Absolute through the 
series of inadequate forms of consciousness.  In tracing the progression through the series, grounds for 
doubting each form of consciousness’s conception of reality arise from within each form,  i.e. from each 
form’s unquestioned presuppositions, and the progression (which includes scepticism as a form of 
consciousness) is shown to lead to a point of completion at which no more doubts are generated.  After 
this point the sceptic would have to provide new grounds not encompassed in the progression to raise 
any legitimate doubt; the onus is very much placed on the sceptic through the demonstration of the 
progression.
112admissibility of the syllogism uniting thought and being is, in principle, established by 
C.(AA.) in the next chapter. It remains to be noted that a philosophically educated 
reader contemporaneous to Hegel would have been familiar with the debates regarding 
Schulze’s response to Kant and Reinhold, and the wider implication of Hegel’s 
procedural worry for Critical philosophy generally and Schulze’s scepticism would not 
be lost on such a reader -  even though it, at first, apparently aims only at Kant.
The sense of Hegel’s 1801  identification of Critical philosophy and Scepticism 
in the prefatory theses of his Dissertation is not then lost in the identification made in 
the Phenomenology. Rather what we come to see is that while Critical Philosophy 
must represent an advance on scepticism insofar as it bears a positive relation to its 
other, it fails to properly investigate and demonstrate the grounds on which it rests, 
due, in a large part to its preoccupation with determining the nature of the sceptical 
attacks of the likes of Schulze, rather than with the threat of what Hegel calls 
‘authentic’ or ‘true ancient scepticism’. Indeed, such preoccupation and the failure of 
Critical philosophy to adequately investigate and demonstrate its grounds is the 
condition of Hegel’s own advance on the philosophies of its key figures such as Kant 
and Fichte, which essentially consists in the clear exhibition of these grounds and the 
necessity of their development. While, for Hegel, Critical philosophy is possible only 
once the fixed, viewpoint of the Understanding has been overcome and a resolution or 
reconciliation of thought and being has been achieved, it exhibits the type of fixity of 
thought demonstrated by the Understanding, as a result of its immediacy, which 
translates to its failure to be sufficiently sceptical (indeed, what else is such fixity of 
thought to amount to if not a willingness to simply accept the ‘abstract form’ as 
‘ready-made’, or given), or better, to apprehend clearly the relation of scepticism to 
philosophy.
113Chapter Three: Proof & Expectations
We have, up to this point, mainly concerned ourselves with establishing, and 
presenting prima facie evidence in support of the hypothesis regarding the opening 
transitions of the Phenomenology that we outlined at the beginning, viz. that the 
transitions attempt to show, in principle, the admissibility of the two ways for the 
unification of thought and being. In the first chapter the general schematic course of 
this attempt was traced, with focus being placed upon the shift in consciousness’s 
starting point at the end of section A.. In the second chapter Hegel’s deep 
preoccupation with the ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ nature of scepticism and his perception of 
Critical philosophy’s failure to identify and concern itself with this scepticism was 
highlighted. The connection between the two, at first sight, perhaps disparate seeming 
topics, was provided in terms o f Hegel’s concern with demonstrability in the face of 
the ‘authentic’ sceptic’s challenge, that is to say, his concern that the validity of a 
grounding principle, concept, or identity of a philosophical system must be 
demonstrated -  something which he thought Critical philosophy failed to achieve. In 
this sense it appears that Hegel's interpretation of scepticism closely informs his 
reaction to Critical philosophy and that this in turn effects his own project in the 
Phenomenology, in so far as it is to avoid such a failure in demonstrating the 
admissibility of the two ways for the unification of thought and being as God or the 
Absolute, as preparatory for Hegel’s larger system.
I take it that by now the initial hypothesis regarding the opening transitions of 
the Phenomenology has been shown to be viable, or at least not without merit as an 
interpretative hypothesis. However, we have not yet discussed the inner workings of 
the demonstration putatively given there, in regard to Hegel's general concerns with 
the demonstrability of a system’s grounding principle and the shortcomings of Critical 
philosophy. In the main, we have spoken in quite general terms where the unification 
of thought and being are concerned, and while we have the general schematic outline 
of Hegel’s demonstration, the details of its nature as a proof remain, by and large, 
indistinct. It is these factors that I primarily wish to address in this chapter, providing 
a clearer model of the sense in which Hegel’s putative demonstration acts as a proof.
We will then, first of all, go back to Hegel’s two ways and bring out the nature 
of the proof they are to constitute (sections 1. and 2.). We should then be able to
114derive expectations that such a proof would have to meet, in order to see whether the 
demonstration of the Phenomenology does in fact meet these expectations (sections 3. 
and 4.).
1.  Hegel's 'two wavs’ & Kant’s "two paths’.
If we return to the days of Hegel's collaboration with Schelling in the Kritisches 
Journal, we find the following statement of the philosophical task of the moment as 
they saw it:
“to put God back again at the peak o f philosophy, absolutely prior to all else 
as the one and only ground o f everything, the unique principium essendi and 
cognoscendi, after all this time in which he has been put beside other finite 
things, or put o ff right to the end as a postulate that springs from  an absolute 
finitude" (O H U   p .l00/p .299)"2
This, perhaps more Schellingian than Hegelian, statement of the principium essendi of 
philosophy is preceded by a summary of the way in which the ‘common 
understanding’ takes such a principium:
“The common understanding posits the Absolute on exactly the same level 
with the finite, and extends the range o f requirements that are made in 
respect o f the finite to the Absolute. Thus it is required in philosophy, that 
nothing shall  be established without proof; the common understanding at 
once discovers the inconsistency that has been committed,  it sees that the 
Absolute has not been proved; the being o f the Absolute is posited 
immediately with  its  Idea, but the common  understanding is quite up to 
objecting that we can very easily think o f something, form  an  Idea of 
something, without there being any necessity on that account that the thing 
we have thought o f should straightaway have any existence; and so on”
(O H U   pp.97-8/p.298).
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Kritisches Journal der Philosophie,  1, no.  1   (1802), pp. 91-115. Translated as  ‘How the Ordinary 
Human  Understanding Takes Philosophy (as displayed in the works of Mr.  Krug)’ in G.  D. Giovanni 
and H. S.  Harris (eds) 2000, pp. 292-310.  Henceforth the text will be referred to by the abbreviation 
‘O H U ’ followed by the original page reference and then the translation page reference.
115Here, at this stage in the development of Hegel’s thought, the image of this 
understanding as hypostatising the Absolute, treating it as a finite thing subject to the 
requirements made in respect of such things, is obviously present, along with an 
insistence, on his own behalf, not to accept this treatment of such a principium. To put 
God or the Absolute back again at the peak of philosophy, something would have to 
be produced against this hypostatisation. Precisely what, Schelling and Hegel were to 
disagree about once Schelling moved away from Jena in 1803, and Hegel himself 
went through a process of working on and rejecting a number of formulations1 1 3  
before producing the Phenomenology. that in part, is to meet this task.
What concerns us here, however, is the theoretical notion of God or the 
Absolute that is to be put back as The one and only ground of everything, the unique 
principium essendi'. As such a ground and equally as something that the common 
understanding posits ‘on exactly the same level as the finite' this bears close 
resemblance to Kant's ‘Ideal of Pure Reason’ 1 1 4 , which constitutes, Kant claims, the 
nucleus of our notion of God. This ideal represents “ something that may afford the 
understanding a sufficient foundation for the complete determination of its concepts” 
(CPR A583/B611). It is. as ideal, an archetype from which all things derive the 
material of their possibility and of which they are imperfect copies (CPR A578/B606); 
it is the idea of all reality and the highest reality, the object of which is then at once 
the primordial and highest being, the being of all beings, the ground of all things 
(CPR A579/B607). Hypostatised the concept of such a being becomes the concept of 
God1 1 5 .
Kant's own discussion of the Ideal of Reason aims at explaining the origin of 
the concept of God in the Ideal. Naturally, Kant claims, that we are not 
straightforwardly persuaded that such a concept, “a mere creature o f’ our “own 
thought is a real being", rather we find that reason is “ much too easily conscious of 
the ideal and merely fictitious character of such a presupposition” to allow this (CPR
113  Harris reports that initially, when still closely allied to Schelling’s Identity Philosophy,  Hegel 
envisaged a presentation of his thought  in a two part system comprised of a critical  logic designed to 
expose our fixed, finite concepts to the infinity of speculative Reason, followed by a speculative logic 
starting with the concept of God and a reinstatement of the Ontological argument. (See G.  D. Giovanni 
and H. S. Harris eds, 2000. pp. 265-268).  Later,  Hegel produced works such as  The Jena Logic and 
Metaphysics (see Gesammelte  Werke, Vol. V II).
114  See CPR A568/B596-A583/B611.
115  O f course, this  is not to suggest that the viewpoint of the ‘common understanding’  in the above 
quote is supposed to be indicative of Kant’s view -  Hegel’s target here is Krug, someone he takes to be 
far less sophisticated than  Kant.
116A583/B611-A584/B612). We are, however, impelled from another direction by the 
regress of the conditioned. This regress starts not from concepts but from experience. 
Once we admit something as existing, Kant argues, we must also admit that 
something exists necessarily because any contingent thing exists only on the basis of 
another contingent thing as its cause, and so forth until we reach a non-contingent 
cause or, in other words, something which is unconditionally necessary -  “ (T)his is 
the argument upon which reason bases its adherence to the primordial being” (CPR 
A584/B612). Once this stage is reached reason begins to search amongst its concepts 
for the one that best matches such a mode of existence as that of unconditioned 
necessity, one that is not incompatible with it. The procedure adopted, Kant claims, is 
to look for the concept of that “ which is independent of any condition” and it is found
“in that which  is itself the sufficient condition o f all  else, that is,  in that 
which contains all reality.  But that which  is all-containing and without  limits 
is absolute unity, and  involves the concept o f a single being that  is  likewise 
the supreme being. Accordingly, we conclude that the supreme being, as 
primordial  ground o f all things,  must exhibit absolute necessity” (CPR 
A587/B615)
The idea of the primordial ground of all things then, is hypostatised and identified with 
that which must be unconditionally necessary; it is at once something transcendent and 
yet real.
From the outset Kant believes that such an argument fails to provide us with 
“ the least concept of the properties of a necessary being and indeed is utterly 
ineffective” (CPR A588/B616) -  even though we may be led by ‘the natural bent of 
the understanding’ to adopt it (CPR A590/B618) -  as the concept of a limited being 
which does not have the highest reality is not strictly incompatible with absolute 
necessity, even if we cannot infer this necessity from the concept we have of that 
being. While such a limited being is not unconditioned we are not, according to Kant, 
for that reason, justified in concluding that its existence must be conditioned. Indeed, 
the issue of whether it has conditioned or unconditioned existence is outside of our 
purview.
Kant goes on to identify three kinds of proofs for the existence of God. The 
first, that begins from “determinate experience and the specific constitution of the
117world of sense as thereby known, and ascends from it in accordance with the laws of 
causality, to the supreme cause outside the world” (CPR A590/B618), is the physico- 
theological proof; the second, that begins “ from experience which is purely 
indeterminate, that is, from experience of existence in general” {Ibid.), is the 
cosmological proof; and the third, that abstracts “ from all experience” and argues 
“ completely a priori, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme cause” 
(A591/B619), is the ontological proof. Kant views these familiar arguments as being 
closely related, in so far as there are ‘two paths' along which they are to be found 
(A591/B619): one transcendental (the ontological proof) and the other empirical (the 
physico-theological and cosmological proofs), the latter, in reason's development, 
leading to the former. For Kant, if his objections to the ontological proof cannot be 
overcome then the other proofs cannot stand either: the cosmological proof appeals to 
the ontological one, and the physico-theological proof appeals to the cosmological 
one. thereby ultimately resting on the ontological proof (CPR A592/B620- 
A631/B659).
Given what has already been said regarding the transitions from A. to C.(AA.) 
in the Phenomenology, it should come as no surprise that these ‘two paths' along 
which reason develops, seem aligned to the ‘two ways' putatively traced in the 
trajectory of those transitions, the First of which is to “begin with being and pass on 
from there to the abstraction of thinking' and the second of which is to trace the 
“ passage from abstraction to being'' (EL §50, p.94). In fact, there should be no 
surprise when we take into account that Hegel's outlining of these ‘two ways' in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic is situated in the context of a discussion of Kant's 
Transcendental Dialectic, and more specifically, in a discussion of the Ideal of Reason. 
We should then be able to use the details of Hegel’s reaction to Kant's objections to 
the proofs which develop on these paths, to discern expectations regarding Hegel’s 
putative demonstration of their ultimate admissibility.
Now, one expectation that immediately arises is that, in sequential terms, 
Hegel's trajectory in these opening transitions of the Phenomenology should mimic 
Kant's outline of the relation of the two paths along which the proofs are found. In his 
own presentation of his objections Kant states:
“(A)s regards the order in which these arguments should be dealt with ,  it
will  be exactly the reverse o f that which reason takes in the progress o f its
118own developm ent...  For it w ill be shown that, although experience is what 
First gives occasion to this enquiry, it  is the transcendental concept which  in 
all such endeavours marks out the goal that reason has set itself to attain, and 
which is indeed  its sole guide in its efforts to achieve that goaf’ (CPR 
A591/B 619)
Hegel will not trace the trajectory in reverse, starting with the transcendental path, but 
rather will re-trace the development as it progresses, displaying what he takes to be its 
true form and import.
So, one might, at least minimally, expect that this re-tracing begin in the 
Phenomenology with the starting point of the empirical path. The expectation then 
would be to start from "‘determinate experience of the things of the present world, and 
the constitution and order of these” (CPR A620/B648), and to move through to the 
‘transcendental concept'. Before we look back at the general schematic course of 
Hegel's putative presentation of the admissibility of the two methods for the 
unification of thought and being, that we have already outlined, in order to see whether 
this expectation is fulfilled, and if so, in what way, we should first return to Hegel's 
analysis of the objections to the proofs and his comments against these objections in 
the Encyclopaedia Logic. A closer consideration of these comments will yield up a 
more detailed picture of the key points that such a presentation should establish.
2.  The Proofs of God's Existence: Critique & The Form of Judgement
My overall strategy here is one of attempting to derive expectations regarding the 
putative presentation of the Phenomenology from the condensed comments of the 
Encyclopaedia Logic. in order to see whether the presentation does meet these 
expectations. If the expectations are met. then our interpretive hypothesis is 
supported. A disadvantage of adopting this strategy is that the Encyclopaedia Logic is. 
at points, very oblique in its statements regarding the ‘two ways’ and the various 
proofs. There are however, further texts, whose comments correspond, in part, to the 
content of this section of the Encyclopaedia Logic, that can be drawn on to further 
elucidate that content: Hegel’s 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of  Religion"6  and his
116 G.  W. F.  Hegel  1984, particularly pp. 414-41.  Hereafter this text will be referred to by the 
abbreviation  LPR followed by the relevant page number.
119Lectures on the Proofs of  the Existence of Godn\  Hegel’s argument in these texts 
regarding the proofs of God is largely the same as that presented in the Encyclopaedia 
Logic, though the presentation is more perspicuous, and so is of at least equal use in 
generating expectations of the Phenomenology’ s putative presentation.
Hegel understands the main objection raised against all such proofs to be that 
they are a syllogising from one being to another diverse being:
“As far as beginning with being is concerned, this being,  as what is 
immediate,  presents  itself as determined as an  infinite manifold, as a world  in 
all  its fullness. This world can be determined  more precisely  as a collection 
o f whatever infinitely  many contingencies  [there are]  (in the cosmological 
proof); or as a collection o f infinitely  many purposes and purposive 
relationships (in the physico-theological proof)- -  Thinking o f this fullness o f 
being means stripping it o f the form o f the singularities and contingencies, 
and grasping it as a universal  being, necessary  in and for itself, one that  is 
self-determining and active in accordance with  universal  purposes, one that 
is diverse from that contingent and singular collection:  [i.e.,] grasping  it as 
God. -  The critique o f this procedure is directed mainly against its being a 
syllogising, a passage [from  one being to another]. As such and  in 
themselves, our perceptions, and their aggregate “the world”, do not show 
the universality that results from the purification o f that content by thinking; 
so this universality  is not justified by that empirical  notion o f the world”  ...
“The other way o f unification, through  which the Ideal is to be established, 
starts from  the abstraction o f thinking and goes on to the determination for 
which being alone remains  ...  What the understanding sets against this 
second way  is in-itself the same as was alleged before, namely that, just as 
the universal  is not found to be present in the empirical, so, conversely, the 
determinate is not contained  in the universal -  and the determinate here  is 
“being".  In other words “being” cannot be deduced  from the concept or 
analysed out o f it” (EL  §'s50/51, pp. 94-5/98)
The perceived problem with the kind of syllogising which is involved in the proofs 
seems to be then, that the move from the starting-point to the end-point appears 
illegitimate; it is a ‘passage from one being to another’ in which the result (the end­
point) is not supported by or justified on the basis of the starting point. This is not,
117  G.  W. F.  Hegel  1974, pp.  155-367.  Hereafter this text will be referred to by the abbreviation  LPEG 
followed by the relevant lecture number and page reference.
120however, a very perspicuous statement. It seems to amount to the claim that the 
syllogisms of the proofs of God are improperly formed, though the specific details in 
each case remain vague. If we start from sensible experience (in the case of the 
physico-theological and cosmological proofs) and attempt to move to the existence of 
God, it seems that the path is blocked, in some sense, because our concept of God 
cannot be justified on the ground of that experience alone -  that is, we do not find 
God presented a posteriori, as the highest being, as the absolutely necessary being 
and creator of the world. He is not to be found presented immediately in that 
experience. Hegel does not. at this point, provide us with too much more here by 
stating that the “ universal is not to be found present in the empirical” (Ibid.)"8. While 
he cannot be objecting generally to inference from empirical experience to the 
unexperienced, it remains to be seen precisely what he has in mind here.
What is clear at this point however, is that accepting such formally improper 
syllogisms would seem to involve an acceptance of illusory inferential connections 
that are invalid, or to put it another way, a non-critical jump or leap to the conclusion 
which leaves behind any connections to the premisses. This is not generally dissimilar 
to the Kantian perspective on the matter in which the result of such proofs -  that God 
exists -  failing to be established by the proofs, will only be accepted because we are 
ignorant of such a jump or under the illusion of the connections.
Indeed, as we’ve noted, in his analysis of the cosmological proof Kant argues 
that even if we allow inference to the existence of an absolutely necessary being, there 
is nothing standing in the way of a limited being, which does not have the highest 
reality, being absolutely necessary; there is no incompatibility between absolute 
necessity and limited or conditioned being. To secure the proof we would need to 
know that the highest being alone is absolutely necessary, that is, the concept of such a 
being would have to contain the concept of a necessarily existing being and so the 
proof is pushed back onto the ontological proof, this being the true ground of the 
proof. Supporters of such a proof  jump straight beyond such a lack of incompatibility, 
accordingly they fail to see the proof’s reliance on the ontological proof1 1 9 , and 
furthermore in the proof “ lies hidden a whole nest of dialectical assumptions” (CPR
1 1 8
We will come to appreciate just what Hegel means by putting matters in these terms later in the 
section when we come to see how Hegel views the relation of the shortcomings of pre-Kantian 
metaphysics and Empirircism to Critical philosophy.
1 1 9
For Kant, such a proof “is guilty of an ignoratio elenchi.  It professes to lead us by a new path, but 
after a short circuit brings us back to the very path which we had deserted at its bidding” (CPR 
A609/B637).
121A609/B637) which involve the overstepping of several of Kant’s critical conditions for 
knowledge. A similar outcome occurs in the case of the physico-theological proof, 
where an object adequate to our concept of God is not to be found in our experience of 
the empirical world and nothing determinate is discovered about the cause or author of 
the apparent order of this world, instead the proof must jump again to the ontological 
one (via the cosmological proof this time) in its attempt to establish God's existence.
Hegel’s rather oblique statement then, of what he takes to be the main 
objection against such proofs, though highly generalised, is far from inaccurate and 
this objection is equally evident in Kant’s comments regarding the ontological proof. 
Kant claims that while the concept of God as the ens realissimum includes existence, 
this does not of itself, it is claimed, banish the question as to whether or not an object 
corresponding to this concept actually exists. Kant argues that existence as a predicate 
attaches nothing new to a concept and so our concept of God expresses mere 
possibility and cannot be said to express reality without the identification of possible a 
posteriori knowledge of this object (God). Such an identification is not to be made 
amongst the contents of sensible experience1 2 0  or to use the Hegelian gloss on it “the 
determinate is not contained in the universal -  and the determinate here is 'being’. In 
other words ‘being’ cannot be deduced from the concept or analysed out of it” (EL 
§51, p.98). Once more it seems that the syllogism is improperly formed such that were 
the movement to be completed it would involve a non-critical jump to the conclusion, 
a plucking of God’s existence from his concept -  existence as present in sensible 
experience, existence as experienced, in which a relation between a concept and an 
object of the senses is expressed, is not what is involved in the concept of God as the 
ens realissimum in the ontological proof, where the existence involved expresses a 
relation between a concept and an object of thought.
1  ^0
"Were we dealing with an object o f the senses, we could not confound the existence of the thing with the mere 
concept of it.  For through the concept the object is thought only as conforming to the universal conditions of 
possible empirical knowledge in general,  whereas through its existence it is thought as belonging to the context of 
experience as a whole.  In being thus connected with the content of experience as a whole, the concept o f the object 
is not.  however, in the least enlarged: all that has happened  is that our thought has thereby  obtained an additional 
possible perception.  It  is not. therefore, surprising that,  if we attempt to think existence through the pure category 
alone, we cannot specify a single mark distinguishing it from mere possibility.Whatever, therefore, and however 
much, our concept of an object may contain, we must go outside it,  if we are to ascribe existence to the object.  In 
the case of objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with some one of our perceptions,  in 
accordance with empirical  laws.  But in dealing with objects o f pure thought, we have no means whatsoever of 
knowing their existence, since it would have to be known  in a completely a p rio ri manner. Our consciousness of all 
existence  ...  belongs exclusively to the unity o f experience: any  [alleged] existence outside this field, while not 
indeed such as we can declare to be absolutely  impossible,  is o f the nature of an assumption which we can never be
in a position to justify".  (C P R  A 6 0 0 -1 /B 6 2 8 -9 ).
122As syllogisms then, the proofs of God’s existence are seen to be formally 
improper. But as we will see, Hegel believes that this appearance of formal 
impropriety, far from invalidating the content of the proofs, highlights a philosophical 
error carried through from the older metaphysics, in which such proofs were 
championed, to the Critical philosophy inaugurated by Kant, that subjected such 
proofs to forceful criticism. The error itself can be expressed most generally as a lack 
of rigour, or more specifically as an insufficiently critical acceptance of the 
deliverances of the understanding. We saw in chapter two that Hegel expressed 
concerns over Kant's putatively uncritical acceptance of the principles of the 
understanding from traditional logic, and we will see here that the appearance of the 
formal impropriety of the proofs, in the Kantian analysis, has its source, according to 
Hegel, in Kant’s taking the deliverances of the understanding as paradigmatic of what 
we ought to require from Reason as the mediating or syllogising faculty. Once such an 
analysis is corrected, the formal impropriety can be disregarded and the true content 
apprehended. The correction of such an analysis and the error at its heart will require 
a reformation of the principles upon which the understanding is based, a more 
rigorous analysis of the concepts, judgements and syllogisms which constitute the 
proofs.
Much of this material is already contextually present to the reader by the time 
(s)he encounters Hegel's comments regarding Kant’s critique of the proofs of God’s 
existence in the Encyclopaedia Logic. It is laid out in Hegel’s discussions of 
‘metaphysics'1 2 1 , or rather pre-Kantian or pre-Critical metaphysics1 2 2 , and 
‘empiricism’1 2 3 , not to mention the ‘Preface’ to the Phenomenology124, and throughout 
that text. But to come to an understanding of it in specific relation to the proofs of 
God’s existence, it is best to initially turn away from such sections and to look instead 
at Hegel's comments on proof or demonstration regarding God’s existence1 2 5 , in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion:
121  See EL §’s 26-36, pp. 65-76.
122
A t  E L  §27,  p. 65:  ”In  its most determinate development, which  is also the one closest to us. this way of 
thinking was the metaphysics o f  the recent past, the way is was constituted among us before the Kantian 
philosophy.  It is only  in relation to the history' of philosophy, however, that this metaphysics belongs to the past: 
for. on  its own account,  it  is always present as the way in which the mere understanding views the ob-jects of 
reason".
123  See EL §’s 37-9, pp.76-80.
124  See particularly PS 58-68, pp. 35-41.
125 A  good dicussion (to which  I  am  indebted) of Hegel’s notion of proof in relation to the proofs of 
God’s existence, and indeed of Hegel’s general thought regarding these proofs can be found  in  P.  M. 
Calton 2002.
123“When we hear the expression “proofs o f God’s existence,” it brings in 
starightaway the possibility that some distortion is involved in it. There is 
talk o f God and his “existence” [Dasein]; “existence” is determinate, finite 
being -  and Existenz, too,  is used in a determinate sense.  But God’s being is 
in no way a limited being.  It would be better to say, “God and his being, his 
actuality or objectivity.” The demonstration has the aim o f showing us the 
coherence between the two determinations [God and being]  because they are 
distinct,  not because they are immediately one.  Everything is immediate in 
its relation to itself, God as God, being as being.  What  is demonstrated  is that 
these  initially distinct things also cohere together and are identical -  though 
they do not have an abstract identity, which would be sameness and hence 
immediacy.
To show coherence means in general to prove. The coherence can be o f 
different kinds, and the proof leaves this difference undefined.  For instance 
there is a coherence that  is wholly external or mechanical.  We can see that a 
roof is necessary to the walls,  because the house has this characteristic 
protection against weather and the like. The purpose is what links the wall 
with the roof, and we can therefore say  it  is proved that a house must have a 
roof. This is no doubt  [logically] coherent, but we are aware at the same time 
that the coherence o f the walls with the roof does not affect the being o f 
these objects. O r again, the fact that wood and tile make up a roof does not 
concern their being, and  is for them  a merely external  nexus.  But there are 
also [types of] coherence that are involved in the thing or the content itself. 
This  is the case,  for instance,  with geometrical  figures. The three angles in a 
triangle add  up to two right angles. That is a necessity o f the thing itself, 
whereas beams and  stones are what they are even without being joined 
together.  In the triangle the connection is not o f the kind where the coherence 
is external; in this case, rather the one [term] cannot be without the other, for 
the second is directly posited along with the first.  But the proof that we give 
for this, or the kind o f insight  [we have]  into this necessity,  is distinct from 
the coherence that the determinations have within the thing itself. The 
procedure that we follow in demonstration  is not a process o f the thing itself 
-  it  is something other than what is involved  in the nature o f the thing.  We 
draw auxiliary  lines.  But  it would not occur to anyone to say that,  in order to 
have three angles equal  in magnitude to two right angles, a triangle should 
adopt the procedure o f extending one o f its sides, and that only by that means 
would  it arrive at this determination. That, by contrast,  is the path o f our
124insight; the mediation through which we pass and the mediation in the thing 
itself are separate from one another. Construction and proof serve only as an 
aid to our subjective cognition; they do not constitute the objective mode by 
which the thing attained this relationship through mediation.  It is indeed a 
subjective necessity, but not the coherence or mediation within the object 
itself.
With regard to the knowledge o f God, to the  internal  coherence o f God’s 
determinations and the coherence o f our knowledge o f God and o f God’s 
determinations, this type o f demonstration  is directly unsatisfactory on  its 
own account.  In this procedure o f subjective necessity  we start from certain 
initial definitions that are already fam iliar to us. There are assumptions or 
initial conditions, for example that the triangle or the right angle is given. 
Definite [logical] connections are presupposed, and we then show in proofs 
o f this kind that if there  is one determination then the other is, too. That is, 
we make the result dependent on given specifications already present. What 
we arrive at  is represented as something dependent upon assumptions.
In the application o f this model  [Vorstellung] o f demonstration to the 
formulation  [Vorstellung\  o f proofs o f God's existence, what appears at once 
is the inappropriateness o f wishing to exhibit a coherence o f this kind in the 
case of God. This appears particularly  in the first procedure, which we called 
the elevation o f the finite to God, so that (if we embrace the process within 
the form o f the proof) we have a relationship in which the finite is the 
foundation from  which the being o f God  is demonstrated.  In this  [logical] 
nexus the being o f God appears as a consequence, as dependent upon the 
being o f the finite. This is the distortion, that this progression that we call 
“proving” is unsuited to what we represent to ourselves under [the name] 
“God” -  for God  is, o f course, precisely the non-derivative,  he is utterly 
actual  being  in and for itself.  But if we now suppose that, by pointing this 
out, we have shown this procedure as a whole is vacuous, then this, too,  is a 
one-sided view -  and one that directly  contradicts the universal 
consciousness of humankind.  For what this nexus contains when we strip 
away that form  o f demonstration  is the elevation to God, and the proofs are 
nothing more than a description o f the self-elevation to God.  It  is because o f
125the Kantian critique o f reason that these proofs o f God’s existence have been 
discarded, consigned so to speak to the rubbish heap.” (LPR 417-419)126.
Here then the suitability of various procedures for proving God’s existence are 
assessed. The essential meaning of a proof is regarded by Hegel to be found in the 
demonstration of coherence between determinations. It is the showing of initially 
distinct determinations to cohere in their relation to one another. This coherence, 
however, can be of different kinds depending on the nature of the relation between its 
terms. A proof shows coherence but does not necessarily stipulate which kind in 
contrast to others. This is important in regard to a proof of God’s existence, as the 
coherence here, between the determinations ‘God’ and ‘being’, is of a particular kind 
and the proof to be offered must be sensitive to this kind. Hegel brings out this point 
and the nature of the coherence involved through his consideration o f‘external’ or 
extrinsic coherence and coherence that is involved in the thing’ or intrinsic 
coherence.
To illustrate external coherence. Hegel notes that we can form a logically 
coherent proof which shows that a roof in connection to its walls, is necessary, given 
the purpose that a house is to fulfill, but that this has nothing to do with the 
determinations themselves. We can show that 'roof and 'walls' cohere insofar as the 
purpose of a house to provide protection against weather, demands that the roof and 
walls are connected to provide such protection. The coherence here shown is then 
limited to this purpose of protection against weather; it is only in this respect that the 
roof and walls are shown to cohere. Such coherence is not intrinsic to roof and walls 
taken on their account; neither the concept 'roof nor the concept 'walls', when 
separated, involves a content that necessitates the connection of one to the other. It is 
precisely in this sense that Hegel calls the coherence here “ wholly external” .
Such a coherence would obviously be no good for a proof of God’s existence, 
where the existence to be shown is a feature of the content of the determination ‘God’
l~6 C.f. the second lecture of Hegel’s Lectures on the Proofs o f  the Existence of God, pp.  165-73.
Interestingly these lectures open with a statement to the effect that Hegel chose this lecture topic to
present due to its intimate connection to the lectures he gave on  logic that preceded them  in the
summer session.  He claims that while the most obvious connection between  logic and the proofs lies in 
the nature of the proofs, “what is logical does not constitute the merely formal side, but, in fact,
occupies the very centre point of the content” of the proofs (pp.  155/6).  Hegel  is not here talking about 
traditional  logic which would be concerned with the purely formal aspect of the proofs, the  ‘auxiliary
lines’ we draw, but the deeper logic  involved in the dialectic of the ‘elevation of thinking’, or the 
developmental process of the thing itself.
126itself. What is required here is a coherence between ‘God’ and ‘being’ that is internal 
to ‘God’ itself, not an extrinsic, and thereby seemingly contingent, one.
In contrast to this Hegel considers “ [types of] coherence that are involved in 
the thing or the content itself’ (Ibid.). This type of proof is illustrated by the 
procedures of geometry used in demonstrating the features of geometrical figures. As 
an instance. Hegel notes that the proof that the 3 angles in a triangle add up to 2 right- 
angles is of this kind (LPR p. 418). Unlike the previous connection of roof and walls 
the coherence between the determinations here is intrinsic to their content. That is to 
say, if given a triangle, then we are necessarily given a figure whose 3 angles add up 
to the sum of 2 right-angles. Such coherence, as internal or intrinsic, is universally 
present in all instances of triangles and not limited to a particular context or purpose.
While it is obvious why Hegel thinks proofs that show only external coherence 
are wholly unsuitable for demonstrating God's existence, it is less obvious why he 
thinks proofs like those constructed in geometry, that apparently show coherence 
intrinsic to the determinations themselves, are unsuitable. The reason is. Hegel argues, 
that upon further analysis these proofs too involve a certain externality in respect of 
the determinations.
The proof constructed to show that the 3 angles of a triangle are equal in 
magnitude to 2 right-angles, we are told, “ is distinct from the coherence that the 
determinations have within the thing itself. The procedure we follow in demonstration 
is not a process of the thing itself’ (Ibid.)1 2 7 . Hegel's point is that the proof 
constructed, in this case, is our subjective cognition of that in virtue of which the 3 
angles of a triangle are equal to 2 right-angles. While the 3 angles of a triangle are 
shown in the proof to be necessarily equal in magnitude to 2 right-angles, this 
necessity is based on a number of assumptions. The starting point of the proof will be 
a given figure: the triangle or right-angle. and the construction of the proof proceeds 
in accordance with a pre-determined set of basic operations or principles of 
construction, from which it is shown that “ if there is one determination then the other 
is. too” (Ibid.). The result, the putative internal coherence, is dependent upon the prior 
assumptions.
The question that Hegel is raising, then, is: 'in what sense the initial given 
figure and the principles of construction can be said to correspond to the nature of the
l27Cf.  PS 42, p. 24.
127thing to be proved?' If the necessity of the proof is based on assumptions then these 
assumptions also need to be demonstrated.
If Hegel is correct on these points then the only internal, necessary coherence 
that such proofs demonstrate belongs to the determinations we employ in accounting 
for the subject of the proof, and this coherence itself depends upon prior assumptions 
unrelated to that subject. Consequently, just like the proofs that concern only external 
coherence, Hegel thinks this type of proof unsuitable for proofs of the existence of 
God.
The main implication of Hegel's comments here, is that traditional forms of 
proof are inadequate to the task of demonstrating God’s existence for the reasons 
cited, which is to say that the traditional syllogistic form of proving God’s existence is 
inadequate to the task. The required kind of coherence is not such that it can be shown 
to follow of necessity given the supposition of other determinations -  it cannot be 
shown to depend on or follow from something else and in this sense should be 
presuppositionless. An appropriate form of proof then, should display the coherence 
of determinations on such a way that the coherence can be seen to be truly internal 
coherence. As such it will not be recognizably syllogistic in the traditional sense, but 
would consist in tracing the process whereby the determinations come to have the 
coherence they do have in the thing itself. We might therefore say that paradigm of 
proof, for Hegel, is that of a self-generative process. What is at the root of the 
inappropriateness of the traditional forms of proof is precisely that they fail to capture 
the appropriate kind of coherence or relation between determinations. It seems then 
that the error, in the first instance, is to be found in the general form of  judgement 
utilised in such proofs, i.e. in the way that they bring one representation into relation 
with another, or the way that they relate predicate and subject.
If we turn our attention to Hegel’s discussion of the old, pre-Kantian 
metaphysics (which asserted such proofs) in the Encyclopaedia Logic, we see this 
confirmed as the source of difficulties in such metaphysics, and we see that the 
resulting difficulties mirror those encountered in his discussion of proof.
Hegel characterises such metaphysics by claiming that it:
“regarded the thought-determinations as the fundamental determinations o f 
things  ...  First, these determinations,  in their abstraction, were taken to be 
valid on their own account, and capable o f being predicates o f  what is true.
128In any case, this metaphysics presupposed that cognition o f the Absolute 
could come through the attaching o f  predicates to it: ; and it investigated 
neither the peculiar content and validity o f the determinations o f the 
understanding, nor yet this form  o f determining the Absolute by attaching 
predicates to it." (EL §28, p.66).
That is to say, such metaphysics simply took determinations of thought immediately 
“ and let them count in their immediacy as predicates of what is true” (EL §28Z, p.66). 
That is to say, it took the predicates as given, ready-made in representation and 
assumed them to mark true or real characteristics or qualities of the subject to which 
they were applied, the subject acting as substratum and the predicates as properties or 
attributes of that substratum. Hegel urges that in considering what he believes to be 
such a philosophically naive position
“(W )e must notice particularly, at this point, that the metaphysical  method was to 
“attach" predicates to the ob-ject o f cognition, e.g. to God. This then  is an 
external  reflection about the ob-ject. since the determinations (the predicates) are 
found  ready-made  in my  representation, and are attached to the ob-ject in a 
merely external way. Genuine cognition o f an ob-ject, on the other hand, has to 
be such that the ob-ject determines itself from within  itself, and does not acquire 
its predicates in this external  way" (EL §28Z, p.67).
The procedure here, is the same as the form of proof that displayed a coherence 
between determinations that was external to those determinations, that was imposed 
on them extrinsically. In such a procedure, determinations such as ‘roof’, ‘walls’ and 
‘house’ were brought into a relation with one another that failed to be derived of 
necessity from the specific content of the determinations on their own account -  a 
‘roof* may be connected to a ‘wall’, but taken on its own there is nothing in the 
content of the determination Toof' that necessitates this connection.
In framing his characterisation of such externality in terms of the general form 
of  judgement in the above quote and throughout his discussion of metaphysics, Hegel 
identifies a package of criticisms that, at first, may not seem to bear any direct relation 
to one another. For example, there is the criticism that the predicates are found ready­
made in representation, which is to say: they are taken up as possessing true content 
without investigation. The issue of whether the determinations are merely subjective
129representations or whether they capture the intrinsic qualities of the object they are 
attached to, is not investigated in this metaphysics. There is then also the criticism that 
the predicates are attached externally to the object. Naturally, if one investigated the 
particular content of the predicates, there is a sense in which we might say it becomes 
as a consequence, more unlikely that one w ill subsequently attach those predicates in 
an external way, but it is still a possibility1 2 8 , and avoiding one of these criticisms does 
not guarantee avoidance of the other. Metaphysics for Hegel, succumbs to both and 
more besides. The predicates used in such metaphysics show themselves to be “ a 
restricted content” in failing to “exhaust” their subject, and though they may show a 
connection to one another insofar as they are attached to one subject, the content of 
one is diverse to that of another and is opposed to it.
The externality involved in the general form of  judgement adopted uncritically in 
metaphysics, seems then to result from a whole package of problems. What unifies 
this package is that the whole package is involved in the completely uncritical 
acceptance of the general form of  judgement. That is to say, in failing to question at 
all “ whether the form of judgement could be the form of truth” (EL §28. p.66), 
whether the very procedure of attaching predicates (as properties or attributes of a 
substratum) to a subject (that substratum) in judgement, is the basic activity of 
thinking insofar as it charcterises reality. This is the case in metaphysics for Hegel, 
where a match between the form of  judgement employed and the form of truth was 
simply presupposed. To adopt such a presupposition is, for Hegel, to assume that, 
formally, truth matches judgment -  that truth is a fixed and isolated content just like 
the content to which the subject of  judgement refers and which acts as a standard for 
the predication performed in judgement. That the truth is such a standard, that it is 
fixed (i.e., static and non-dynamic) and capable of being isolated into discreet 
individual truths is a presupposition which, Hegel urges, must be questioned. This 
presupposition is encapsulated in Hegel's characterisation of the objects of this 
metaphysics -  the subjects to which predicates are attached -  as also being taken 
straightforwardly from representation. The “ only criterion” then “of whether the 
predicates fitted, and were satisfactory or not. was that of representation” (EL §30, 
p.68). Accordingly such metaphysics is dogmatic, in the sense that the subject of a 
judgment already has an isolated and determinate content taken from representation,
the question then of whether or not that judgment is true, comes to depend on whether
1 2 8
Indeed, as we will see, something akin to this occurs, according to Hegel, in the Kantian case.
130any contradiction is to be found between the content of the subject and the content of 
the predicate attached to it in judgement; and given two opposed assertions about the 
same object “ it had to assume that ... one must be true, and the other false” (EL §32, 
p.69).
A presupposition of correspondence between the form of  judgement and the form of 
truth is equally what underpins the procedure adopted in the form of proof that aimed 
at displaying an internal coherence. The model there was one of axiomatic proof, and 
so the coherence on show in the proof appears internal given the basic starting points: 
the axioms and principles of construction. But here it is assumed that the truth is 
axiomatic, that it is fixed in nature and isolatable. The coherence of such proofs is 
only genuinely established if the coherence traced corresponds ontologically to the 
coherence it is to establish, if it is no mere representation of it. That is to say such a 
proof will only escape the externality Hegel ascribes to it, if the way it relates its 
determinations corresponds to the way the object relates its determinations. 
Accordingly, to claim that such a proof does establish internal coherence between 
determinations (and is therefore a suitable form for the demonstration of God’s 
existence) is to assume that the form of  judgement involved is the form of truth, to use 
the Hegelian vernacular.
An uncritical acceptance of the general form of  judgement may then involve 
all or just some of the problems involved in metaphysics, but whatever problems it 
involves, it will display an externality regarding the relation of its predicates to its 
subjects because it presumes truth to be fixed and isolatable.
If Hegel is to avoid the kind of problems encountered in metaphysics, in his 
own demonstration of the putative admissibility of the two methods for the unification 
of thought and being, then obviously a critical revision of the general form of 
judgement that precludes the externality that infects it is required. Before we look at 
the nature of Hegel’s revision and its implications for the presentation in the 
Phenomenology, we need to trace the connection between an uncritical acceptance of 
this general form of  judgement and Critical philosophy’s critique of the traditional 
proofs of God’s existence. This critique was highly influential and we have seen that, 
according to Hegel’s analysis, it was based upon the formal impropriety of the proofs 
as syllogisms. However, for Hegel, the true deficiency rests with an uncritical 
acceptance of the general form of  judgement, and this is a deficiency that Critical 
philosophy fails to address or overcome. In this sense then, Critical philosophy
131succumbs to the same deficiency (though to a lesser degree) as that position in which 
the traditional proofs were asserted, and its critique of them is ill founded insofar as it 
fails to identify this deeper underlying cause of formal impropriety. Now, if this is an 
accurate outline of the connection, then Hegel’s diagnosis of Critical philosophy’s 
error in its critique may seem quite strange. After all, one of Kant’s avowed aims is to 
revolutionise the procedures of metaphysics, making it scientific and not merely the 
result of natural disposition (CPR Bxxii), and Hegel himself variously acknowledges 
Kant’s general approach of first critically investigating the fitness of the instrument of 
cognition to its task, before accepting its deliverances1 2 9 . There is a question then as to 
whether or not Hegel’s diagnosis is accurate. In order to address this question, more 
detail is needed regarding the relation of metaphysics and the critique of it, to Critical 
philosophy. For Hegel, this relation is established through Empiricism and a modem 
scepticism that stems from it.
In Hegel’s discussion of empiricism we come to see that essentially the 
shortcomings of metaphysics are still not addressed and their common cause -  an 
uncritical acceptance of the general form of  judgement -  remains. Importantly, this 
transmission of error occurs in spite of, empiricism's origin in a dissatisfaction with 
the content and grounding of metaphysics. Hegel observes that:
“(E)mpiricism owes its origin to the need  ...  for a concrete content and a firm  
footing, a need which cannot be satisfied by the abstract metaphysics o f the 
understanding. As for this concreteness o f content,  it simply means that the ob­
jects o f consciousness are known as inwardly determined, and as a unity o f 
distinct determinations. As we have seen, however, this is in no way the case 
with any metaphysics based upon the principle o f the understanding. As mere 
understanding, thinking is restricted to the form  o f the abstract universal, and is 
unable to advance to the particularisation o f this universal.  For example, the 
older metaphysics made the attempt to bring out, through thinking, what the 
essence or the basic determination o f the soul  is, and  it was decided that the soul 
is simple. This simplicity ascribed to the soul  has here the significance o f abstract 
simplicity, excluding all  distinction, which, as compositedness, was considered 
the basic determination o f the body and then further o f matter generally. Abstract 
simplicity, however, is a very poor determination,  in which it is completely
I 29
For instance, see PS 73, pp. 46-7 and EL §41, Z l, pp.81-2. O f course, he also castigates this Kantian 
approach for allowing the “mistaken project of wanting to have cognition before we have any 
cognition, or of not wanting to go into the water before we have learned to swim” (Ibid.) to creep in.
132impossible to capture the wealth o f the soul and o f the spirit as w ell” (E L §37, Z, 
pp.76-7).
That is, one of the effects of the procedure of the older metaphysics was to determine 
its objects in a purely abstract fashion (i.e., one that excludes distinction or 
particularisation). Its predicates were taken immediately from representation and 
treated as wholly positive determinations. Accordingly, they were finite insofar as 
they were fixed against and limited by their opposite. It is in this sense that the objects 
of metaphysics have only abstract determination -  the soul is simple, it does not 
include or involve compositedness, and similarly, as infinite or positivity, or reality in 
general, God excludes the finite. Such determinations exclude distinction and the 
objects of metaphysics are determined in this abstract way as essentially one 
determination to the exclusion of others.
In contrast empiricism takes the objects of consciousness to be “ inwardly 
determined'' and “as a unity of distinct determinations” (Ibid., p.76), eschewing the 
metaphysical idea that “things as they are in-themselves result from the thinking of 
what is” (EL §28, p.66) for the principle “that what is true must be in actuality and 
must be there for our perception” (EL §38, p.77). Hegel characterises the position as 
follows:
“Instead o f seeking what is true in thought  itself,  Empiricism proceeds to draw it 
from  experience, from  what is outwardly or inwardly present.
In one respect.  Empiricism  has this source in common with metaphysics itself, 
which  likewise has representations -  i.e., the content that comes originally from 
experience -  as the guarantee for the authentification o f its definitions (its 
presuppositions as well  as its more determinate content).  But on the other side, 
this or that single perception is distinct from experience, and Empiricism elevates 
the content that  belongs to perception, feeling, and  intuition  into the form  o f 
universal notions, principles, and laws, etc. This only happens, however,  in the 
sense that these universal  determinations (for instance, "force”) are not supposed 
to have any more significance and validity on their own account than that which 
is taken from  perception, and no justification save the connection that can be 
demonstrated  in experience  ...  In  Empiricism there lies this great principle, that 
what is true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception  ...  the 
consistent carrying through o f its programme denies the supersensible altogether
133or at least its cognition and determinacy, and it leaves thinking with abstraction 
only, [i.e.,] with formal universality and identity” (EL §’s 37/38, pp. 76-7).
In restricting itself to sense-experience as guarantor of the truth of the content of its 
judgements, empiricism seems to circumvent the abstract determination and lack of 
distinction or particularisation of content in the older metaphysics. But as Hegel notes, 
the sacrifice made for this gain in the consistent carrying through of the empiricist 
programme, is that of genuine universality and necessity. In restricting ourselves 
purely to the here and now of sense-perception, we are left with only formal 
universality and identity. That is to say, in taking its content from perception, feeling 
and intuition, empiricism distinguishes This or that single perception’ from experience 
per se with its attendant determinations of universality and necessity. Such 
determinations have no justification on their own account and no more significance 
than that which is taken from perception. ‘God’, ‘the soul’, and so forth, which 
constituted the objects of cognition for metaphysics (its general subject matter) are 
denied to be objects of cognition for empiricism. Here, the general subject matter is 
finite only, as provided in sense-experience. This follows from the principle of 
empiricism:
“In reflecting upon this principle it has been observed, to begin with, that in 
what is called  ‘experience' and what has to be distinguished from merely 
singular perceptions o f single facts, there are tw'o elements; one of them  is 
the infinitely manifold material that isolates itself into single [bits] that stand 
on their own, the other is th e/0 /777, the determinations o f universality and 
necessity.  It is true that empirical observation does show many perceptions o f 
the same kind, even more than we can count; but universality is altogether 
something other than a great number.  It  is true that empirical observation also 
provides perceptions o f alterations that follow one after the other and o f ob­
jects that lie side by side; but  it does not provide any necessary connection.
Since however, perception is to remain the foundation o f what counts as 
truth, universality and  necessity appear to be something unjustified, a 
subjective contingency, a mere habit, the content o f which may be 
constituted the way  it is or in some other way.
An important consequence o f this is that in this empirical approach juridicial 
and ethical determinations and laws, as well as the content of religion, appear
134to be something contingent, and that their objectivity and inner truth have 
been given up.
Hum e’s scepticism from which this reflective observation mainly starts, 
should be very carefully distinguished from  Greek scepticism. In Humean 
scepticism, the truth o f the empirical, the truth o f feeling and intuition  is 
taken as basic; and, on that basis, he attacks all  universal determinations and 
laws, precisely because they have no justification by way o f sense- 
perception. The old scepticism  was so far removed from  making feeling, or 
intuition,  into the principle o f truth that  it turned  itself against the sensible in 
the very first place  instead." (EL §39. p.40).
The ‘firm footing’ then that was to come from the more ‘concrete content' of 
empiricism belies a certain species of scepticism or potential for doubt regarding the 
validity of certain determinations. That is. it is a scepticism based on the principle that 
“what is true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception” (EL §38, 
p.77). This scepticism is in essence the ’modem scepticism’ of Hume, and presumably 
Schulze, which unlike ancient scepticism, is not “ exhaustive as regards the 
determinate'’ (LHP. Vol.2, p.365), but is instead to be more properly regarded as a 
dogmatism in the same way as older metaphysics. Accordingly, empiricism is 
ultimately to be viewed as dogmatic in its adherence to this principle, irrespective of 
its motivation1 3 0 . The principle, allowing this species of scepticism, restricts the 
content of what counts as true (what counts as a valid object of cognition), while still 
resting on representation as the criterion against which to assess its judgements. Here, 
there is still failure to question whether the form of  judgement is the form of truth, 
and although there is a restriction of valid objects of cognition, there is a failure to 
question the content of the predicates employed.
Empiricism’s programme consistently carried through, appears as a mirror 
image of metaphysics in its one-sidedness. It addresses the loss of distinction and 
particularity in the determination of the objects of metaphysics by restricting itself to
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It is worth recalling here that Hegel viewed the history of the development of scpeticism and its 
treatment, broadly speaking, as being one of a degeneration  into dogmatism.  He thought it to be in step 
with the “communal degeneration of philosophy and the world in general” (RSP, p.30/330), such that 
figures like Schulze and Krug just represented different sides of the same philosophical coin (see Ch.2, 
section 2 abovej.The implication, then, that Empiricism simply repeats the errors of the older 
metaphysics by failing to address their common cause stands inspite of the appearance of a type of 
scepticism. Though this scepticism seems to point away from the older metaphysics,  in basing itself on 
the principle of empiricism  it is no less guilty of merely accepting the general form of  judgement as 
simply capturing or reflecting the truth.
135the opposite extreme: the distinction and particularity of the present in sense- 
experience, forsaking any determination of universality and necessity as unjustified 
on its own grounds. Hence, it is left with purely formal universality and identity. The 
principle upon which this position is based, is for Hegel, just as dogmatic as the 
assertion of metaphysics that the fundamental determinations of things are thought- 
determinations. even though the principle is motivated by the avoidance of the 
shortcomings that result from the adherence to the assertion of metaphysics. Both are 
presupposed and neither position sufficiently investigates its respective grounds.
Hegel traces the relation of this principle and the modern scepticism stemming 
from it, to Critical philosophy:
“Critical  Philosophy  has in common with  Empiricism that  it accepts experience 
as the only basis for our cognitions; but it w ill  not let them count as truths, but 
only as cognitions o f appearances.
The distinction between the elements found  in the analysis of experience -  the 
sensible material and  its universal relations -  serves as the first starting point.
Combined with this we have the reflection that only m  hat is singular and only 
what happens are contained  in perception  [taken] on  its own account.  But at the 
same time. Critical  Philosophy holds on to the factum that universality and 
necessity, being also essential determinations, are found to be present in what is 
called experience. And,  because this element does not stem  form the empirical  as 
such,  it belongs to the spontaneity o f thinking, or is a priori. -  The thought- 
determinations or concepts o f  the understanding make up the objectivity o f the 
cognitions of experience.” (E L §40,  pp.80-1).
Critical philosophy does not then let representations act straightforwardly or 
immediately as a criterion of truth insofar as the objectivity of the cognitions of 
experience is constituted by the concepts of the understanding. Determinations of 
universality and necessity are taken as essential to experience and are contributed a 
priori, they are not derived from perception on its own account, but nor are they mere 
habit. They are an external addition of sorts, albeit one that is necessary for 
experience. As such the cognitions of experience can be investigated through the 
concepts of the understanding (the determinations of universality and necessity) that 
constitutes their objectivity. The key issue being whether the concepts of the 
understanding have value or validity on their own account.
136Accordingly, Hegel notes, “ the Critical Philosophy subjects to investigation 
the validity of the concepts of the understanding that are used in metaphysics, but also 
in the other sciences and in ordinary representation” (EL §41, p.81). This is, given 
Hegel’s identification of the common cause of error, “a very important step” (Ibid. Z l, 
p.81); here for the first time the determinations of the older metaphysics, along with 
those of empricism and ordinary representation, are not taken to be valid on their own 
account. Their capability of being predicates of what is true is not simply taken for 
granted but is subjected to investigation1 3 1 . Critical philosophy then represents more 
than a mere synthesis of the older metaphysics and empiricism for Hegel.
However, Hegel observes:
“This critique does not  involve itself with the content...  or with the determinate 
mutual  relationship o f these thought-determinations to each other;  instead,  it 
considers them according to the antithesis o f subjectivity and objectivity in 
general.  In the way that  it  is taken here, this antithesis relates to the distinction o f 
the elements within experience.  In this context “objectivity" means the element 
o f universality and necessity', i.e., o f the thought-determinations themselves -  the 
so-called a priori.  But Critical  Philosophy extends the antithesis  in such a way 
that experience in its entirety falls within subjectivity;  i.e.,  both o f these elements 
together are subjective, and nothing remains in contrast with subjectivity except 
the thing-in-itself' (EL  §41,  p .81).
The modern scepticism resulting from reflection upon the principle of empiricism is 
appropriated into the Critical philosophy as occasion to investigate the validity of the 
concepts of the understanding; its key distinction, that determinations of universality 
and necessity are not part of the sensible material of perception taken on its own 
account, being repeatedly employed in the Kantian critique of the older 
metaphysics1 '2 . However, this investigation, according to Hegel, fails to address the
1 3 1   O f course, it is the case that empiricsm did not take all of the determinations of the metaphysics 
preceding it to be valid on their own account -  it restricted its general subject matter to sense- 
perception.  However, for Hegel,  it  is also the case that,  it didn’t subject the determinations it rejected to 
philosophical  investigation, rather it rejected a class of determinations on the basis of the 
presupposition that ‘what is true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception’.
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For instance, when we look at Hegel’s comments concerning Kant’s paralogisms and the Ideal of 
Reason we see references in each case back to such a distinction:
"Kant draws attention to the Haw  involved in this transition: that two types o f determination are 
confounded (paralogism), namely, empirical determinations with categories; concluding from the former to the 
latter, or in general replacing the first with the second is quite unjustified.It is obvious that this criticism expresses 
nothing other than the comment o f Hume that we referred to above (§39): that thought-determinations in general -  
universality and necessity -  are not found  in perception and that, both in its content and in  its form, the empirical  is
137‘particular content’ or ‘mutual relation’ of the concepts of the understanding; it only 
investigates whether they are subjective or objective, which is to say, that Hegel 
believes that Kant fails to demonstrate the interconnectedness of the categories and 
their content in the correct way -  he fails to provide an adequate deduction of the 
categories, one in which they can be seen to possess necessity on their own account. 
This limited investigation has its own value insofar as it succeeds in turning the 
linguistic usage of these terms in ordinary language on its head. There ‘objective’ 
refers to that which is given in sense-perception and subsists on its own account as 
independent, and it is thoughts (the determinations of universality and necessity) that 
are taken to be ‘subjective’, or not self-standing. In Kantian philosophy an object, 
given in representation, is a synthetic unity of a manifold of predicates, and its unity is 
derived from the apperception of the transcendental ego. That is to say, it is this 
apperceiving activity of the transcendental ego that is constitutive of object-hood. 
Here, then, “what can be perceived by the senses is really secondary and not self- 
standing” insofar as it lacks its own unity, which is derived from elsewhere, while 
what is produced in apperception using a priori determinations of universality and 
necessity, “what measures up to thought (the universal and the necessary)” (Ibid. Z2, 
p.83) is ‘objective’. It is these a priori determinations of universality and necessity 
that stand as independent and primary.
Hegel does not take issue with this investigation as far as it goes, but it is 
obvious that he does not think that the Kantian philosophy has succeeded in 
adequately overcoming the externality of the procedures of metaphysics and 
empiricism. An object, as a synthetic unity of a manifold of predicates, is what 
constitutes the subject in judgement in the Kantian philosophy, the difficulty being 
that, in Hegel’s view, the properties of such a subject remain only externally 
connected to it. As subject, it is merely a collection of predicates combined into a 
unity through the activity of the transcendental ego1 3 3  and as such, the combination
diverse from the determination o f thought" (EE §47. p.90).
“elevation of thought from the empirical  notion of the world to God is countered with the Humean 
standpoint (as was the case with the paralogisms: see  §47). the standpoint that proclaims the thinking o f our 
perceptions to be inadmissable;  i.e. the eliciting of the universal and necessary out of these perceptions" (EL §50. 
p.95)“What the understanding sets against this second way  is in-itself the same as was alleged before, namely that, 
just as the universal  is not found to be present in the empirical, so. conversely, the determinate is not contained in 
the universal -  and the determinate here is “being". (EL  §51. p.98)
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'  As such, the transcendental ego might be termed a quasi-subsratum -  the focal point from which the 
predicate’s coherence in a unity  is derived.  For a more detailed account of such a view see R.  Stem 
1990, particularly Ch  1, pp.22-29.
138itself possesses an intrinsic unity of its own located in the transcendental ego, or as 
Hegel puts it:
“The Ego is what is originally  identical, at one with  itself, and utterly at home 
with itself.  If 1   say “I", this is the abstract self-relation, and what is posited  in this 
unity is infected by  it, and transformed  into it. Thus the Ego is, so to speak, the 
crucible and fire through which the indifferent multiplicity  is consumed and 
reduced to unity. This, then,  is what  Kant calls "pure apperception”." (EL §42,
Z l, pp.  84-5)
However, this intrinsic unity is not absolute, it is rather the subjective activity of the 
transcendental ego -  the combination of a manifold of predicates into a synthetic 
unity, into an object, is only for us. There may be no unity or object in this sense, 
beyond our powers of cognition; all we can speak of beyond this cognition is an 
indeterminate thing-in-itself.
Hegel's point here is not to claim that the Kantian philosophy has failed to go 
beyond metaphysics and empiricism or has failed to offer a solution to their 
shortcomings. On the contrary, the Kantian position has combined the insights of both 
previous positions: it has incorporated empiricism’s critique of the earlier 
metaphysics, that distinction or the determinate is not to be found in the abstract 
universal, and takes on board empiricism's demand for a concrete content, but it also 
attempts to overcome the formal universality of empiricism by making the 
determinations of universality and necessity (the categories) that which stands as 
independent and primary -  objects of cognition being given through the modes of 
combination specified by the categories. The Kantian position seems to perform a 
delicate balancing act between the previous positions, by reconceiving the relation 
between the general form of  judgement and objects1 3 4 . This is something that Hegel 
would not deny, so what does objecting that the Kantian philosophy fails to 
adequately overcome the externality of the previous positions mean?
One way to answer this question can be given in terms of Hegel’s discussion 
of proof. What we have in the Kantian philosophy, where the object is constituted by 
the combination of predicates into a unity that seems intrinsic, is a situation akin to
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It could be said that the Kantian philosophy attempts to mediate between two equipoised positions, 
in the sense that Hegel views the respective grounds of metaphysics and empiricism as equally 
dogmatic.
139that of the second form of proof: the coherence between determinations here appears 
internal or intrinsic, but is really only a subjective necessity -  a function of the various 
modes in which we make the combination. There is no absolute unity underwriting 
the unity supplied by the apperception of the transcendental ego, and accordingly the 
categories are simply subjective in the sense that they lack necessity on their own 
account1 3 5 . In fairness to the Kantian, he may well reply to such an accusation of 
externality that it need not trouble him in the least -  this is simply the result of his 
investigation and the price that has to be paid for the solution to the shortcomings of 
metaphysics and empiricism. Hegel would have to accept this rebuttal if he thought 
that the Kantian investigation had been carried out thoroughly enough, if he thought 
the critique of the concepts of the understanding involved in it concerned itself with 
the ‘content or with the determinate mutual relationship of these thought- 
determinations to each other’, but he does not. For Hegel, the categories are simply 
adopted empirically from the table of judgements and are only investigated to see 
whether they are subjective or objective, their content and relationship is taken for 
granted1 3 6 . It is this claim then that Hegel falls back on in his assertion of externality 
as problematic for the Kantian philosophy. We do not need to accept the Kantian 
result as the price that has to be paid, because it has not been demonstrated that it has 
to be paid. Critical philosophy of the Kantian form is certainly an improvement on 
metaphysics and empiricism, but crucially it still suffers from a similar externality, 
and accordingly dogmatism1 3 7 .
135 “What human beings strive for in general  is cognition of the world: we strive to appropriate it and to conquer it. 
To this end the reality of the world must be crushed as it w ere:  i.e..  it must be made ideal. At the same time, 
however,  it must be remarked that it is not the subjective activ ity of self-consciousness that introduces absolute 
unity into the multiplicity in question: rather, this identity  is the Absolute, genuineness itself* (EL  §42. Z l. p.  85). 
“That the categories are to be regarded as belonging only to us (or as “subjective") must seem very bizarre to the 
ordinary consciousness, and there is certainly something awry here. This much  is correct about it. how ever: that 
the categories are not contained in immediate sensation.  ...  when we regard two events as standing to one another 
in the relationship o f eause and effect: what is perceived here is the two isolated events, which suceed one another 
in  time. But that one is the cause and the other the effect (the causal  nexus between them) is not perceived: on the 
contrary, it is present merely  for our thinking. Now. although the categories (e.g.. unity, cause and effect, etc.) 
pertain to thinking as such,  it does not at all  follow  from this that they must be therefore merely something of ours, 
and not also determinations o f ob-jects themselves.  But. according to Kant's view, this is what is supposed to be 
the case, and his philosophy is subjective idealism,  inasmuch as the Ego (the knowing subject) furnishes both the 
form  and also the material o f know ing -  the former as thinking and the latter as sensing subject"  (E L   §42, Z 3, 
pp.85-6).
136 We should bear in mind here that making this claim  involves a strong reading of Kant’s claims  in 
his ‘metaphysical deduction’  (see Ch. 2, note 49, p. 103).
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A  similar verdict also holds for Fichtean philosophy, albeit for slightly different reasons:
“Initially, the principle that thinking determines itself from within was established in a merely formal 
way  in the Kantian philosophy:  Kant did not demonstrate the manner and extent o f this self-determination of 
thinking. On the contrary',  it was Eichte who recognised this defect: and when he made his demand for a deduction 
of the categories, he also tried at the same time to furnish an actual deduction too.  Fichte’s philosophy makes the 
Ego the starting point for the development o f philosophical thinking: and the categories are supposed to result from 
its activity. But the Ego does not genuinely appear as free, spontaneous activity here, since it is regarded as having
140We can now begin to see why Hegel insists that the Kantian critique of the 
proofs of God’s existence has no effect on their true content when he comes to discuss 
it in the Encyclopaedia Logic. There he objects that:
“(S)ince man is a thinking being, neither sound common sense nor philosophy 
will ever give up raising itself out o f the empirical  worldview to God. This 
elevation has the thinking consideration o f the world as its only foundation, not 
the merely sensory one that we have in common with the animals.  It  is for 
thinking, and  for thinking alone, that the essence, the substance, the universal 
might, and purposive determination o f the world are [present]. The so-called 
proofs that God  is there have to be seen simply as the descriptions and analyses 
o f the inward journey o f the spirit.  It is a thinking journey and  it thinks what is 
sensory. The elevation o f thinking above the sensible,  its going out above the 
finite to the infinite, the leap that is made into the supersensible when the 
sequences of the sensible are broken off, all this is thinking itself; this transition 
is only thinking. To say that this passage ought not to take place means that there 
is to be no thinking.” (EL §50, p.95).
It is now obvious that Hegel objects to any philosophical position that limits its view 
of the truth to the empirical or that completely rejects the result of ‘the elevation of 
thinking above the sensible', the result of the ‘so-called’ proofs of God’s existence, on 
the grounds of formal impropriety, because these grounds are forwarded on the basis 
of an uncritical or insufficiently critical acceptance of the general form of  judgement. 
As far as Hegel is concerned, when viewed from such a basis the proofs may well 
suffer from such impropriety, but to discount them on this basis alone is unjustifiable, 
and rather like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It seems that what Hegel 
intends to refer to here by the ‘elevation of thinking’ might be usefully considered as
been aroused only by a shock from outside: the Ego is then supposed to react to this shock, and to achieve 
consciousness of itself through this reaction.
On this view, the nature o f the shock remains something outside of cognition, and the Ego is always 
something conditioned which is confronted by another.  So, in this way Fichte, too. came to a halt at Kant's 
conclusion that there is cognition only o f the finite, and the infinite transcends thinking. What Kant calls “the 
thing-in-itself'  is for Fichte the shock from outside, this abstraction o f something other than the Ego. which has no 
determination other than that it is negative:  it is the Non-Ego in general.  So the Ego is regarded as standing in 
relation to the Non-Ego.  It is only  the Non-Ego that arouses its self-determining activity, and it does this in such a 
wav that the Ego is only the continuous activity' of self-liberation  from the shock.  But it never acheives actual 
liberation, since the cessation o f the shock would mean the cessation of the Ego. whose being is simply its activity. 
Moreover, the content that the activ ity  o f the Ego brings forth  is nothing else but the usual  content of experience, 
with the added proviso that this content is merely appearance" (EL §60, Z2, p. 108).
This should come as no surprise given Hegel’s treatment of Kant and Fichte together in PS 
C(AA.) (see Ch 2.), where the general criticism expressed is essentially the same as here.
141analagous to the ‘ascending’ function of Reason in Kantian terminology'38. This 
allows us to see that Hegel’s point regarding the Kantian critique is that assessment of 
the deliverances of such a function of Reason (i.e. the proof’s of God’s existence) 
based on an insufficiently critical acceptance of the general form of  judgement, is a 
mistake. It is just this mistake that is being made when this function of Reason is 
characterised and assessed by Kant in the terms of the principles and standards of the 
Understanding. These principles and standards are derived from an insufficiently 
critical acceptance of the general form of  judgement and as such cannot be assumed, 
without further investigation, to provide characterisation and assessment free from 
distortion. This is what Hegel means when defining “the great mistake” as “wanting 
cognition of the nature of thinking only in this form that is proper to the 
understanding” (EL §50, p.96). Naturally, we will fail to represent the function or 
process of Reason in an accurate form if we depend on the uncritical acceptance of 
the general form of  judgement displayed in metaphysics, and similarly for any other 
philosophy, we can expect only a misrepresentation of such a function if the uncritical 
acceptance isn’t adequately addressed. This then, for Hegel, is what we have in the 
Kantian critique: a distortion or misrepresentation of the function of Reason, the 
apparent formal impropriety of the proofs of God’s existence being just a function of 
the distortion.
3.  The Revision of the Form of Judgement
We can now turn to Hegel’s revision of the general form of  judgement and its 
implications regarding a demonstration of the true content of the proofs of God’s 
existence. We will recall that Hegel’s analysis of the forms of proving identified the 
general form of  judgement adopted as responsible for the externality of those 
procedures. Correspondingly, in the metaphysics that espoused the traditional proofs 
of God’s existence, such externality was found to result from an uncritical acceptance 
of this general form of  judgement, and in the empiricism and Critical philosophy that 
followed, which criticised both this metaphysics and the traditional proofs, the general 
form of  judgement was still found to have been adopted without sufficient critical 
investigation. The fundamental problem then, with this general form in reference to
138  See C P R  A 3 3 0 -2 /B 3 8 6 -9 .
142proving or demonstrating God’s existence, as Hegel sees it, can be summarised in the 
following way:
“(W )hat has to be demonstrated  is a proposition, a judgement in fact, with a 
subject and predicate.  We cannot, to begin with,  find any fault with the demand 
here implied, and  it  looks as if the whole point turned on the nature o f the act o f 
proof.  But the very  fact that  it is a judgement which has to be proved at once 
renders any true philosophical  proof impossible.  For it  is the subject which  is 
presupposed, and consequently becomes the standard for the predicate the truth 
o f which has to be proved; and accordingly the essential criterion so far as the 
proposition is concerned,  is merely  whether the predicate is adequate to the 
subject or not, and  idea or ordinary thought, on which the presupposition is 
based,  is taken as deciding the truth.  But the main and only concern o f 
knowledge, the claims o f which have not been  satisfied, and which have not even 
been taken  into account,  is just to find out whether this very presupposition 
contained  in the subject, and consequently the further specification  it gets 
through the predicate,  is the totality o f the proposition and is true” (LPEG, 
pp.256-7).
This is a neat general summary of the basic problem that Hegel sees as being inherent 
in the general form of  judgement, but it w ill require some unpacking if we are to 
relate its details to the revision of this form that Hegel takes to be necessary. This will 
take some pages, but we might begin by noting that the aspect which renders any ‘true 
philosophical proof impossible’ is that it is a ‘judgement’ which has to be proved.
Just what it is about a judgement which causes this, is that it is the ‘subject 
which is presupposed' and taken as the criterion or standard by which the conformity 
of the predicate (to the subject) is to be evaluated, “ and accordingly the essential 
criterion ... is merely whether the predicate is adequate to the subject or not, and idea 
or ordinary thought, on which the presupposition is based, is taken as deciding the 
truth" (Ibid.). So. in such a procedure the content of the subject, drawn from ‘ordinary 
thought’, is taken to be affirmative, that is, it is taken to represent the truth and is held 
fixed as a standard by which to assess that which is predicated of it. If what is 
predicated of such a subject measures up to the content of that subject then the 
predication is deemed to be true. Now this may appear puzzling. Ordinarily (for us 
now), truth is a property of a proposition, not of its constituent parts. It is the content
143of the judgement as whole which is deemed to be true, not just a predicate or a 
subject. So what is meant by Hegel in highlighting the acceptance of the presupposed 
content of the subject as criterion, as that which renders any true philosophical proof 
impossible?
In answering this question we need to be clear about the kind of truth that is 
usually ascribed to propositions or judgements. Ordinarily what makes a proposition a 
true proposition is the accordance of its content with the way things are. That is, the 
standard of truth is usually taken to be external to the proposition or judgement made: 
a certain property is predicated of a subject and we look outside the judgement to the 
world, to determine whether that which is predicated of the subject in thought actually 
is a property of that subject.  This kind of approach presupposes that we have access to 
such an external standard. The standard here is an external, actual counterpart to the 
whole judgement, it is the actual concrete individual with all its properties, which the 
judgement aims to reflect.
Obviously on this kind of account of propositional truth, the content of such a 
standard does not appear to be presupposed. The standard is external to thought and 
this is precisely what makes it a good or desirable standard. So what sense are we to 
give to Hegel’s assertion of the subject of  judgement as a presupposed standard?
Well, what is presupposed in propositional truth is that we have access to an 
external standard. Indeed, it is normally presupposed that we have a direct or 
immediate access to this standard, we presuppose that ‘the rose’ of a judgement, say, 
that ‘the rose is red', is that rose, out there in the world in front of us. We presuppose 
that we are able to correctly isolate or indiviuate the subject of  judgement by 
identifying it with an external, individual objective counterpart as its standard. But, 
for Hegel (following Kant), having a concept like ‘rose’ involves judgement. Such a 
subject term is constituted by a synthesis of different representations into a unity. In 
the general form of  judgement, the truth of this subject-constitutive judgement is not 
questioned, that is. whether the concept of the subject, that we presume matches an 
external standard, is a true concept or not, is not asked. What is meant by something 
being a true concept, is not that it be identifiable with some external counterpart or 
appear to be instantiated, a la propositional truth. It is not being asked whether the 
concept ‘rose’ can be identified with an object out there in the world, but rather, 
whether the concept ‘rose' here matches or conforms to its essential nature. Hegel’s 
point in asserting that the subject of  judgement is a presupposed standard of truth, is
144that in identifying an external standard of truth out there in the world, we are 
assuming our concept of the subject to be a true concept of that subject, i.e. we are 
assuming that it matches the essential nature of that subject and correctly indivduates 
it, just as it was assumed in the case of proofs of internal coherence or necessity, that 
our proof captured the internal necessity of the determination itself. In this case the 
proofs, and the coherence they were to demonstrate, proceeded from pre-existing 
assumptions which were assumed to reflect or match features of the determination to 
be demonstrated. This is the sense in which the subject term is a presupposed 
standard: it is taken to accurately capture the essence of that to which it refers, such 
that an instantiation of that concept could stand as an external standard by which to 
measure judgements.
So, for Hegel, it is not an external standard that furnishes the truth conditions 
for a judgement, but rather the concept of the subject employed, and in expressing 
matters in this way it becomes clear that Hegel does not hold that truth consists in the 
identity of a proposition's or judgement's content with a fact. Instead, truth in Hegel's 
sense could be said to be material truth1 3 9  -  it consists in the accordance of a thing 
with its essence. Accordingly he notes in the Encyclopaedia Logic:
“(T)he question about the truth o f thought-determinations is bound to sound 
strange to our ordinary consciousness,  for the determinations of thought 
seem to acquire truth only  in their application to given ob-jects, and on this 
assumption  it makes no sense to question their truth apart  from this 
application.  But this question is precisely the point at  issue. Certainly, when 
we raise it, we must know what is to be  understood by “truth”.  In the 
ordinary way, what we call  “truth” is the agreement o f an ob-ject with our 
representation o f it.  We are then  presupposing an object to which our 
representation is supposed to conform.
In the philosophical  sense, on the contrary, “truth”, expressed abstractly and 
in general,  means the agreement o f a content with  itself. This is therefore a 
meaning o f “truth” quite different from the one mentioned above” (EL  §24,
Z2, pp.59-60)140.
139 The distinction o f‘material’  truth from  ‘propositional’  truth  is made in Heidegger  1977, and is 
employed in reference to Hegel’s conception of truth  in  R. Stern  1993.
140 Cf.  EL §213, p.286: “truth means that objectivity corresponds with the Concept -  not that external 
things correspond with my representations (representations of this kind are just correct representations 
held by me as this [individual]”.
145The difficulty then, inherent in the general form of  judgement that precludes a true 
philosophical proof of God’s existence being given, is that the presupposed concept of 
the subject is just not questioned as to its material truth, that is, it is not asked whether 
our concept matches the essence of that subject. Instead, our concept is held fixed and 
taken to be affirmative, it is assumed as the standard for the truth of the predicate. 
What would be required for such a proof is a judgement in which the material truth of 
the subject-term is not presupposed, in which, instead, the content of the subject-term 
can be seen to develop or unfold in its own necessity. This would involve a rejection 
or dissolution of the fixed content that we ordinarily take to be affirmative, a 
dissolution of those features of the general form of  judgement responsible for the 
distortion present in the accounts of metaphysics, empiricism, and Critical philosophy, 
and that leads to the view of the proofs of God’s existence as suffering from formal 
impropriety.
In contending that such a proof can be given, Hegel is contending that the 
general form of  judgement -  the relating of subject and predicate on the basis of a 
fixed, presupposed content belonging to the subject-term -  does not represent the true 
process of  judgement. In judging, thought does not simply remain satisfied with the 
presupposed content of the subject as a standard of truth, but is, for Hegel, ultimately 
driven beyond that content to the determination of a materially true content.
Key to understanding how this occurs, is grasping the way in which 
Judgement (Urteil)1 4 1  for Hegel functions essentially as a separation or division 
between subject and predicate. It is only by separating subject and predicate that 
subject and predicate can be related, and in applying predicate to subject, judgement 
maintains the distinction between these elements1 4 2 . This process of separation is 
captured in the general form of  judgement: in the distinction between subject and 
predicate.
141  Ur-teil can be rendered as ‘primary '  or ‘original division’.
u:  It's generally accepted that Hegel derived his view of  judgement from  Holderlin (see ‘Judgement 
and  Being’ in Holderlin  1988), who claimed against Fichte that the transcendental subject cannot be 
used as an initial or absolute principle because it does not involve unity, but rather division or 
separation (of itself as subject from  itself as object).  Such separation (and any subsequent relation) of 
subject and object belongs to judgement, which for Holderlin cannot be basic or primary, but can 
instead only function  in the context of a more basic and general apprehension of a deeper, underlying 
unity (Being). This Being, for Holderlin,  is no object of rational knowledge and so cannot be 
demonstrated or proved (access to it could only be offered through poetic expression).  Hegel’s own 
view obviously would not concur with this last claim, for Hegel, on the contrary, such being (unity) 
immanently develops into its opposite (division) by which it is self-mediated.  It displays the self- 
reflective structure of subjectivity, separating itself as subject from  itself as object.
146Hegel contends that if we consider the general form of  judgement more 
closely, we'll see that the subject is always separate or divided from the predicate in 
an important sense:
“With regard to the more precise determinacy o f the subject and the predicate, the 
fir s t...  is the solid ground in which the predicate has its subsistence and is ideal  (it 
inheres  in the subject); and since the subject  is altogether and immediately 
concrete, the determinate content o f the predicate  is only one o f the many 
determinacies o f the subject, and the  latter [is] richer and wider than the  predicate.
Conversely, the predicate, as what  is universal, subsists on  its own 
account, and is indifferent as to whether this subject is or is not;  it reaches beyond 
the subject, subsumes  it under itself, and  is for its part wider than the subject" (EL 
§170, p.247).
The problem is that the subject -  as an immediately concrete individual -  receives a 
distorted characterization in the judgement, because it is identified with an abstract, 
universal predicate in which its concreteness is dissolved. That is, the concreteness of 
the subject is fractured or broken up into independent marks or attributes -  integral 
aspects of this individual are hypostatized into independent, abstract universals 
(predicates) which are identified with the subject, characterizing it in judgement. This 
characterization however, is more accurately a kind of external reconfiguring of the 
entity, in which the the marks or attributes in their abstractedness are applied to it.
Thus, this difference of subject and predicate in judgment seems to make it 
unsuitable for expressing what is concrete. In judgement the subject represents what 
is concrete and individual insofar as the subject is implicitly taken to be the ground of 
the predicate -  that in which the predicate inheres. The predicate therefore initially 
seems to have a secondary status in comparison with the subject -  it is derivative and 
dependent on the subject as the concrete individual to which it belongs. However, in 
its application to the subject in judgement the predicate is applied as a separate, 
isolated content applicable to a whole range of subjects -  in short, as an abstract 
universal. As such the subject qua concrete individual seems to be dissolved in the 
predicate, or subsumed under it. The predicate, as abstract universal, is indifferent as 
to whether this particular subject is or is not.
For Hegel then, the general form of  judgment is not formally apposite to the 
truth. Far from the general form of  judgement being the form of truth, it seems that:
147“the form of the proposition, or more precisely that of the judgement, is incapable of 
expressing what is concrete (and what is true is concrete) and speculative” .
We can see how this separation of subject and predicate in judgement factors 
into Hegel's account of pre-Critical metaphysics and empiricism encountered earlier. 
Such metaphysics, we w ill recall, presupposes that “ what objects genuinely are is 
brought before consciousness, through thinking about them” (EL §26, p.65). That is 
to say, it assumes that reality (“what objects genuinely are” ) is only given through its 
characterization in thought, and not in sensation (as the immediate presentation of 
things) (EL §28 Zusatze, p.66). This is an aspect which Hegel applauds1 4 3 , though he 
doesn't applaud the attendant, unquestioned acceptance of the general form of 
judgement as the form of truth -  its unquestioned acceptance that such characterizing 
is accurately carried out in judgment. The difficultly here is that there is no 
questioning of the determinations used in judgement, neither of the predicate 
determinations, which as abstract cannot accurately represent the concreteness of the 
subject (EL §28-9. pp.66-8), nor of the subject determination, which is simply taken 
as granted from representation to act as a standard or criterion for the predication1 4 4  
(EL §30-1, pp. 68-9). As such, this metaphysics seems to characterize individual 
subjects according to a contingent criterion and in terms of abstract universals that are 
indifferent to the subject to which they putatively belong, i.e. those characterizations 
seem to tell one nothing of the essential nature of the subject, which is itself 
constituted by a seemingly contingent content.
It is not surprising then, that empiricism, which Hegel claims “owes its origin 
to the need ... for a concrete content and a firm footing, a need which cannot be 
satisfied by the abstract metaphysics of the understanding” (EL §37, Zusatze, p.76), 
displays a certain nominalism in restricting what is to count as truth to what is 
immediately present in sensation, i.e. in perception, intuition and so forth (EL §38, 
p.77). Here there is a rejection of the presupposition of pre-Critical metaphysics that
m For example: “This science regarded the thought-determinations as the fundamental determinations 
o f  things’ , and,  in virtue of this presupposition, that the cognition of things as they are in-themselves 
results from the thinking of what is, it stood at a higher level than the later critical philosophizing” (EL
§28, p.66).
“what was good about it was the consciousness that thought alone constitutes the essentiality of what 
is” (EL §36 Zusatze, p.76).
l44That is to say, the content of the subject determination  is simply accepted as complete and ready­
made from whatever has come to be represented or meant by that subject term. For example,  if the 
subject is 'God', then the content which forms the standard for any predication is that which the term 
'God' empirically has come to represent. (In this particular case the content might be stipulated or 
codified by the Church.) The important feature of this, for Hegel,  is that no question is asked as to 
whether this content, which is taken as the standard for the predication, is itself accurate.
148the fundamental determinations of things are thought-determinations and, 
accordingly, the universal determinations of thought are “ not supposed to have any 
more significance and validity on their own account than that which is taken from 
perception, and no justification save the connection that can be demonstrated in 
experience” (Ibid.). This restriction of what is to count as truth (i.e. as the criterion for 
a predication) is to provide the “ firm footing” along with the “concrete content” that 
metaphysics lacks. Hegel highlights, however, that matters haven't fundamentally 
changed from metaphysics: there is still no critical investigation into the general form 
of  judgement. Whereas the concrete content of perception here counts as the standard 
of truth, is here the content against which to check the accuracy of a certain 
predication, this content qua standard can only be characterized in terms of abstract 
universals. That is, if the determinate content of this standard is not provided in terms 
of abstract universals, then it cannot function as a standard against which to measure 
the accuracy of a predication in judgement. And yet, if it is so provided, then it seems 
that one is back in the position of metaphysics, where that which objects are in- 
themselves is only provided in thought (as judgement).
One seemingly either relapses into the presupposition of metaphysics or 
maintains that perception is to remain the foundation of what counts as truth, thereby 
sacrificing the universal determinations employed in judgement as “ something 
unjustified, a subjective contingency” (EL §39, p.80) and so forth. Either way the 
result is the same: truth, as what is concrete and necessary, is over here and divorced 
from its determination in thought, which is over there.
Now, for Hegel, Critical philosophy attains a recognition of the separation 
involved in judgement, and there is no assumption of immediate access to the object. 
Here representation is not straightforwardly or immediately taken as a standard for. or 
criterion of, truth. Instead the unity of distinct determinations constitutive of object- 
hood comes to be seen as subjective, deriving from the transcendental ego, the 
knowing T , and judgement, accordingly, comes to be seen as an act of composition. 
While the subject of  judgement here is no longer something that, in its content, can be 
assumed to have an accurate, external counterpart -  the unity of the object is not 
something in the world -  there is still a difficulty. Kant still holds to the general form 
of  judgement as the basic activity of thought. He still holds the thing to which the 
subject refers to be a fixed, isolated standard, even though it is not cognitively 
accessible.
149This can be seen in the element of empirical realism that Kant retains in his 
theory. For Kant, the categories contributed by thought are essentially without content 
apart from sensible intuition. Which is just to say that without the input of sensibility, 
without their application to sensation, no determinate object can be provided by 
them1 4 5 . Sensation itself must, in turn, be grounded in something external from human 
subjectivity. If this were not the case then sensation would not be an effect of 
something external to oneself, but would find its ground inside oneself. That is, the 
raw input from which objects are constituted would be grounded within oneself, and 
objects would be the creation of oneself.  This is, then, the element of empirical 
realism that Kant maintains in his theory -  one's experience is not merely constituted 
by one's own independent mental states, it is not limited to one's representations, but 
involves a constraint by the world; there can be no objects of perception, no empirical 
reality, without our sensibility being affected by something over against it -  some 
external ground of sensibility. This role of the external ground of sensibility is 
fulfilled by the thing-in-itself.
In his Phenomenology of  Spirit^ Hegel refers to this element as an 
“ extraneous impulse” , saying of Critical philosophy:
“It is  involved in a direct contradiction;  it asserts essence to be a duality of 
opposed factors, the unity o f  apperception and equally a Thing.; whether the Thing 
is called an extraneous impulse, or an empirical or sensuous entity, or the Thing- 
in-itself,  it still  remains in principle the same,  i.e. extraneous to that unity" (p.  145)
This provides the basic form of the difficulty that Hegel is concerned with in Kant's 
system. The  difficulty consists in a dichotomy of the synthesizing activity (i.e. 
apperception) of the transcendental ego, through which the concrete individuality of 
objects is constituted, and the thing-in-itself as the non-sensible origin of the 
determinate content of those objects.
Hegel is not here denying the element of empirical realism that Kant 
maintains, pretending as if the thing-in-itself were completely divorced from 
experience, and this is not the issue here for Hegel. Rather, Hegel thinks that Kant 
renders his position inconsistent by holding that the thing-in-itself is ontologically 
dichotomous from our concepts. That is to say, Hegel thinks that Kant makes the 
unity of apperception the principle of sensibility which provides content for the
l45This is not to say that aside from sensibility the categories lack any meaning whatsoever -  insofar as 
they make an  independent contribution to cognition, they must have some meaning on their own 
account.
M 6G.  W.  F. Hegel  1977.
150categories -  that objects in the form in which they are given to our sensibility are 
already determined by conceptual conditions:
“the original synthetic unity o f apperception  is recognized also as the principle o f 
the figurative synthesis, i.e. o f the forms o f intuition; space and time are 
themselves conceived as synthetic  unities, and sponteneity, the absolute synthetic 
activity of the productive imagination,  is conceived as the principle o f 
...sensibility" (Hegel  1977, p.69-70).
As such, it seems wholly mysterious to Hegel how the thing-in-itself, on Kant's 
account, is to function as the external ground of sensibility qua something 
independent of the synthesizing activity of apperception. If what is given in intuition 
is always at least minimally conceptualized, then it seems that our concepts are not 
applied to some prior non-conceptual deliverance of sensibility. As I have already 
highlighted, this is not to deny the element of empirical realism in Kant -  for Hegel, 
there is still constraint by the world, only this constraint is itself conceptually 
determined. Consequently, from Hegel's perspective Kant's thing-in-itself is an 
unnecessary assumption.
If this is the case, the dichotomy of things-in-themselves and concepts is an 
unnecessary assumption (and one which Kant himself equivocates over), then there is, 
in principle, no insuperable impediment to determining an object in its truth or 
concreteness. The basic thought is that if the concreteness of the various 
determinations of the object stems from the activity of the transcendental ego, that is, 
if the transcendental ego in its activity acts as a quasi-substratum uniting the 
determinations, then what we are missing or what is required to express the object in 
its concreteness are the various determinations of the transcendental ego (as that 
quasi-substratum) itself. Now, the categories represent the determinations of the 
transcendental ego. insofar as they specify the various modes in which determinations 
in general  are combined to constitute unities. So, in order to reach the truth, for 
Hegel, we require a deduction of the various categories, i.e a demonstration of their 
necessity, and. as we have already seen, it is precisely this which, for Hegel, Kant 
fails to provide. According to Hegel, Kant produces a list of categories by adopting 
them “empirically'’ from the table of judgments specified by traditional (i.e. 
Aristotelian) logic, taking their content and relationship for granted, rather than 
providing a genuine deduction. That is, on Hegel's diagnosis Kant accepts judgment 
as the central cognitive act of thought because judgment is taken to be the basic
151activity of thought by traditional logic, and in doing so Kant fails to appropriately 
question the form of  judgement and demonstrate that the categories he specifies are 
the necessarily inherent categories of thought.
Now, for Hegel, if in judgement the standard is not presupposed, and the 
subject term is instead treated as an empty name, a merely approximate attempt to 
identify the subject, then the only determination to be found stems from the 
predication1 4 7 . In this case the predicate provides the determinate content of the 
subject, and acts as the standard for the subject. In other words the content here 
expressed by the predicate would be an essential, inner determination of a single 
encompassing subject -  this universal content would constitute the individual subject. 
It is just such a presupposition that, for Hegel, leads to an irreparable divide between 
thought and being opening up. as the determinate content of the subject comes to be 
viewed as constituted only in thought and as fixed in that thought, there is no access 
to that subject's true being. Or. put in terms of Hegel’s discussion of proof, there is no 
access to the internal coherence or necessity of that subject’s determinations, there are 
merely our subjective re-presentations of it.
If the presupposition of the subject of  judgement is suspended in this way, then 
the fixity and affirmative nature of the subject as criterion collapses: the standard or 
criterion in judgement by which the truth of the predicate was to be established, was 
furnished by the content of the subject, the content of the predicate being compared to 
that of the subject for conformity, but this content (of the subject) is presupposed, 
hypothetical, and as such so too is the standard or criterion used for comparison. Hegel 
makes this plain in his discussion of the Cosmological Proof in the Encylopaedia 
Logic, where the transformation involved in ‘thinking the empirical world’ “ exercises 
a negative activity with regard to that foundation as well” , with regard to that subject 
(the empirical world) as the fixed, affirmative starting-point for the proof. He claims, 
“ when the perceived material is determined by universality, it does not remain in its 
first, empirical shape. With the removal and negation of the shell, the inner import of 
what is perceived is brought out” (Ibid.).
147  C f.: "In every judgement the subject is an  idea which has been presupposed, and which is defined in the 
predicate, that is. an idea which  is defined or determined  in a general way by thought, which means, again, that the 
determinations or specific qualities o f the content o f the subject have to be indicated, even if, as in the case of 
material predicates, red. hard, and so on. this general mode o f determination, which is. so to speak, the share 
thought has in the matter,  is really nothing more than the empty form o f universality. Thus, when it is said that God 
is infinite, eternal, and so on. God  is. to begin with, as a subject simply something hypothetical, existing in idea, 
and it is only in the predicate that it is first asserted what He is.  So far as the subject is concerned, we do not know 
what He is, that  is. what content He has, or what is the determinate character o f the content, as otherwise it would 
be superfluous to have the coupola "is" and to attach the predicate to it" (L P E G , p.254).
152This last claim may seem mysterious. Would not a collapse of the criterion of 
judgement simply result in just that -  a collapse, which leaves us without any 
criterion? In what way does such a collapse bring out an ‘inner import’?
In response Hegel points to the fact that in the collapse of the subject as 
criterion, we have a reversal of the priority of subject over predicate as criterion, and a 
dissolution of their distinction -  the subject and predicate collapse into one another. 
Ordinarily and at first the subject is taken as a fixed affirmative substrate or substance 
on which the predicates hang as accidents. Here thought has no role in the substance, 
which is a separate, fixed, object-like entity, and (just as we saw in metaphysics) 
thought directly cognises or reflects this substance and its accidents, the relation in 
thought of subject and predicate directly imitating the object-like relation of the 
substance and its accidents. When the Kantian philosophy arrives, the transcendental 
ego or knowing T  takes the place of that first subject: of the fixed, affirmative 
substrate or substance, and accordingly here thought appears to take the dominant role 
of the substance -  that which connects subject and predicate in a unity is the knowing 
T . However, the first subject has not simply been done away with, and in the Kantian 
philosophy we still have fixed, affirmative subjects to which predicates are to be 
compared for conformity, but in attempting the comparison we find that the content of 
the logical subject has passed to the side of the predicate: in the object we find only 
the knowing ‘I’. The primacy of the subject as a basis for comparison (its role as 
standard or criterion) is broken down, and the content of the predicate now expresses 
the essence of the subject -  subject and predicate have collapsed into one another. The 
‘inner import’ that is putatively laid bare is indicated in the ‘speculative proposition’ 
that results.
"Usually, the Subject  is first made the basis, as the objective fixed self; thence the 
necessary movement to the m ultiplicity o f determinations or Predicates proceeds.
Here, the Subject  is replaced by the knowing  T  itself, which  links the Predicates 
with the Subject holding them.  But, since that first  Subject enters into the 
determinations themselves and  is their soul, the second Subject, viz. the knowing 
T ,  still  finds  in the predicate what  it thought  it had finished with and got away 
from, and from which  it had hoped to return to itself; and,  instead o f being able 
to function as the determining agent  in the movement o f predication, arguing 
back and forth whether to attach this or that Predicate, it is really still occupied
153with the self o f the content, having to remain associated with it, instead o f being 
for-itself.
Formally, what has been said can be expressed thus: the general  nature o f the 
judgement or proposition, which  involves the distinction o f Subject and 
Predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the proposition o f 
identity which the former becomes contains the counter-thrust against that 
subject-predicate relationship" (PS  60/61,  pp.37-8)
A speculative proposition, as Hegel calls it, as that which remains (and in being a 
proposition that expresses identity or equivalence), contains or exemplifies the 
transformation or inversion of the traditional subject/predicate relation which occurs 
when our thought is forced to move from a judgemental or reflective mode to a 
genuinely speculative one. That is, such propositions are, in some way, to function as 
a catalyst or impetus to a movement to properly speculative thought -  forcing a 
reconsideration of the general form of  judgement by disrupting the usual 
subject/predicate relation we find there, and urging us to move beyond it. By way of 
example Hegel provides two speculative propositions: ‘God is being' and ‘the actual 
is the universal’:
“in the proposition  ‘God is being', the  Predicate is  ‘being';  it has the significance 
o f something substantial  in which the Subject  is dissolved.  "Being' is here meant 
to be not a Predicate, but rather the essence;  it seems, consequently, that God 
ceases to be what he  is from  his position  in the proposition, viz. a fixed Subject.
Here thinking,  instead o f making progress  in the transition from  Subject to 
Predicate, in reality  feels itself checked by the loss o f the Subject, and, missing it, 
is thrown back on to the thought o f the Subject. Or, since the Predicate itself has 
been expressed as a Subject, as the being or essence which exhausts the nature of 
the Subject, thinking finds the Subject  immediately in the  Predicate  ...  it is still 
absorbed  in the content, or at  least  is faced with the demand that  it should be.
Similarly, too, when one says:  ‘the actual is the universal', the actual  as subject 
disappears  in  its predicate. The  universal  is not meant to have merely the 
significance o f a predicate, as if the proposition asserted only that the actual  is 
universal; on the contrary, the universal  is meant to express the essence o f the 
actual" (PS 62, pp.38-9)
Such propositions thus indicate what is involved in Hegel’s revision of the general 
form of  judgement. Here the conditions of the subject acting as standard or criterion
154for the predicate, i.e. its fixity, isolation and affirmative nature, are dissolved, they 
will not apply. Instead the subject is devoid of pre-determined, fixed content: it is an 
approximation or empty name1 4 8 , the essential content of which is to come from its 
series of predicates.
There are a number of important implications that follow from this revision:
First, the content now expressed by the predicate is an essential, inner 
determination of a singular encompassing subject or totality. In the general form of 
judgement, exemplified by ‘S is P \ we have the usual Aristotelian candidates of 
substance and attribute/accident in the respective positions of‘S’ and ‘P’, while ‘is’ 
expresses a relation that holds between the judgement terms. In the speculative 
revision ‘S’ is the empty name of the singular subject as a totality, and so ‘P’ 
expresses not an accidental property of ‘S’ that may belong to many different subjects, 
but rather an essential determination of the one subject. Accordingly, a speculative 
proposition aims at capturing an inner relation of necessity and it is in this sense that 
such propositions aim at bringing out the ‘inner import’ of what is perceived. To 
achieve this the starting point of a philosophical proof must be something immediate, 
something which does not have its ground outside of itself -  an absolute or primitive, 
and such a starting point is just what we find in Hegel's system in the form of 
immediate consciousness in the Phenomenology and pure, indeterminate being in the 
Logic.
Second, this speculative revision affords a doubling of the direction in which 
the judgement is to be read. With the previous general form the judgement reads one 
way only: ‘S is P \ For example, where we have ‘rose’ as subject and ‘red’ as 
predicate, we have the judgement ‘the rose is red’, and not ‘the red is rose’. This is 
due to the relation of the subject as substance which supports its accidents, to the 
predicate, which as accident subsists on that basis. The relation here is fixed, the 
predicate as accident cannot support the subject as substance: we cannot read ‘P is S’ 
or ‘the red is rose’. In speculative thought ‘P’ is no longer an accidental property of
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As opposed to a proper name such as kGod’, into which tradition has loaded a large pre-determined 
and fixed content. The speculative proposition then can be viewed as a tool by which this content is 
dissolved, leaving us with a hypothetical element for subject: an empty name. That is, it compels us to 
reconsider it (the proposition) and understand  it in some other way. At the same time, however,  it 
cannot be a proper expression of philosophical truth, as it employs a propsitional form, one which, even 
though it expresses a relation of identity, nevertheless distinguishes the elements related. As such it 
seems that a truly speculative content cannot be captured by the usual propositional form, implying it 
cannot be formalised into a traditional  logic.
155‘S’ and there is a reversal of the direction in which ‘S is P’ can be read: we can also 
read ‘P is S’. Does this mean that Hegel would countenance ‘the red is rose’? The 
answer is, I think, ‘certainly not’, but to understand why we need to understand the 
level at which speculative thought and its development occurs. It should already be 
plain that such thought deals with a subject matter that is taken to lie below the level 
of empirical perception or representation, not in the sense of a substance, but in the 
sense of being internal to it, its essence -  it is to bring out the ‘inner import’ of what is 
perceived. A judgement such as ‘the rose is red’ is made at this empirical level, and a 
speculative proposition, along with the double direction involved in it, lies below this 
level, forming its essential content. The Hegelian revision of the general form of such 
judgement comes through the Kantian realisation of the knowing ‘I’ as constitutive of 
objectivity, in which the categories are reinstated as the essential determinations of 
empirical things. The essence or ‘inner import’ of an empirical judgement, or one 
based in representation, is then to be expressed at a categorial level and this is the 
level at which speculative thought operates. The content or inner relations of necessity 
that develop in speculative thinking and are captured in speculative propositions are 
categorial. Accordingly the double direction of the speculative judgement will not 
hold at the level of a judgement such as ‘the rose is red’. This cannot equally be read 
as ‘the red is rose’ as ‘the rose’ here is the substance that supports the accident ‘red’. 
The reversal can only occur when the form of such a judgement is dissolved or passed 
through (in the collapse of subject and predicate into one another), but then we no 
longer stand at the level in which subject and predicate are related externally as fixed 
subject and accidental property.
Third, this dissolution of the general form of  judgement transforms the 
previous process of predication from one in which the essential content was given and 
taken to act as a standard for deciding the truth of that predicated of it, to a process in 
which, that which is predicated is constitutive of the essential content of the subject. 
That is to say, that content which was previously taken as given in the process of 
predication is now produced by it. By ridding the proof of any reliance on 
presupposition, it transforms the previous methods of proof into a fluid development 
in which what is true and what is produced or constituted in the development are 
interchangeable1 4 9 . Predicate and subject have here collapsed into one another, and
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In this light it should be clear that Hegel’s claim that philosophical thought can and does go beyond 
the general form of  judgement is essentially a claim to the effect that genuine philosophical thought
156there is no longer a relation of dependence between them, instead we find an 
equivalence.
Fourth, here we have the process of the subject determining itself, not a re­
presentation of it -  external and abstracted from it -  but instead the actual 
determination as it occurs in that subject. In reference to Hegel’s conception of truth 
as material truth, mentioned earlier, we can see that here, insofar as the content of the 
subject is self-determining and not imposed on the subject externally, we have a 
materially true content, and the question, as far as proof is concerned, is no longer 
whether the coherence of determinations in a judgement matches a presupposed or 
given content, but whether the predication constitutes the complete determination of 
the subject -  the totality of the judgement (LPGE p.257). To put it in the terms of 
Hegel’s discussion of the form of proof, it is as if we have the process the triangle 
followed in determining itself rather than the auxiliary lines that we draw in an 
attempting a demonstration of it. Here, then, there is no separation to be made 
between form and content, we cannot abstract the former from the latter. The content 
that develops is always that of the one subject and the subject is that content. In this 
sense a formalisation of this process would lose or abstract from its essential 
character.
Now, Hegel faces a Gordian knot of sorts in aiming to demonstrate the development 
of this content, as he observes:
“(T)he sublation o f the form o f the proposition must not happen only in an 
immediate manner, through the mere content o f the proposition. On the contrary, 
this opposite movement must find explicit expression  ...  this return o f the Notion 
into itself must be set forth. This movement which constitutes what formerly the 
proof was supposed to accomplish,  is the dialectical  movement o f the proposition 
itself. This alone is the speculative in act, and only the expression o f this 
movement  is a speculative exposition  ...  The proposition should express what the 
True is; but essentially the True is Subject. As such  it is merely the dialectical 
movement, this course that generates itself, going forth from, and returning to, 
itself.  In non-speculative cognition proof constitutes this side o f expressed
realises intellectual intuition as a species of conception. Here the distinction between knowing and 
creating disappears -  the process of self-knowledge of the subject is a process of self-constitution. This 
is not, for Hegel, some privileged form of mental experience, but it is open to any rational individual 
with discursive capacities.
157inwardness. But once the dialectic has been separated from proof, the notion o f 
philosophical demonstration has been lost.
Here we should bear in mind that the dialectical movement likewise has 
propositions for its parts or elements; the difficulty just indicated seems, 
therefore, to recur perpetually, and to be inherent in the very nature o f 
philosophical exposition. This is like what happens in ordinary proof, where the 
reasons given are themselves in need o f further reasons, and so on ad infinitum.
This pattern o f giving reasons and stating conditions belongs to that method o f 
proof which differs from the dialectical  movement, and belongs therefore to 
external cognition. As regards the dialectical  movement itself,  its element is the 
one Notion; it thus has a content which is,  in  its own self, Subject through and 
through. Thus no content occurs which functions as an underlying subject, nor 
receives its meaning as a predicate; the proposition as it stands is merely an 
empty  form.” (PS 65/66, pp.39-40)
A presentation of the development of the content which constitutes philosophical truth 
will involve the use predicative language. Indeed, although the propositional form, 
that relates a fixed predicate to a pre-determined given subject, is deemed an ‘empty 
form’ due to its incapacity to display or contain true philosophical content, it is 
nevertheless this form that must be passed through or sublated in order to apprehend 
the true content (the sublation of this form being part of that content). Such a form 
cannot simply be done away with, but must come to be understood differently:
“the habit o f expressing the speculative predicate in the form o f a proposition, 
and not as Notion and essence, creates a difficulty that can be increased or 
diminished through the very  way  in which philosophy is expounded.  In keeping 
with our insight  into the nature o f speculation, the exposition should preserve the 
dialectical  form, and should admit nothing except  in so far as it is comprehended 
[in terms o f the Notion], and  is the Notion.” (PS 66, p.41)
A new type of philosophical exposition is required to display the content, one which 
teaches the reader to treat subject/predicate sentences speculatively, that is, not to treat 
the predicate and subject as related according to the usual propositional form, but 
instead to treat them as ‘essence’ and ‘Notion’ respectively, in a dialectical process.
In summary, we can see that philosophical proof cannot, for Hegel, consist in 
a straightforward affirmative movement from a pre-determined, isolated individual as
158starting point, to some other thing as if it were equally a self-standing individual. This 
is the error of  all other forms of proof. Rather, philosophical proof depends on 
grasping the identity of the initial, purely approximate, subject determination and its 
further determination in the predicate through a suspension of presuppositions. As we 
have seen, the movement is then one from an initial subject to an increasingly 
detailed, concrete determination of that same subject.  Hence, proof as a 
demonstration of this identity, must bring forth the identity in the initial 
straightforward affirmative movement. It must display the affirmative movement in 
which the subject is treated as given, as a dialectical movement in which the logical 
determination of the subject turns into that of the predicate. In other words, a function 
of such a proof is to teach us to read speculative propositions and the dialectical 
movement involved in them (PS 61  &  65, pp.38/39) in judgment. It is such movement 
itself which, for Hegel, “ constitutes what formerly the proof was supposed to 
accomplish” and which “ alone is the speculative in act” (PS 65. p.39).
As far as the traditional proofs of the existence of God are concerned then, we 
can see that their error consists in being straightforward affirmative movements from 
presupposed starting points, and therefore they show only an external coherence of 
their terms. While the ontological proof attempted to show internal coherence, it too 
fundamentally relied upon presupposition.
The success of Hegel's own re-working of proof through the revision of 
judgement then, can be seen to rest on the suspension of the presupposition of any 
standard for the truth of  judgement. This does not mean that we must reject any such 
presupposition from the outset, but that we should suspend or withhold assent to any 
such given presupposition. It is only in doing so that we can adopt a meta-level role of 
impartial phenomenological observers, watching to see what occurs in to a given 
presupposition in the experience of a form of consciousness. As Hegel urges: “we do 
not need to import criteria, or to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts 
during the course of the inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these aside that we 
succeed in contemplating the matter at hand as it is in and for itself (PS 84, p.54).
Whether or not it is possible to withhold any such assent in this manner is a 
question for every individual reader of Hegel, though I confess, I do not see that it is 
impossible to do so. Either way, it is an earnest request to attempt to do so, and one 
that should be taken seriously in reading Hegel. In withholding in this manner, the 
only questions for the success of Hegel's presentation centre on whether the reader is
159in accord with the presentation: ’does such withholding leave one initially with pure, 
indeterminate immediacy?', 'does one's experience of this immediacy match the 
description of sense-certainty?', etc., and such questions should be asked at every 
stage of following Hegel though his  system. If no discord is found, then Hegel's 
presentation will be successful.
4.  Expectations Fulfilled?
From the implications outlined above and our general account in this chapter, we can 
derive a number of expectations which Hegel’s putative demonstration of the two 
ways admissible for the unity of thought and being in the Phenomenology is to meet. 
We w ill recall that the strategy in this chapter has been to consider Hegel’s assessment 
of. and reaction to, the Kantian critique of the proofs of God’s existence, in order to 
derive such expectations, and we have seen in the process that Hegel’s primary 
concern with this critique (and indeed, philosophical positions that act as forerunners 
to it) is its failure to sufficiently investigate its grounds. The Kantian critique, for 
Hegel, attacks the 'elevation of thinking' that leads consciousness from the ‘empirical’ 
to the ‘transcendental path’ (and by which it affirms the proofs of God’s existence). 
The empirical path is taken to ultimately rest on the transcendental one, that is, the 
physico-theological proof rests on the cosmological proof, which in turn rests on the 
ontological proof. The attack itself is made on the basis of the principles of the 
Understanding, which themselves are derived from an insufficiently critical 
acceptance of the general form of  judgement. How such an insufficiently critical 
acceptance affects the possibility of providing a philosophical proof or demonstration, 
and the kind of distortion incurred by positions guilty of such acceptance, was 
explicated through Hegel’s own discussion of proof and of the relation of metaphysics, 
empiricism, and Critical philosophy. We saw that the conditions involved in such 
acceptance and responsible for the distortion, along with the failure to see a way to 
providing a proof, viz. the fixity and affirmative nature of the subject as standard, lead 
to a collapse in the usual subject/predicate relation and to a revision of that relation.
160Given the details of the general account in this chapter then, we might reasonably 
expect Hegel’s putative demonstration to meet the following expectations1 5 0 .
First, given the earlier supposition of a correspondence between Kant’s two 
paths (the empirical and the transcendental) and Hegel’s two ways, we would expect 
(as mentioned earlier) that a presentation of admissibility of the two methods in the 
Phenomenology would begin from the empirical path. It is on this path that the starting 
points of the physico-theological proof: “the  experience of the things of the present 
world, and the constitution and order of these” (CPR A620/B648), and that of the 
cosmological proof: “ experience which is purely indeterminate ... experience of 
existence in general” could be located.
Second, given Hegel’s view of  judgement as involving a process of separation 
or division -  as an Ur-teilung -  that leads to its revision, which reveals judgement as 
productive of the inner content of things, i.e. of their true being, we would expect the 
presentation of the Phenomenology to display a method which involves the kind of 
separation found in judgement.
This must be presented in such a way that, we as readers, can be made aware of 
the distortion inherent in an insufficiently critical acceptance of the general form of 
judgement. In the previous discussion of the general form of  judgement this was 
achieved through the collapse of that form. A standard for the subject that was 
presumed to be external to thought, was shown to be dependent on a distorted view of 
a fundamental separation between thought and being, which itself stemmed from an 
insufficiently critical acceptance of the form of  judgement as the form of truth. Even 
the Kantian, who grasped that the standard for the subject is constituted in thought, 
maintained this separation of thought and being, taking any such standard as merely 
subjective.
So. this second expectation is really two expectations: first, we would expect to 
see the same kind of difficulties that the acceptance of the form of  judgement as the 
form of truth engenders in metaphysics and empiricism, that Critical philosophy fails 
to overcome, and that leads to the speculative revision of  judgement, and second, we 
would expect that revision to come through a collapse in the usual subject/predicate
150 Naturally, what follows is not a definitive list giving expectations that any putative demonstration of 
the admissibility of methods for the unity of thought and being would have to meet in order to be 
successful. As stated in the introduction, I am not concerned with the success or failure of Hegel’s 
project, but rather with a certain way in which his thought concerning scepticism and Critical 
philosophy may help us to understand the opening transitions of the Phenomenology.
161relationship. That is, we would expect to witness a collapse of the fixity and 
affirmative nature of the subject as standard for the truth of  judgement.
Third, we would then expect this acceptance of the form of  judgement as the 
form of truth to be involved in the starting point of the empirical path. But this starting 
point is not to serve as the ground of Hegel’s proof -  it is not be taken as an 
affirmative starting point. If it is taken as such, then the result, viz. the unity of thought 
and being, would be taken to depend upon this false or distorted view of  judgement. 
This is something that we saw Hegel explicitly warn against earlier, in his discussion 
of proof51. Rather, the starting point in the process of proof is negated, it is shown to 
be a nullity, and what appears to be the result is shown to be the ground1 5 2 . It is this 
process that Hegel refers to in the Encyclopaedia Logic when he claims:
“The metaphysical  proofs that God is there are deficient explanations and 
descriptions o f the elevation o f the spirit from  world to God, because they do not 
express, or rather they do not bring out. the moment of negation that is contained 
in this elevation -  for the very fact that the world is contingent implies that it is 
something incidental, phenomenal,  in and  for itself null and void ...  It  is only the 
nullity o f the being o f the world that  is the bond o f the elevation; so that what
151  "In this procedure of subjective necessity we start from certain  initial definitions that are already familiar to us. 
There are assumptions or initial conditions, for example that the triangle or the right angle is given. Definite 
[logical] connections are presupposed, and we then show in proofs of this kind that if there is one determination 
then the other is. too. That  is. w e make the result dependent on given specifications already  present.  What we arrive 
at is represented as something dependent upon assumptions.  In the application of this model  [VorsteUung] o f 
demonstration to the formulation  [ I orstellung] o f proofs o f God's existence, w hat appears at once is the 
inappropriateness of w ishing to exhibit a coherence of this kind in the case of God. This appears particularly in the 
first procedure, which we called the elevation o f the finite to God. so that (if we embrace the process within the 
form o f the proof) we have a relationship in w hich the finite is the foundation from which the being o f God is 
demonstrated.  In this [logical] nexus the being o f God appears as a consequence, as dependent upon the being o f 
the finite.  This is the distortion, that this progression that we call “proving" is unsuited to what we represent to 
ourselves under [the name] "God" -  for God is. of course, precisely the non-derivative, he is utterly actual being in 
and for its e lf (L P R  4 1 7 -4 1 9 ).
Hegel also reiterates the point at EL §50, p.96, by pointing out (in specific reference to Jacobi) 
that the manner in which the  ‘elevation’ of thinking above the sensible i.e.. the passage from the finite to 
infinite, conditioned to unconditioned, takes place, corrects the semblance that this elevation  is 
grounded  in the finite or conditioned.
1 5 ^
"   In the  1821  Lectures On  The Philosophy O f Religion,  Hegel describes, metaphorically, this feature of 
the usurping of the starting point as ground by that which seemed to result from  it, by characterising the 
progression from the starting point to the result as being like “a stream flowing in opposite directions”. 
This bears comparison to Plato’s characterisation of dialectic at Republic 511  b-c (see Plato  1993):
"When it takes things for granted,  it doesn’t treat them as starting-points, but as basic in the strict sense -  
as platforms and rungs, for example. These serve  it until  it reaches a point where nothing needs to be taken for 
granted, and which is the starting-point for everything. Once it has grasped this starting-point,  it turns around and 
by a process of depending on the things which depend from the starting-point it descends to an end-point".
In terms of  judgement, this brings out the importance of the collapse of the fixity and 
affirmative nature of the subject-term, its status as hypothetical. It is this collapse which allows us to see 
that the fixity and affirmative nature of this term was simply being assumed.
162does mediate vanishes, and in this mediation, the mediation is itself sublated”
(EL §50, p.96).
So, insofar as we would expect the acceptance of the form of  judgement as the form of 
truth to be involved in the starting point of the empirical path, we would expect that 
such acceptance w ill be shown not to be the true ground of the proof, and that this will 
involve the highlighting of the negating moment -  the moment of the collapse of the 
usual subject/predicate relation in judgement.
It is this moment of collapse that provides the link between Hegel’s two ways. 
What was taken to be the starting point in the first way -  being -  appears, through the 
collapse, to be the abstraction of thinking. However, ‘we’ see that the movement from 
being to abstraction, the movement of the collapse, is productive of the essential 
content of actual being, that is, the movement of one way (being to abstraction of 
thinking) is shown, actually, to be the movement of the other (abstraction of thinking 
to being). It was claimed in the first chapter, that this connection of the ways is 
demonstrated through the transition of A. into B. Therefore, our fourth expectation 
would be to locate the moment of collapse in this transition1 5 3 .
Insofar as the fulfilment of these expectations would indicate the collapse and 
revision of the general form of  judgement we have previously discussed, then it would 
also involve the implications of that collapse and revision discerned there. So, are 
these expectations met in the transitions from A. to C.(AA.) outlined in the first 
chapter, and if so how?
A cursory look back to the details outlined in the first chapter should be 
sufficient to establish that these expectations are met and to show in what way they are 
met. We can take each expectation in turn.
First, it appears that the Phenomenology’ s putative presentation does begin on 
the empirical path. In A. we begin with sense-experience, and more specifically, with 
immediate knowledge of the empirical. Throughout A. consciousness is concerned 
only with its experience of the empirical world, even in ‘Force & the Understanding’ 
where the supersensible world comes into view, it does so only as the inner truth of the 
empirical world. Consciousness is not yet here concerned with anything other than the
153 Given the connection between  Hegel’s two ways, we can see that they are. at least structurally, 
linked to Kant’s two paths. For Kant, the proofs to be found on the empirical path -  the physico- 
theological and cosmological proofs, while being taken to be independent from the transcendental path 
and  its ontological proof, are in fact shown to be dependent on the ontological proof. Obviously, for 
Hegel, there is a somewhat similar relation.
163empirical world, its presence, order and constitution, and furthermore the inner truth of 
this world, its being as a whole or in general, turns out for consciousness to be purely 
indeterminate. By B., insofar as ‘we’ have, in principle, grasped the Absolute Notion, 
‘we’ start from the ideal of Reason, though not as a mere ideal or as an abstraction of 
thinking, but as actual, and insofar as consciousness has not grasped this, but instead is 
faced with an indeterminate, unknowable beyond, opposed to itself, the ideal appears 
as a mere ideal or abstraction of thinking.
Second, it seems that the presentation in the Phenomenology involves the same 
kind of difficulties involved in metaphysics and empiricism that Critical philosophy 
fails to sufficiently overcome, which lead to a collapse of the fixity and affirmative 
nature of the subject in judgement as the standard of truth. If we recall the dialectic of 
Sense-certainty and Perception we w ill see that the difficulties encountered there are 
of the same nature as those involved in metaphysics and empiricism. The difficulties 
stem from the conviction that there is a perfect fit between cognition and truth, that the 
latter is given directly or immediately in the former, or put another way. that both the 
form and content of truth match the form and content of cognition.
In Sense-certainty we begin with a form of consciousness that 
straightforwardly accepts immediate determinations as given, to be true. That is, like 
metaphysics. Sense-certainty involves the belief or conviction that truth is simply 
cognised and Hegel confirms as much when he says in his discussion of metaphysics 
that “A ll philosophy in its beginnings, all of the sciences, even the daily doing and 
dealing of consciousness, lives in this belief’ (EL §26, p.65). Now. in Sense-certainty 
this cognising is like its object, immediate: “here neither 1  nor the thing has the 
significance of a complex process of mediation; the ‘I’ does not have the significance 
of a manifold imagining or thinking; nor does the ‘thing’ signify something that has a 
host of qualities” (PS 91, p.58). There is simply “ an immediate pure connection”
(Ibid.) between subject and object. At least, that is how Sense-certainty is meant to be, 
but when we look at an actual instance of it we find that the object given represents the 
truth and the cognising or knowing an unessential element. The cognising is mediate, 
it comes only through the object, which is the truth. Here we see straightaway the 
division involved in judgement: in judgement one element, the subject, represents the 
concrete content and truth, whereas another element, that which is predicated of the 
subject, that which putatively informs of the subject, is an accident of the subject, 
unessential to it. Correspondingly, in Sense-certainty the object is the truth and the
164subject, ‘I’, is unessential. But then the object seems not to be what Sense-certainty 
proclaims it to be, the sheer being of the thing, the immediate essence or the ‘This’, 
seems instead to be a universal which abides irrespective of its varied and fluctuating 
content. That is, just as the subject in judgement, in its separation from the content 
described by the predicate applied to it, is something over against this content -  that in 
which the content inheres, or its essence -  so too the object of Sense-certainty is 
something over against the immediate content it is taken to be by consciousness. As 
we saw, consciousness as Sense-certainty tries various strategies to hold onto its object 
as a unique, immediate essence, but ultimately comes to accept it as the universal, and 
in doing so becomes Perception.
As Perception the universal is apprehended by consciousness as a number of 
properties belonging to the thing. In merely apprehending there is no strict opposition 
between cognition and truth here. Perception, at its outset, simply cognises the truth. 
This truth though seems to involve conflicting elements, it is at once an abstract 
universal medium of indifferent properties -  an Also, and an exclusive One. 
Perception, as it initially apprehends its object, apprehends it “purely as a One’ (PS 
117, p.70), but it also perceives in the object “a property which is universal, and which 
thereby transcends the singularity [of the object]” (Ibid.), and accordingly accepts the 
object as a community, as an Also. But the properties which provide the object with 
determination must be exclusive or independent in order to do so, and so the object as 
an Also, as the abstract medium of those properties, cannot be indifferent but must be, 
in truth, exclusive like the properties, i.e. a One. It is at once an abstract medium and 
an exclusive unity. These conflicting characterisations of the object capture just the 
kind of conflict that we saw develop in empiricism as it attempted to provide a 
concrete content by restricting the truth to what is sensuously present in perception. 
There, we saw that in the analysis of the object empiricism separates out the 
determinate, concrete properties of the object, rendering them abstract universals and 
thus loses the object as a concrete unity -  rendering the unity an abstract universal like 
the properties. Again, in this conflict, we saw simply what was involved in the general 
form judgement. In judgement while the predicate is something separated and 
independent from the subject which is its ground or essence, and thus is something 
secondary or unessential, it is the predicate which characterises or determines the 
subject, and we identify the subject with the predicate applied to it.
165In Perception, we also see that the conflicting characterisations give rise to a 
questioning of or doubt regarding the conviction from which they stem. In attempting 
to resolve the conflict of these characterisations Perception resorts to the expedient of 
taking responsibility for whichever characterisation is deceptive, which is to say it 
begins to relinquish the conviction that it merely cognises the truth and begins to grasp 
that it actively takes things to be a certain way. It only begins to do so however, at this 
point, because the standard for truth is still sensuous and external. All it needs to do 
now, to reach the truth, is to remove whatever it contributes to the appearance of the 
truth through its taking. Naturally, this proves to be easier said than done.
We see consciousness develop on from here into ‘Force & the Understanding’ 
in which the truth of the object of Sense-certainty and Perception is grasped not as 
sensuous but notional, as a supersensible realm of laws. In other words, we see the 
elevation of the sensuous content, “the content that belongs to perception, feeling and 
intuition into the form of universal notions, principles, and laws etc.” (EL §38, p.77) 
that occurs in empiricism. Similarly to empiricism, “these universal determinations 
(for instance “ force” ) are not supposed to have any more significance and validity on 
their own account than that which is taken from perception, and no justification save 
the connection that can be demonstrated in experience” (Ibid.). Rather, they are at once 
“ beyond the perceived world” and “equally present in it ... its direct tranquil image” 
(PS  149, pp.90-1). We watch more difficulties develop for consciousness as the 
perceived world retains for itself an aspect independent of the notions. Again these 
difficulties mirror those found in the development of empiricism into a kind of 
modern, Humean scepticism, where it is realised that the determinations of 
universality and necessity lack justification on the basis of perception. Though these 
determinations are arrived at through the analysis of the perceived world and 
putatively represent its truth, they seem indifferent to their actual expression in the 
perceived world, it seems that such determinations are not found present in the 
perceived world. As a result the inner world and perceived world seem separate from 
and opposed to one another. Here once more we see the separation involved in the 
general form of  judgement. The subject as the concrete content, even though it is 
characterised by the predicate through its identification with it, is diverse from this 
predicate, which is abstract and not the entirety of the subject’s content.
Now, these difficulties lead consciousness to accept responsibility for the 
opposition of these elements. The truth itself is taken to lie beyond this opposition, and
166is unknowable. In terms of the general form of  judgement then the subject here can no 
longer represent a standard of truth, and therefore a predicate applied to it cannot 
characterise an aspect of the truth, rather the truth in its actual content lies beyond the 
general form judgement in an object fundamentally diverse from it, and judgement is 
taken to be purely formal. In accepting responsibility for the opposition of the 
elements, consciousness accepts responsibility for making distinctions which are not 
real distinctions but purely formal ones, and as such the truth is not to be found in such 
distinctions but beyond them, over against them. However, as Hegel points out, this 
distinguishing of the true content as standard over against the merely formal one of 
consciousness, is itself  just a distinction of consciousness, i.e. a formal distinction that 
is not real. Consequently, this distinction is collapsed and consciousness’s previous 
truth -  the supersensible world -  is inverted, collapsing into its opposite -  the sensuous 
world.
In witnessing this inversion or collapse we were to learn that the error of 
consciousness throughout its foregoing difficulties was that o f‘fixing the differences 
in a different sustaining element’, i.e. of placing the truth over here (whether as the 
sheer being of Sense-certainty, the concrete thing of Perception or the supersensible 
world of the Understanding) and that which seems different from it (the constant 
passing of the mere being into non-being, the contradictory appearance of the thing, 
and the absolute flux or movement of the sensuous world of appearance) over there, in 
a different sustaining element, as independent and opposed to the truth. What was not 
questioned by consciousness in this fixing was the content of what was taken to 
constitute the truth in the first place. Rather consciousness was simply certain of this 
content as truth and attempted to hold fast to it, so that whatever contradicted the 
content in experience must be diverse from it. We have seen that this feature is 
inherent in the general form of  judgement.
O f course, in grasping the error of consciousness and watching its progression 
through various different forms in A. we have seen that by holding fast to the 
presupposed content, by taking the subject in judgement to accurately represent the 
standard of truth, consciousness is, in effect, testing the adequacy of this content 
against its experience, and the content is altered to match the experience1 5 4 . However, 
in consistently attempting to hold fast to the content, fixing any differences from the
154  In this respect we saw the essential content pass from  immediacy to abstract universality, to 
internally differentiated universality etc.
167content which arise in experience in a different sustaining element, consciousness as 
Understanding finds itself left with the truth as a content it cannot know in its 
determination. That is, in holding to the general form of  judgement as the form of 
truth, consciousness finds itself faced with the truth as an unknowable content through 
its own experience. It has, so to speak, dissolved the content of its previous truths.
Now, insofar as our second expectation is met it is clear that from the outset of 
A. consciousness involves the acceptance, or we might say certainty, that the general 
form of  judgement is the form of truth. However, as the third expectation makes clear, 
this cannot act as an affirmative starting point, instead it is to be negated and what 
results from it is to be shown to be the ground or the truth of the certainty. This seems 
to occur in the transition from A. to B.
In this transition we have seen that with the determination of the truth as an 
independent, unknowable substrate, consciousness brings about the collapse of its 
standard of truth, that is, it brings about the collapse of the subject in judgement as the 
standard of truth. The subject in judgement was assumed to accurately capture or 
represent the external object which stood as the truth. With the determination of this 
object as an unknowable beyond this assumption is thrown into question, it seems that 
far from accurately representing this object the determinate content of the subject itself 
is constituted by the Understanding. That is to say, the certainty that the general form 
of  judgement is the form of truth is negated. However, as we have seen this is just as 
much the negation of the determination of the truth as an unknowable substrate 
because this determination is made on the basis that certainty -  the subject accurately 
represents the object. The truth is neither a content independent from consciousness 
nor is it an unknowable content, and its determination as such is an abstraction of 
thinking based on an uncritical acceptance of the general form of  judgement as the 
form of truth.
The result of this negation is self-consciousness as the truth or essence of 
consciousness, and this is a new starting point. Naturally, this starting point, this self- 
consciousness, is at first completely abstract. After all, this truth at this stage is simply 
neither a content independent from consciousness nor unknowable, and its content is 
yet to be seen in its development. The development of its content, as we saw in the 
discussion of B., is given through its opposition to consciousness. This new truth, self- 
consciousness, as the negation of the previous truth, consciousness, results from that 
previous truth and so that truth is required for the demonstration of this new one.
168Hence Hegel’s description of immediate self-consciousness as containing 
consciousness as a distinct moment within itself, or his description of it as Desire. As 
we saw, insofar as consciousness is contained in self-consciousness it can be said that 
self-consciousness produces the object of its desire, the truth to be negated, by which 
self-consciousness is self-consciousness. It is through this process of production and 
negation that we come to see what self-consciousness involves or consists in, and 
come to see that the object produced, far from being indistinguishable from or 
completely reducible to this self-consciousness, is rather independent from it, another 
independent self-consciousness.
So, both the third and also the fourth expectation we had are met: the moment 
of the collapse of the previous truth comes in the transition from A. to B., and this 
collapse provides the connection between the movement from being to the abstraction 
of thinking and from the abstraction back to being. The connection between the 
movements is given in the fact that the first movement is an essential feature of the 
second, that through which the second movement is made.
It seems then that the expectations derived from our account in this chapter, 
that the presentation of the opening transitions of the Phenomenology was to meet if 
our general hypothesis was to be confirmed, are in fact met in that presentation. That 
is, our general hypothesis appears to be confirmed.
169Conclusion
Now that we have seen that the expectations derived in chapter three are met by 
Hegel’s presentation in the opening transitions of the Phenomenology it remains for 
me to, first, briefly review what I take to be the results of the foregoing, and second, 
say a few words concerning the implications of this for the way in which I view the 
relation of the Phenomenology to the Logic and Hegel’s idealism in general.
I have tried to show in the foregoing that the hypothesis that the opening 
transitions of the Phenomenology involves an, in principle, demonstration of the 
admissibility of two ways for the unification of being and thought is neither without 
merit as an interpretive hypothesis, nor lacking textual support. Support has been 
found straightforwardly in our reading of these opening transitions and through the 
connections displayed in the reading with other texts, whereas its merit derives from 
the interconnectedness of the texts insofar as they are in agreement on the general 
matter of what is required for a genuine philosophical proof, and what constitutes the 
error of previous forms of philosophy such as metaphysics, empiricism and Critical 
philosophy.
This error was identified as an insufficiently questioned acceptance of or 
insufficiently critical reliance on the general form of  judgement as the form of truth. 
The problem here was not so much with any contention that judgement is able to 
reach truth, as with a perceived failure to appropriately investigate the nature and 
functioning of  judgement in relation to truth. As we saw, Hegel questions the 
traditional construal of  judgement, reconceiving it as a process which far from relying 
on an external content for its standard, or the subjective content found in Critical 
philosophy, actively produces its own content in a process of self-determination. This 
reconceived process fulfilled Hegel’s criteria for a genuine philosophical proof. That 
is. it consisted in the presentation of the intrinsic coherence or internal necessary 
connections of determinations of content with one another. It shows the internal 
determination of the matter itself to be proved and not simply our subjective 
representation of that determination, and begins from a starting point emptied of 
assumed, pre-determined content which was to be held fixed as a standard of truth. It 
is the internal self-generative process of a single, absolute subject.
170We saw that much of the motivation for this analysis and reconception of 
judgement stems from Hegel’s early work on scepticism and its influence on his 
reading of Critical philosophy as well as metaphysics and empiricism. O f course, the 
reconceived process of  judgement is itself implicit in the movement through the 
various forms of consicousness presented in the Phenomenology, and as the essence 
of both thought and being this self-generative process is that in which the distinction 
of thought and being is dissolved. In arguing that the opening sections of the 
Phenomenology trace a path from being to the abstraction of thinking and from this 
point back again, in which the opposition of being and thought, in principle, can be 
seen to have been dissolved, I have of course been suggesting that the 
Phenomenology provides a demonstration of this implicit self-generative process and 
a means by which it can be comprehended.
Though I have not given space to a detailed discussion of the relation of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology to the Encyclopaedia Logic and, indeed, the rest of his 
system, it should be plain that I see the Phenomenology as representing an 
introduction to that system insofar as it is to show that the certainties and convictions 
of the consciousness observed there actually lead it to the realisation that being is not 
something objective standing over against thought, but rather that the two are 
essentially the same self-generative process. As Hegel notes:
“the individual  has the right to demand that Science should at least provide 
him  with a ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within 
himself.  His right  is based on his absolute independence, which he is 
conscious o f possessing in every phase o f his knowledge; for in each one, 
whether recognised by Science or not, and whatever the content may be, the 
individual  is the absolute form.  i.e. he  is the immediate certainty o f himself 
and,  if this expression be preferred, he is therefore unconditioned being. The 
standpoint o f consciousness which knows objects  in their antithesis to itself, 
and  itself in antithesis to them,  is for Science the antithesis o f its own 
standpoint" (PS 26, pp. 14-15)
The Phenomenology is just such a ladder by which natural consciousness up-ends 
itself, attaining the standpoint of Science in which thought and being are understood 
to be essentially the same. In its introductory capacity, then, the Phenomenology does 
not provide us with a presentation of the self-generating essence in its pure
171determinations; this is the task of the Logic. Rather we see this essence implicit in 
various forms of consciousness and come to the realisation (as does the consciousness 
observed) that being is not to be regarded as the distinct, fundamentally separate 
object of consciousness, opposed to thought, but that both thought and being are, in 
essence, the same.
As such a ladder for natural consciousness, the Phenomenology may be 
viewed as not being the sole possible path to the Logic'--. One example of another 
path may be a review of the history of modem philosophy like that of metaphysic, 
empiricism, and Critical philosophy etc. found at the beginning of the Encyclopaedia 
Logic'-b , which may convince one to suspend or abandon the presuppositions one 
holds regarding the relation of thought to being. This is a plausible suggestion and we 
have seen that much of the content of HegeTs review is also involved in the 
presentation of the Phenomenology. However. I do not think that this should be taken 
as a suggestion that the presentation in the Phenomenology is essentially redundant or 
replaceable by some other presentation. The comments regarding the various 
philosophical positions made in the Encyclopaedia Logic are direct and concise, and 
certainly may appear disagreeable to the founders and followers of the positions 
concerned. While they may constitute a path of sorts to the Logic they do not 
constitute a demonstration that such positions immanently lead to the speculative 
standpoint, rather they seem to highlight common shortcomings dissolved in such a 
standpoint. As such, they are, perhaps, intended to be supplemental to the kind of path 
traced in the Phenomenology, a reminder of the unwarranted claims or 
presuppositions of modem philosophy.
Now, if the Phenomenology is at least, in part, to fulfil the task I have imputed 
to it. then a question arises concerning the relation of the opening transitions to the 
rest of the more overtly historical dialectic in the Phenomenology. In light of the 
putative demonstrations of A. and B. and evidence which suggests that Hegel himself 
had doubts concerning the coherence of this earlier material with the rest of the 
Phenomenology'-\ should this earlier material be treated as the rational core of the
155  For instance, see S. Houlgate 2006, pp. 144-8 and also pp.67-71.
156 This is one of the suggestions Houlgate makes.  Ibid.
157  For example, as R.  Pippin (1993) notes, the fact that Hegel’s own summary of the Phenomenology 
for his students at Numberg only included material up to the chapter on Reason, i.e. C.(AA.), has been 
taken by some interpreters as evidence that Hegel preferred a direct transition from this point to the 
Logic.  Pippin also noted that Otto Poggeler hypothesizes that in actually writing that chapter of the 
Phenomenology Hegel realised that he had effectively fulfilled his task of providing a science of the
172work, separable in some way from the whole? This is a question which cannot be 
answered solely on the basis of the research undertaken here. While my research does 
suggest a spilt of sorts, a close consideration of the rest of the material of the 
Phenomenology from C.(AA.) onwards would be required before we could affirm or 
deny this, and the issue of the precise relation of the presentations of A. and B. as I 
envisage them, to the rest of the Phenomenology must be left for another time.
Similarly, the wider issue of the general nature of Hegel’s idealism, of how we 
are to classify it as a philosophical position, is a topic for another occasion, though 
there is at least one observation concerning this issue in the foregoing worth bringing 
out here.
There is nothing in what has been said to suggest that Hegel simply follows Kant in 
his critical turn and that we should construe Hegel’s claims regarding the collapse of 
the distinction between thought and being in an anti-realist fashion. That is to say, 
there is nothing to suggest that such a collapse ought to be thought of in terms of the 
claim “that a Notionally conditional actuality is all that being could intelligibly be” 1 5 8 , 
instead of more straightforwardly in terms of a claim that being as it is, is no longer 
distinguishable from what we conceive it to be. We have seen Hegel’s criticism of 
pre-Kantian metaphysics and the role his reading of scepticism has in this, but we 
have also seen that, while he views Kant’s position as a great advance on this 
metaphysics and takes up the imperative to submit all unwarranted principles and 
fundamental assumptions to investigation, in part, from the Critical philosophy, he 
also charges this philosophy with committing essentially the same error as pre-Critical 
metaphysics. Taking his comments at face value then, it seems that the correction of 
this error allows us to see the Absolute itself in its self-determination.
If the role sketched for the Phenomenology is correct, then any sceptical 
worries concerning our view of the fundamental nature of reality seem to be dealt 
with as we progress: in viewing each form of consciousness, grounds for doubting 
that form’s conception of reality are articulated from within that form and not just 
abstractly raised, and these grounds are shown to be based on unquestioned 
presuppositions. The progression through the forms is shown to lead to a point at 
which no more doubts are encountered. If the sceptic then wishes to raise a doubt after 
this point (s)he would have to actually provide new grounds not encompassed by the
experience of consciousness.
1 5 8  Pippin  1989, p.98.
173progression in the Phenomenology, and failure to do so would render the doubt 
incoherent or idle. Again, there is nothing in what has been said to suggest that this 
relatively straightforward demonstration need be construed as a demonstration that 
any sceptical worries that attempt to exploit a division between thought and being are 
incoherent or senseless, because ‘a Notionally conditional actuality is all that being 
could intelligibly be’, rather than because they have been seen to based on 
unquestioned presuppositions and we are now in a position to see reality itself in its 
actual self-generative process.
O f course, I have not directly engaged with such a view in the foregoing and it 
cannot be ruled out without much further detailed investigation of the 
Phenomenology and Hegel’s system generally, but there seems to be little in what we 
have seen to suggest that this kind non-metaphysical view need be adopted, that we 
cannot simply accept Hegel’s statements concerning the self-generative essence as the 
fundamental nature of reality at face value.
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